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 It is generally agreed that executives would do a better job managing shareholder 
interests if their pay was linked more directly to the performance of their firms, relative to 
that at peer firms.  However, studies concerning the use of relative performance 
evaluation in executive compensation have found only weak evidence relating executive 
pay to peer-firm adjusted performance.  This study introduces a simple model that 
considers executive switching and replacement cost effects on the power of the incentives 
that a firm can employ.  The model predicts that firms with high replacement costs will 
find it difficult to pre-commit to a relative performance contract.  The empirical results 
are partially consistent with the model.  Firms from more homogeneous industries are 
more likely to pre-commit to a relative performance contract.  Furthermore, the weaker 
(stronger) performing, more homogeneous firms, which should have lower (higher) 
replacement costs are more (less) likely to pre-commit.  With respect to the degree of 
relative performance compensation paid after performance is realized, the evidence is 
mixed.  Both industry homogeneity and performance ranking have an impact on the 
 vii
degree to which relative performance evaluation is found.  Overall, the results suggest 
that the availability of an accurate signal concerning  relative performance, as well as the 
level of a firm’s executive replacement costs, have an impact on its willingness to utilize 
a relative performance compensation system. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
The advantages of basing an executive’s compensation on the firm’s peer adjusted 
performance are demonstrated in Holmstrom’s (1979, 1982) theoretical works.  Relative 
performance evaluation (RPE) should incorporate a more informative signal as well as 
insure the manager from industry trends that are beyond the manager’s control.  Research 
has yet to document widespread use of RPE in executive compensation or to provide a 
definitive explanation for its absence.   
This dissertation studies how a firm’s executive replacement costs affect its 
ability to utilize RPE incentives.  RPE has the well known positive effect of filtering out 
trends that are common to an industry, thereby better reflecting performance attributable 
to the efforts of a firm’s managers.  However, nonnegotiable contracts can lock the firm 
and the manager into a compensation outcome calculated by a formula such as RPE, 
leaving the firing and quitting decisions to be based on labor market conditions and 
replacements costs.  In the presence of a mid-contract signal providing an indication of 
final firm output, there is an increased likelihood that the manager will voluntary depart 
the firm due to a downward revision of expected wages.  This can precipitate the need for 
a wage revision.  Since the signal will be known to both parties, the power of the 
incentives, defined as the difference between the high and low wage that the manager can 
receive, offered by the firm will be decreasing in replacement costs.  Since RPE can be a 
high powered incentive, the likelihood of a firm pre-committing to RPE will be 
decreasing in replacement costs. 
I construct a single period binomial model where the manager has the option of 
providing a high or low effort and the firm may pay the manager a high or low wage that 
is dependent upon firm output.  The manager may leave the firm, subject to a switching 
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cost, if a better effort-compensation ratio is available outside of the firm.  The firm may 
fire the manager if it can find a cheaper source of labor, subject to replacement costs, 
outside of the firm.  The firm will also be subjected to replacement costs if the manager 
voluntarily departs.  The model finds that increased switching costs will either maintain 
or reduce the power of the incentives that the firm provides as long as the power of those 
incentives has not already been minimized.  The model also illustrates that the power of 
the incentives will be decreasing in the replacement costs and will collapse to zero with 
very large replacement costs.  Since RPE incentives will behave this way, they will be 
ruled out for firms with large replacement costs.  The firm will only revise wages when it 
is advantageous to do so, vis-à-vis incurring replacement costs for the new manager.  The 
model is therefore useful in predicting where a pre-commitment to relative performance 
evaluation in compensation will not occur.  That is, firms that face significant 
replacement costs will have limitations on their ability to utilize relative performance 
evaluation. 
I empirically test pre-commitment to RPE using a firm’s industry homogeneity 
and recent historical performance as a proxy for replacement costs.  The results suggest 
that firms in more homogeneous industries are more likely to pre-commit to RPE, but the 
better performing more homogeneous firms are less likely to pre-commit.  This is 
consistent with the model since better performing firms will likely have higher 
replacement costs than weaker performing firms. 
Traditional measurement of post-performance RPE will measure the pay-
performance result of firms that have pre-committed to RPE as well as firms that did not 
commit but still compensated in an RPE-consistent manner.  This study utilizes the 
informational difference between pre-commitment to RPE versus waiting for a firm’s 
post-performance results to incorporate RPE.  If firms utilize RPE based upon the quality 
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of the performance signal that they receive, then we would expect for industry 
homogeneity to be important to a firm pre-committing to RPE as well as the level of post-
performance RPE that is found.  When post-performance RPE is empirically tested, the 
results suggest that recent performance is a factor in most instances; however, 
homogeneity is a factor when performance is not related to RPE.  This is once again 
consistent with both replacement costs and the availability of a good industry-adjusted 
performance signal affecting RPE utilization. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows:  The next chapter 
reviews the relevant literature.  Chapter 3 presents a simple model that evaluates the 
effect of switching and replacement costs on the power of compensation incentives.  
Chapter 4 empirically analyzes the likelihood of a firm to pre-commit to an irrevocable 
form of relative performance evaluation.  Chapter 5 presents the empirical results 
concerning post-performance relative performance evaluation payouts and Chapter 6 
offers conclusions for the dissertation. 
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Chapter 2: Relevant Literature 
The principal-agent problem described in the moral hazard framework generally 
involves a risk-averse manager and a risk-neutral agent.   The firm requires the manager 
to expend a high level of costly effort that is not observable by the agent.  While 
complete risk-sharing cannot be attained, attempts to solve the problem have involved 
motivating the manager by both promising a share of the profits and by threatening to fire 
the manager. 
While the literature has not directly addressed the issue, managers have the ability 
to influence the optimal contract by threatening to quit the firm.  Likewise, the firm’s 
ability to fire the manager may also influence the optimal contract.  Together, these two 
influences should impact a firm’s ability to utilize high powered incentives such as a 
compensation contract based upon the firm’s performance relative to its industry peers.   
This chapter proceeds by briefly reviewing the pay for performance and relative 
performance evaluation literature that may help to understand the effects described 
above.  It then reviews the retention-related literature and the involuntary turnover 
literature in order to address a firm’s executive departure issues. 
Pay for Performance and Relative Performance Literature 
Fama (1980) suggests that the need for explicit incentive contracts is lessened by 
the fact that internal and external labor markets alleviate problems with the separation of 
ownership and control.  Since the labor market provides a full ex-post settling up, 
managers will be motivated by high wages and the prospect of higher future wages to 
expend high-level efforts.  Fama assumes that the manager has enough time remaining in 
a career to prevent making short-sighted decisions.  Holmstrom (1982) points out that for 
managers who are in the later stages of their careers, explicit contracts are needed 
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because there are fewer future-wage incentive periods remaining as motivation.  Hartzell 
(1998) shows that pay-for-performance sensitivity should be decreasing in the probability 
of firing while it should be increasing in the probability of retirement.   Therefore, firms 
should be cognizant of a manager’s career stage when designing performance incentives. 
In a test of learning versus incentives in managerial pay for performance, Murphy 
(1986) finds that the learning model is supported because the relation between pay and 
performance is stronger in a CEO’s initial years.  That is, revisions to CEO wages are 
greater in the early years when there is the most uncertainty concerning a manager’s 
abilities. 
Shavell (1979) shows that it is never Pareto Optimal for a risk-averse agent to 
bear all of the risks of production, whereas it is optimal for a risk-neutral agent.  To 
spread the risk associated with production, the principal will insure the agent in the form 
of a minimum level of wages.  Harris and Raviv (1979) find that the principal can realize 
some gains through monitoring the agent when providing this insurance, even when 
monitoring is imperfect and the risk-averse agent’s actions cannot be observed.  
Therefore, even an imperfect relative performance evaluation (RPE) signal may help to 
improve the principal-agent relationship.  Holmstrom (1979) also proves this and shows 
that to be optimal, a contract must incorporate the information contained in an 
informative signal.   Holmstrom (1982) justifies the RPE solution to the principal-agent 
problem, finding that the executive benefits if insured from risk beyond the executive’s 
control.  Thus, if the compensation mechanism ignores information that is unique to the 
relative performance of the firm, the mechanism may be inefficient.  Not withstanding 
the practical complications introduced by the accounting regulations associated with 
explicitly filtering industry and market shocks, it seems unlikely that firms would ignore 
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the potential benefits to RPE and would find creative ways to introduce an informative 
signal to their pay-performance contracts. 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) find that the sensitivity of CEO to shareholder wealth 
is surprisingly low.  When incorporating changes in contemporaneous compensation, 
changes in holdings, and the present value of changes in salary, they find that CEO 
wealth increases by about $3.25 per $1,000 in shareholder wealth.  Although this level of 
sensitivity is generally thought to be too low for proper agent motivation, Haubrich 
(1994) finds that with high risk-aversion parameters, it is reasonably reconciled to agency 
theory predictions.   
   Another interesting concern is that of encouraging risk-averse agents to take 
projects that are commensurate with the risk-neutral position of the shareholders.  Much 
of that literature has focused on the benefits of the convex payoff advantages inherent in 
option grants to firm executives.  Guay (1999) documents that firms provide convex 
incentives in order to motivate managers to invest in risky projects, which could 
otherwise incur large losses through under-investment.  DeFusco, Johnson and Zorn 
(1990) find that the variance of stock returns increases for firms after the approval of 
executive option plans.  They also find that these firms generally exhibit a wealth 
transfer, wherein stock prices react positively post-event, while their bond prices react 
negatively.  John and John (1993) note the possibility of over-encouraging management’s 
investment in risky projects through the use of convex payoff incentives such as options.  
They find that the wealth transfer documented by DeFusco, Johson and Zorn (1990) can 
be alleviated when utilizing convertible debt in the firm’s capital structure.  Aggarwal 
and Samwick (1999a) find that executives of companies that have a low market return 
variance have higher pay-performance sensitivity.  This may suggest that board of 
director compensation committees are aware of the adverse consequences of high-
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powered incentives and use them to a greater extent when their cost is low.  It is plausible 
that a board would handle other high powered incentives with adverse consequences, 
such as RPE, in a similarly constructive manner.  
Much work has focused on measuring RPE and documenting its anemically 
perceived effect on compensation.  Gibbons and Murphy (1990) find evidence of RPE, 
but also find it difficult to distinguish whether firms benchmark to their industry or some 
other broad market measure.  Their work is supported by a number of proxy statements 
that show the market for executive talent extends well beyond a firm’s respective proxy-
required competitive industrial group.  Antle and Smith (1986) study 39 firms over a long 
period and find evidence that compensation is more closely related to the relative return 
on assets than the absolute return on assets.  While their results are encouraging for RPE 
in accounting returns, they support only partial market return filtering.  Ely (1991) finds 
similar results in her examination of the Bank, Electrical Utility, Oil and Gas, and Retail 
Grocery industries.   
A portion of the executive compensation literature has focused on industry factors 
that may affect compensation RPE.  Antle and Smith (1986) warn that RPE may be 
detrimental to the firm when managers have the ability to change the industry where a 
firm competes.  Dye (1992) finds that the benefits of RPE are lower when managers have 
a small number of available projects, but greater when they have either a larger number 
of project choices or none at all.  He warns that RPE may motivate managers to invest in 
industries where they can outperform their competitors.  Murphy (1999) states that RPE 
is increasingly popular in cyclical industries and utilities, where it is replacing budget-
based measurement.  He suggests that firms competing in homogeneous industries find 
the cost of the RPE signal less expensive than those in less homogeneous industries.  One 
interpretation is that while a lower signal cost within an homogeneous group makes it 
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cheaper and more efficient to evaluate a firm’s executives, it also makes it easier to 
evaluate executive candidates from outside an industry.  This will help the firm to 
determine the size and quality of the executive pool from which the firm is likely to 
recruit a replacement.  If replacement costs are impacting compensation policy then a 
larger talent replacement pool, relative to a less homogeneous group where the pool is 
smaller, might affect a firm’s compensation policy.  Johnson and Tian (2000) suggest that 
a firm can more accurately determine the reservation utility level for an executive when 
there are a larger number of firms in an industry.  This means that more homogeneous 
industries will have less market level pay uncertainty. 
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b) contribute to our understanding of cross-
sectional RPE industry variation by showing that the nature of competition in an industry 
will affect the maximizing incentives given to managers.  They find that for firms in 
industries where the competition is Bertrand (strategically based) compensation should 
exhibit a positive and not negative (or index filtering) sensitivity to rival firm 
performance. That sensitivity should be increasing in competition.  Their empirical 
evidence supports the hypothesis in a test of manufacturing firms.   However, they find 
little overall evidence of relative performance in a 1993-1995 sample.  In earlier work, 
Sklivas (1987) finds that compensation serves as a commitment device.  He finds that if 
its competition is Bertrand, the firm can weight profits higher than sales in the 
compensation formula, committing the firm to less aggressive pricing behavior, which 
translates into higher profits.  Sklivas finds the opposite if the competition is Cournot 
(output based), as the firm weights sales higher and more aggressive output forces lower 
profits.  Kedia (1996) finds that firms producing strategic complements have more pay 
for performance than those producing strategic substitutes, where aggressive competition 
can be more detrimental to the firm. 
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Garvey and Milbourn (2001) suggest that older, more diversified executives do 
not require the benefits of RPE filtering for industry shocks while younger executives 
will benefit from RPE.  Their empirical findings agree with that assertion.   
RETENTION 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) note that firms with a high probability of bankruptcy 
must pay higher salaries in order to induce executives to take the risk of working there.  
A high salary can be thought of as an insurance premium that helps compensate a risk-
averse executive for a high-volatility wage contract.  One benefit for the firm is that an 
executive can interpret a higher salary as an increase in the switching costs of leaving the 
firm.  Gilson and Vestsuypens (1993) found that in a study of distressed firms, CEO 
replacements from inside the firm are generally paid 35% less than those they replace, 
while outside replacements are generally paid about 36% more than their predecessors.  
Although they suggest that outside replacements may have specialized expertise that 
helps to account for the difference, it may also indicate that there are high switching costs 
for prospective hires to leave their current employers.  The firm may need to use 
increased compensation to establish a new high level of switching costs in order to 
overcome a high turnover rate.  Blackwell and Farrell (1997) find that new CEOs who 
follow either forced or voluntary departures have significantly larger stock option grants 
than their predecessors.  At the same time, those who follow forced departures also have 
higher salaries and bonuses than their predecessors, while those who follow voluntary 
departures do not.  It appears that firms may be using compensation as a form of 
insurance for new hires who must join a weak team.  Alternatively, firms may be 
attempting to align the executive’s economic expectations with the interests of 
shareholders.  Core and Guay (2001) find evidence suggesting that firms use options to 
attract and retain certain types of employees as well as for incentive purposes.  Mehran 
 10
and Yermack (1999) find a negative relationship between option compensation and CEO 
turnover that is also consistent with firm use of compensation for retention purposes.   
Firms generally justify the resetting or repricing of executive options that have 
fallen far out-of-the-money by arguing their incentive and retention merits.  Brenner, 
Sundaram, and Yermack (2000) mention that firms that generally argue for re-setting 
strike prices on out-of-the-money options are under-performing.  Such firms must believe 
that their executives are currently valuable to the firm as a going concern.   They also find 
that the value to the executive from resetting options does not substitute for other related 
annual compensation and that executives with larger pay packages are more likely to 
have their options reset.  If a higher level of compensation indicates a higher quality 
executive, we would assume that the likelihood of higher compensated executives having 
their options reset is greater than for lesser compensated executives.  Chance, Kumar and 
Todd (2000) find a similar result with no evidence of reduced compensation to offset the 
value gained in repricing the options.  Both studies indirectly imply that executives 
expect an annual compensation target which is not altered for special events like 
repricing options.  Achyra, John and Sundaram (2000) show that some resetting is almost 
always optimal, but the advantages of resetting decrease as the costs of replacing 
incumbent managers decrease.  Their interpretation is that the high cost of replacing 
executives helps to explain why firms retain and re-calibrate the incentives for existing 
managers rather than replace them.   
The cumulative literature suggests that executive retention costs for a company as 
well as the switching costs for managers are an important part of the principal-agent 
relationship.  Noting that option repricing is a costly contract renegotiation action, the 
renegotiation costs will be borne by the firm if executive replacements cost are at a 
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sufficiently high level.  If true, a firm’s commitment to a specific compensation contract 
may be a function of the potential cost to replace lost executive talent. 
Parrino (1997) finds evidence consistent with the idea that poorer performing 
CEOs are easier to identify and cheaper to replace when they are working in 
homogeneous industries.  As an extension of that result, industry homogeneity can be a 
proxy for the abundance of industry-specific human capital, which may in turn, affect a 
firm’s ability to replace an executive. If true, then firms in more homogeneous industries 
will have fewer retention concerns, holding other variables constant, due to lower 
replacement costs.  Those firms may be able to utilize a high powered pay-for-
performance contract involving RPE.  We would then expect to find greater contract-
based RPE in more homogeneous industries if firms are looking to optimize their pay-
performance relationships.   
Industry homogeneity may also have a negative effect on a firm’s ability to 
incorporate RPE.  Fee and Hadlock (2003) find that executive talent raids by outside 
firms are more likely if the target executive’s firm has outperformed an industry 
benchmark.  We know that a firm competing in a more homogeneous industry will 
generate a clearer performance signal that will be available to industry outsiders as well 
as insiders.   Compared to weak performers top performers within an industry, controlling 
for homogeneity, should be more sensitive to increases in the market wage for specific 
executive talent. This increased sensitivity might lessen a firm’s ability to pre-commit to 
compensation-based RPE, and yet increase the need for the firm to ensure a relatively 
high post-performance wage to the top performing firm executives.  
Himmelberg and Hubbard (2000) find evidence that the supply of qualified CEOs 
available to manage large corporations is relatively inelastic.  They theorize that an 
executive pecking order results in top talent working for larger firms where their efforts 
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are put to better use because of the advantages in scale. Empirically, they find less 
compensation-based RPE in larger firms than in smaller firms.  This finding suggests that 
firms increase compensation when they are sensitive to the possibility that top talent may 
leave voluntarily for better opportunities.  If a similar argument can be made for 
performance levels, then better performing industry-ranked firms would compensate their 
executives at a post-performance level that is in line with their industry ranking in order 
to retain their top talent.   
Hubbard and Palia (1995) find that deregulated banks have substantially higher 
executive turnover than those that did not deregulate.  Their study offered insight to 
Himmelberg and Hubbard (2000) who theorized an executive pecking order.  In a 
different line of reasoning, Garen (1994) predicts that the sensitivity of an executive’s 
pay-to-performance should be decreasing in the size and the variance of the firm.  Thus, 
as risk shifts from the individual executive to the firm, sensitivity diminishes.  Smith and 
Watts (1992) find evidence that managers with a higher marginal effect on the firm are 
rewarded with higher compensation.  In addition they find that managers with greater 
discretionary impact, such as those in firms with more growth options, are paid more.     
Involuntary Turnover 
Firms can also use potential termination as an incentive.  Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1983) find that downward rigid wages motivate workers to generate higher efforts in 
order to prevent from being fired in the next period.  Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) find that 
the threat of termination serves as a motivational device and keeps firms paying more 
than a market wage, in turn helping to create an equilibrium level of unemployment.  
Coughlin and Schmidt (1985) and Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988) find a negative 
relation between firm performance and the probability of executive turnover.  Morck, 
Schliefer and Vishny (1989) find that while turnover is higher for firms that have 
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performed poorly, complete turnover is more likely in poorly performing firms within 
poorly performing industries.  Hartzell (1998) finds that the threat of termination can 
substitute for incentive compensation.  In a study covering a twenty-four year period, 
Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001) find that although the frequency of CEO turnover and 
outside successions has increased, the relation between the likelihood of forced CEO 
turnover and firm performance did not significantly change.  In fact, it did not vary 
during an intense takeover market.  This may suggest that boards of directors require a 
minimum level of executive performance that has remained static over time.   It would 
also indicate that boards may use firing as a base incentive, but that they do not use threat 
of firing to increase efforts.   
Summary 
While theoretically at least, it is clear that compensation based RPE will help to 
optimize contracts, most of the literature has found that the presence of RPE is weak at 
best in measuring a firm’s performance relative to its industry competitors.  Evidence 
suggests that high-powered incentives, which should include RPE, vary according to the 
competitive structure of a firm’s industry, the age of its executives, and the degree of risk 
that the firm represents to the executive.  To date, the RPE literature has not investigated 
a firm’s costs to replace an executive. 
Prior research has generally investigated the relationship of firm and industry 
post-performance to compensation levels and changes, industry RPE-based contracts and 
those that pay in a manner consistent with how we measure RPE.  However, research to 
date has not documented pre-commitment RPE.   
Executive turnover is related to the cost of firing and replacing an executive as 
well as a firm’s ability to confirm that a manager’s performance was poor.  The model in 
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the next chapter investigates how the cost of executive departures affects a firm’s ability 
to offer high-powered incentives.   
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Chapter 3: A Model of High Powered Incentives in the Presence of High 
Replacement Costs 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical understanding concerning 
executive replacement and switching costs in the power of the incentive compensation 
that firms offer to managers.  A simple single-period binomial model is constructed 
where the manager has the option of providing a high or low effort and the firm may pay 
the manager a high or low wage that is dependent upon firm output. 
The model includes switching costs incurred by the manager when voluntarily 
leaving the firm.  It also includes the firm’s cost to replace a manager who has departed 
voluntarily or has been fired.  The primary effect of switching costs is to either maintain 
or reduce the power of the incentives that the firm provides as long as the power of those 
incentives has not already been minimized.  While replacement costs may appear to allow 
for the firm to provide higher power incentives when replacement cost are only incurred 
for firing, they will reduce the power of the incentives when the firm has to account for a 
voluntary departure by the manager.  The net effect of the switching and replacement 
costs is to generate incentive power that is either constant (and zero) or decreasing in 
replacement costs.   Since relative performance evaluation incentives are high powered 
incentives, we should find that firms with high replacement costs will be less likely to 
utilize relative performance evaluation.  The model assumes that the contract is binding 
from the perspective that the manager’s wage levels cannot be reduced.  However, it also 
includes the possibility that the firm may increase the manager’s pay if a signal is 
received that predicts that the manager will leave the firm. 
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The model is useful in predicting pre-commitment based relative performance in 
compensation.  That is, firms that face significant replacement costs will have limitations 
on their ability to utilize pre-commitment relative performance evaluation. 
The chapter proceeds by presenting the full switching and replacement costs 
problem for descriptive purposes.  After the initial presentation, a simpler version 
containing minimal constraints is presented and analyzed so that the additional 
constraints can be understood when added back in. 
Model 
The model contains a single performance period and is set in a moral hazard 
framework.  At t =0 the risk-neutral manager and the firm agree to a contract to pay the 
manager a wage that is based upon the output that the manager will produce during the 
period.  Output will either be high or low, where πH > πL.  Firm output is the partial result 
of managerial effort where the manager has the choice of either a high or low effort, 
where eH > eL comes at a cost to the manager of either C(eH) or C(eL) and C(eH) > C(eL).     
At t=1, a high wage will be paid if output is high or a low wage paid if output is low (WH 
or WL).  Limited liability is assumed which makes both wages non-negative.  
If the manager chooses eH then the probability of high output is increased by e 
over the probability P of high output given a low effort.  That is, 
 
P(πH| eL) = P         (1) 
 
P(πL| eL) = 1-P        (2) 
 
P(πH| eH) = P+e        (3) 
 
P(πL| eH) = 1-P-e        (4) 
 
 
It is assumed that 0.5 < P < 1, 0 < e < .5, as well as 0.5< P+e < 1. 
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The manager’s utility will depend upon the level of effort that must be expended 
to achieve a given wage level.  See Figure 1 for a display of the possibilities as well as 
the timing. 
The cost minimizing firm will seek to pay the lowest total expected payout that is 
possible subject to three constraints.  First, the risk-neutral manager must expect to 
receive a higher utility level for a high effort than the expected utility for a low effort.  
Next, the expected wage paid by the firm for a high effort must be greater than the 
expected utility offered in the market for a high effort (Ui), less a cost to the manager (S) 
for switching firms.  The manager will switch employers if the switching costs do not 
totally erode the higher wage available at the new employer.  An example of switching 
costs would be unvested compensation that will be lost at the incumbent firm if the 
manager voluntarily leaves.  It may also include the costs associated with finding a new 
position.  Last, the expected wage for a high effort must be less than or equal to the wage 
that the firm would have to pay a new employee for a high effort (Wi), plus costs to the 
firm for firing and replacing (F) the old manager.  If cheaper labor is available then the 
firm will fire the manager as long as the replacement costs do not totally erode the 
cheaper labor costs provided by the new manager.1    The complete problem for the cost 
minimizing firm is to minimize total expected compensation, D, with constraints as 
below. 
 
            
( ) ( ) LH WeP1WePD:Min −−++=      (5) 
 
subject to the following 3 constraints. 
 
 
                                                 
1 The costs to the firm for replacing a manager who has voluntarily departed are not yet included. They are 
considered in an informational signal adaptation of the model at the end of the analysis. 
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  (6) 
 
 
            
( ) ( ) SUWeP1WeP iLH −≥−−++       (7) 
 
            
( ) ( ) FWWeP1WeP iLH +≤−−++       (8) 
 
For simplicity, the cost of a low effort is assumed to be zero. 
      
          
 ( ) 0eC L =                   (9) 
 
 
Equation (6) is the incentive compatibility constraint while (7) and (8) are the 
voluntary departure and firing constraints, respectfully.  After the analysis concerning the 
three constraints is complete the model proceeds to include an interim period signal for 
future output that will be available to both firm and manager.  If the signal predicts that 
output will be low then it will provide an opportunity for the manager to voluntarily leave 
the firm if the manager’s utility can be improved by working for another firm.  The 
contract then implicitly incorporates the possibility for an upward wage revision. 
Simple Cost Minimization Problem 
We begin by calculating the total expected wage that the firm expects to pay the 
manager that is subject to a single incentive compatibility constraint.  The switching and 
firing cost constraints will first be ignored in order to understand their incremental effect 
when they are included in the analysis.  As will be apparent later, this simply corresponds 
to the case where switching and replacement costs are very large. 
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( ) ( ) LH WeP1WePD:Min −−++=      (5) 
 
subject to (6) 
 
            
 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )






   (6) 
 
 
Since WH and WL are non-negative, the problem can be solved by forcing WL =0 and WH 
equal to the minimum compensation differential required by equation (6).  Therefore, (5) 




W HH = and 0WL = .  The intuition is that as long as there is 
a wage differential of 
( )
e
eC H between WH and WL, then (6) will be met.  A smaller 
differential will make the expected wage of a low effort greater than the cost-of-effort 




W HH =  and 0WL = . 
The power of the incentives for high effort will be the wage differential referred 
to above, i.e., 
            











Voluntary Departure with Switching Costs are Introduced 
The analysis proceeds by introducing the possibility that the manager will 
voluntarily leave the firm if a better compensation package is available outside of the 
firm.  The manager will voluntarily depart if it is possible to obtain another position 
outside of the firm that provides incentives for a high effort level that will pay a wage 
some value above Ui that will account for the switching costs.   The manager’s cost of 
leaving the firm, plus the cost to find another position are denoted S.  The problem is now 
updated with the additional constraint. 
 
            
( ) ( ) LH WeP1WePD:Min −−++=      (5) 
 
 
subject to the following 2 constraints. 
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( ) ( ) SUWeP1WeP iLH −≥−−++       (7) 
 
 
Since a constraint has been added to the problem, the smallest WH that can 
possibly be attained will be as found in (10).  Otherwise, the incentive to exert a high 
effort will not be sufficient given constraint (6).  It is first assumed that (6) is more 
constraining (greater) than (7).  In that event, the following adaptation from (7) will hold. 
 
            









The optimal contract will then contain  
 
            










= .    (12) 
 
 
This is the same value calculated for the case without the choice of a voluntary departure.  
The power of the incentives will also be the same. 
 
            
 













=−=−   (10) 
 
 
If the quitting constraint is not binding then the power of the incentives are 
unchanged relative to the case where the manager cannot quit.  The power of the 
incentives will remain constant and are neither increasing nor decreasing in switching 
costs. 
We must now find the power of the incentives where the switching cost constraint 
is binding.  Equation (7) is written below for quick reference.   
 
            
( ) ( ) SUWeP1WeP iLH −≥−−++       (7) 
 
 
If WL = 0, then (13) holds and WH must be solved for directly in (7) as found in (14). 
 
 
            
 




















            
0WL = .           (15) 
 
Checking that the solution satisfies (7) we find that (16) verifies the solution. 
 
            












+      (16) 
 
 
The power of the incentives are now as in (17). 
 











=−       (17) 
 
 
In order to compare (17) to (10) assumption (13) is used to find (18). 
 
            














≤     (18) 
 
This means that the power of the incentives are larger if switching costs are 
smaller.  The power of the incentives is also decreasing in S.  The result is straight 
forward.  If switching costs are high, then the manager is less likely to leave the firm.  
This will enable the firm to provide lower powered incentives as switching costs increase.  
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The firm will continue to do so until the minimum incentive in (10) in reached.  This 
leads to the following proposition. 
 
Proposition: The power of the incentive is non-increasing in switching costs. 
An additional case must be investigated.  If (7) is non-binding, then (6) must be 
the binding constraint.  An alternative description is represented in (19).   
 
            







       (19) 
 
This case appears to be identical to the first case in the switching costs model.  However, 
an additional solution must be analyzed.  This third case represents the possibility that the 
lowest power of incentives in (10) is operable and can be met with WL > 0.  Put another 
way, the right hand side of (19) represents the total expected utility that must be achieved 
to retain the executive while the left hand side represents the differential incentive 
required to encourage the executive to provide a high effort level.  Therefore, another 
way of achieving all of the constraints is for WL to be non-zero where the minimum 
power of incentives is utilized.   
Since the minimum power of incentives will solve the problem, we can make WH 
a function of WL and then solve for WL in constraint (7). 
 





WW HLH =−         (20) 
 





WW HLH +=         (21) 
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If (21) is substituted into (7), (22) is obtained. 
 
            










 ++     (22) 
 
Now, WL is found in (23) and is used to solve for WH as in (24). 
 
            





−−=        (23) 
 
            
 










−−+=      (24) 
 
Although the power of the incentives was used to solve for WL and WH, a brief review of 
(10) will be helpful. 
 
            
 











=−     (10) 
 
The power of the incentives is therefore at a minimum level and will be constant in S. 
To summarize the switching costs model, there are two general cases concerning 
the power of the incentives and are summarized below. 
 
            
 
















            













=−     (17) 
 
The analysis shows that where managers have large job switching costs, the 
power of the incentives provided to the manager will be at the lowest possible level, 
constant and neither increasing nor decreasing in switching costs.  For small switching 
costs, the power of the incentives will be larger than the minimal level but will be 
decreasing in switching costs.  As such, the inclusion of switching costs cannot increase 
the power of the incentives.  The power of the incentives, as a function of switching 
costs, can only decrease to an absolute minimum.  The analysis confirms the proposition. 
Introduction of Replacement Costs 
The possibility that the firm will fire the manager is now introduced.  The two 
previous constraints remain active.  It is assumed that the firm can hire a new manager to 
expend a high effort level for an expected wage of Wi.  The total costs of firing the 
current manager, plus any recruiting costs for the new manager are F.  The problem is 
described below. 
 
( ) ( ) LH WeP1WePD:Min −−++=      (5) 
 
subject to the following 3 constraints. 
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  (6) 
 
            




            
( ) ( ) FWWeP1WeP iLH +≤−−++       (8) 
 
The new constraint says that if a firm knows that it is paying too much for a 
manager, relative to comparable pay for a new manager (plus replacement costs), then the 
firm will fire the manager.  The first case to analyze is where (25) will hold. 
            
SUFW ii −≤+         (25) 
Condition (25) says that the expected utility in the market is greater than or equal 
to the expected wage in the market.  An interpretation is that an executive’s expected 
utility for a high effort is greater than the market level of compensation unadjusted for the 
effort.  The executive finds the cost of the effort in that job to be larger than the wage.  
The power of the incentives collapses to zero. 
A similar case is where  




FW Hi ≤+ .        (26) 
 
Condition (26) more explicitly describes a similar possibility that the market wage for a 
high effort is very small relative to the cost of that effort.  An example is where a 
seasoned office executive cannot be paid enough to compensate for the effort required to 
do physical construction work.  The result is that the executive opts not to work for the 
firm and the firm would rather the executive not work for the firm.  The power of the 
incentives is once again zero. 
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The cases where contracts with incentives can be obtained are described in (27) 
and (28). 




SUFW Hii ≥−≥+        (27) 







i −≥≥+        (28) 
Since the new replacement cost constraint is non-binding, then it is clear that we either 
have the minimum possible power of incentives in (10) or incentives that are decreasing 
in S as in (17).  Replacement costs from firing an executive will have no effect on the 
power of the incentives.  It should be noted what will occur in (27) or (28) when 
replacement costs and switching costs are infinite.  In that case, firing cannot occur and 
switching firms cannot occur.  The resulting contract will be the minimum power of 
incentives found in (10). 
            
 






WW HHLH =−=−       (10) 
 
A more realistic case is now introduced where replacement costs to the firm are 
also incurred when an executive voluntarily departs.  In addition, it is assumed that there 
is an α probability that a signal concerning the final output by the manager will be 
produced.  The signal, if it is generated, is not a perfect predictor and it occurs after the 
contract is negotiated but before output is realized.  The problem is made more difficult 
for the firm because the manager also has access to this signal and will make the decision 
to leave the firm if market level utility expectations are not met.  That is, if a low output 
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signal is generated then the manager knows that compensation will fall below what is 
known to be competitive for the effort level.  The replacement costs to the firm to recruit 
a new manager may make the firm want to retain the services of the manager.  The firm 
must then be prepared to revise the low wage that the manager will receive if a low 
output signal is received. It is assumed that constraint (7) is binding in order to fully 
capture the effects of the manager quitting the firm. 
 
            
( ) ( ) SUWeP1WeP iLH −≥−−++       (7) 
 
Three possibilities can occur. 
1.  No signal is generated with probability of 1- α.  In that event, the power of the 
incentives are as in (17). 
            













=−     (17) 
 
2. The signal occurs but it is a good output signal where (17) once again holds because 
the signal does not cause the manager to be concerned about the wage to be  
received. 
3. The signal occurs and it indicates low output.  Since the firm does not want the 
manager to leave the firm, it can revise the low output wage subject to the 
replacement costs that the firm would incur if it lost the manager and had to recruit a 
replacement. 
 
Case 3 raises the possibility that the firm will raise WL in order to prevent the 
manager from leaving the firm.  That wage is revised to the amount shown in (29). 
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=        (29) 
The wage is based upon the minimum wage that the manager is willing to work for as 
suggested by the market utility for a high effort.  It is a linear combination of the 
minimum wage required for the manager to stay at the firm and the maximum possible 
wage that the firm will be willing to pay.  The average of the two wages is used so that it 
adjusts the low payoff to the manager as if the minimum wage is paid half of the time and 
the maximum wage the other half of the time.  The wage in (29) assumes that the average 
of the two wages is used but it is chosen for illustrative purposes.  Any linear 
combination that includes a positive maximum wage will achieve the same results. 
Note that WH will be unchanged and as in (14) while WL will be one of two 
possibilities. 
 





=          (14) 
 
            
0WL = with probability 1-α, or      (30) 
           





= with probability α.    (31) 
 
Constraint (6) is now revised to incorporate the signal. 
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Note that if α is equal to zero, then (32) can easily be attained.  Solving for α in (33) we 
find the critical level for which (32) holds. 
            





















SU iiHi     (33) 
Since (7) is binding, the numerator and the denominator in (33) is positive.  However, 
note that if the replacement costs are large, then (33) will not hold.  In that case, the firm 
will not revise the contract and the manager will leave the firm where the power of the 
incentives goes to zero.  If (33) holds then the power of the incentives will be as shown in 
(34). 
            














WW iiiLH     (34) 
Now, it is easy to see that the power of the incentives will be decreasing in the 
replacement costs that the firm will incur to replace the manager.  In addition, the power 
of the incentives will be decreasing in the probability that a signal concerning the output 
will be generated.  The probability of receiving a signal, and a negative one in particular, 
introduces an extra opportunity for the manager to leave the firm.  This opportunity 
provides a reducing effect on the power of the incentives.   
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Another condition that must be considered is constraint (6).  It is required to 
provide incentives for high output.  That leads to (35). 
            














     (35) 
If (35) holds then the power of the incentives will be decreasing in the replacement costs 
as well as decreasing in the probability of receiving a signal concerning output.  If (35) 
does not hold, then the power of the incentives collapses to zero as no effort is provided 
and no wages are paid. 
The results find that in the presence of replacement costs where the manager can 
voluntarily leave the firm, the power of incentives provided to a manager will either be 
decreasing in replacement costs or they will be zero if replacement costs are very high.  
Summary 
This chapter presents a one-period, two-effort moral hazard model where the firm 
needs to provide incentives for the risk-neutral manager to supply a high level effort.  It 
incorporates managerial switching costs, when voluntarily departing the firm, as well as 
replacement costs to the firm when either form of managerial departure occurs.  Optimal 
contracts are derived whereby the power of the incentives can be measured for the effects 
from switching and replacement costs. 
The model finds that the power of the incentives that a firm may employ will be 
decreasing in the costs incurred by the firm to replace a manager.  The results indicate 
that high powered incentives may not be available to firms with high replacement costs.   
The model also finds that the power of the incentives offered by a firm will be non-
increasing in executive switching costs.  The logical extension of the result provides 
motivation for empirical evaluation of a number of research questions concerning high 
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powered incentive compensation.  In particular, does firm implementation of relative 
performance evaluation in compensation vary in relation to replacement costs.  The 
model predicts that relative performance evaluation should be used to a lesser extent in 
firms where replacement costs are large.  A full explanation concerning other 
implications is left for future research.  
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Chapter 4: Testing for RPE Commitment in Firms 
The model in the previous chapter demonstrates that the power of the incentives 
offered by a firm to a manager will decrease as the costs that a firm incurs to replace a 
manager increase.2  In the case where replacement costs are very high, the power of the 
incentives will collapse to zero.  The model assumes that the pay-performance contract is 
agreed upon at the beginning of the performance period but allows the firm to make an 
upward revision of wages to prevent a manager from leaving.   Since relative 
performance evaluation in compensation (RPE) is a high-powered incentive, the model 
predicts RPE pre-commitment will be less prevalent for firms with high replacement 
costs.  The purpose of this chapter is to test that prediction.   
Earlier work finds that if RPE provides a valuable signal concerning a 
management team’s performance, then RPE involvement should help to improve a firm’s 
pay-performance relation (See Holmstrom (1979, 1982)).  If a firm operates in a highly 
homogeneous industry where there are many closely related products or services, then the 
performance of that firm is both easier to quantify and more statistically meaningful.  We 
should then find a greater degree of RPE in the pay-performance relationship of a firm 
that is competing in a more homogeneous industry (compared to less homogeneous 
industry firms) as long as frictions that are not related to the better industry performance 
signal do not significantly alter the theory.   
An alternative hypothesis concerning industry homogeneity states that there is a 
greater amount of industry-specific executive talent in more homogeneous industries than 
in less homogeneous industries.  Given the greater supply of industry-specific human 
                                                 
2 The power of the incentives is defined as the differential between compensation for high output and 
compensation for a low output.  
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capital in homogeneous industries, we expect lower executive replacement costs for these 
firms than for those from less homogeneous industries.  Consequently, industry 
homogeneity serves as a proxy for executive replacement costs with higher costs 
corresponding to less homogeneous industries.  If compensation-based RPE commitment 
is negatively related to a firm’s replacement costs, then firms competing in more 
homogeneous industries should have lower replacement costs and be more inclined to 
pre-commit to RPE than firms that compete in less homogeneous industries.   This 
reasoning leads to Hypothesis I. 
 
Hypothesis I: Firms competing in more homogeneous industries should be more inclined 
to pre-commit to relative performance compensation contracts than firms in less 
homogeneous industries.   
 
Evidence in support of Hypothesis I is consistent with firms using RPE where a 
more accurate performance signal is available as well as where replacement costs are 
low.  If industry homogeneity is positively related to a firm’s willingness to commit to 
RPE, it will be empirically difficult to determine which alternative better explains a 
firm’s propensity to involve RPE.  However, an examination of a firm’s recent 
performance relative to its industry may be used to empirically distinguish between the 
clearer signal explanation and the replacement costs explanation.  I propose that a firm’s 
level of replacement costs will be positively related to a firm’s industry-performance 
ranking.  This proposition is supported by work by Hayes and Schaefer (1999) and Fee 
and Hadlock (2003). 
Evidence suggests that firm’s attempt to upgrade their executive talent in an effort 
to improve their industry-performance ranking.  Hayes and Schaefer (1999) find evidence 
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supporting the hypothesis that managers with superior perceived abilities are generally 
targeted as executive candidates by raider (hiring) firms.  They also find a positive 
(negative) initial market reaction for the raider (raided firm) upon announcement of a 
successful talent raid.  This is consistent with the explanation that external recruitment is 
a means to improve a firm’s performance.  In similar work, Fee and Hadlock (2003) find 
that raider firms appear to target executives of higher performing firms when they look to 
recruit a CEO.  Their sample is comprised of proxy named executives in the raided firm 
who accepted the position of CEO at the raider.  As long as proxy level executives 
continue to be candidates for external CEO positions, the Fee and Hadlock results suggest 
that a raider will tend to recruit top executives from the talent base of firms with a higher 
performance level than the raider.3   
Fee and Hadlock (2003) also find that raiders make hiring grants that are related 
to the forfeited unvested compensation that managers have accumulated during their 
tenure at the raided firms.  This means that raiders are reducing the switching costs 
involved for a manager to accept a new position.  It also increases the replacement costs 
to the raider.  Since the forfeited value should be an increasing function of the raided 
firm’s recent historical performance (assuming that the forfeited value is equity based) 
then a major source of a firm’s cost to recruit an executive from a highly ranked firm 
should be higher than if they chose to recruit from a weakly ranked firm.4   
The literature suggests that if firms follow a rule to recruit high level executives 
from firms with a better performance record than their own, then we would expect higher 
                                                 
3 This is similar to the recruitment process in the academic market.  Universities generally recruit faculty 
that have either completed a Ph.D. from a university with a higher ranking or from the faculty of a higher 
ranked university.  While lower university sourced candidates will eagerly apply for an opening at a top 
school, those applications are rarely successful due to the hiring preference of the top-ranked schools. 
4 This will be true as long as weaker performing firms have not paid their executives larger values of 
compensation, that is subject to vesting, than the better performing firms in the industry.  If this were not 
true, then it might be an example of a negative pay-for-performance relationship.  The pay-for-performance 
case is assumed to hold. 
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ranked firms to have higher expected recruitment or executive replacement expenses than 
lower ranked firms.   
Arguments to the contrary should be noted.  First, a higher ranked firm may have 
a greater probability (and consequently partially reduced recruiting costs) of successfully 
recruiting a top executive than a lower ranked firm since the recruited executive might 
perceive greater compensation opportunities while working for a highly ranked firm.  
While this argument appears feasible for managers from firms with a marginally weaker 
performance history, it is improbable that a top-performing firm would recruit talent from 
a perennially poor industry performer.  Another counter argument suggests that firm 
performance is not necessarily indicative of non-CEO talent.  If true, then industry-
ranked performance will not serve as a proxy for the quality of the individual.  While this 
may be true in some instances, the Fee and Hadlock (2003) evidence suggests that any 
proxy named executive may be a candidate for the top position at another firm.  
Therefore, while firm performance may not reflect the ability of all of a firm’s top 
executives, it should be a reasonably good indicator of executive ability.   
I proceed by assuming that a firm’s industry-performance ranking is positively 
related to the expected costs of replacing a lost executive although the net effect of the 
arguments and counter arguments is ultimately an empirical question.   It follows that if 
replacement costs negatively impact compensation RPE, then a firm’s industry-adjusted 
performance will negatively impact the likelihood of pre-committing to RPE.  This leads 
to Hypothesis II.   
 
Hypothesis II: Weaker performing firms should be more inclined to commit to an RPE 
mechanism than their stronger performing counterparts.   
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Evidence in support of Hypothesis II would provide more conclusive evidence 
regarding replacement cost effects of RPE pre-commitment.  Before proceeding to the 
data and empirical setup, it is important to understand some of the limitations firms face 
in their compensation design choices.  I briefly summarized these limitations below. 
 
Frictions Due to Accounting and Compensation Conventions 
Accounting and compensation convention make RPE difficult to incorporate in 
executive compensation.  They also make it difficult to document a firm’s intentions to 
utilize an RPE compensation plan.  The principal effect of accounting and compensation 
convention is to reduce a firm’s ability to fine-tune its compensation payout through an 
RPE formula (see Appendix A).   
The realistic choice for equity-based compensation is to involve RPE calculations 
in the size of an initial grant or possibly to accelerate the vesting restrictions on a grant 
after the initial grant date.  The income statement expense required to index the strike 
price of an already granted option (which is considered a post-grant modification) can be 
prohibitive.  Therefore indexing is generally considered inferior to pre-grant calculations 
or the alternative that accelerates vesting based upon a predetermined performance 
criteria.  However, the more “income statement expensive” method would generate better 
principal-agent incentive alignment.   While cash-based programs do not suffer from this 
friction, they do have a greater problem.  The amount required for a cash payout to be a 
significant portion of an executive group’s annual compensation can impact a firm’s cash 
flow.  Therefore, accounting and cash limitations will make it difficult to incorporate a 
finely tuned, yet economically significant RPE-based mechanism into the process.  This 
may also help explain the limited systematic RPE in cash-related compensation plans.  
These limitations also necessitate creative solutions for incorporating RPE into the pay-
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for-performance relationship.  The data gathering process to find RPE commitment must 
also be flexible enough to capture firm intent. 
Empirical Setup and Data Description 
The central question in this chapter is whether pre-commitment to RPE 
compensation varies according to the replacement costs that a firm will be subjected to in 
the event of an executive departure.  Hypothesis I predicts that more homogeneous firms 
should be more willing to commit to an RPE mechanism.  As stated above, the joint 
hypothesis predicts that firms will utilize RPE when a statistically more meaningful 
signal exists and when executive replacement costs, proxied by industry homogeneity, 
are lower.   If industry-ranked performance is indicative of executive replacement costs, 
then a negative relation between performance and pre-commitment to RPE should exist.  
As stated in Hypothesis II, lower industry-performing firms should exhibit a greater 
propensity to pre-commit to an RPE compensation mechanism than higher performing 
firms.  Evidence in support of both hypotheses is needed to provide support for the 
prediction that replacement costs are negatively related to the likelihood that a firm pre-
commits to RPE.5 
While this study focuses on industry-based relative performance measures, 
Gibbons and Murphy (1990) suggest that identifying a correct benchmark may be 
difficult.  In fact a number of compensation committee proxy reports specifically point 
out that the competitive market for their executive talent needs extends beyond the SEC-
required industrial proxy comparison group.  In order to investigate wider definitions of 
relative performance, I divide RPE commitment into four broad measures.  I define 
industry relative measures as any measure where a firm’s market derived returns are 
                                                 
5 Pre-committing to RPE means that a firm described a formal mechanism to incorporate RPE into a 
portion of their compensation.  Proxy statements for the S&P 500 were examined to identify whether a firm 
committed to an RPE mechanism or not.  The exact procedure is discussed later in this chapter.   
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compared to the market returns of a similar industry composite for a compensation 
calculation.  The measure does not require that the firm utilize a commonly known 
industry composite, and in many cases the proxy statements suggest that different firms 
within the same industry define their peers differently.   I define accounting relative 
measures as any measure where a firm’s financial statement sourced data is compared to 
an industry financial statement composite in order to calculate a type of compensation.  
Since comparing financial statements across industries will be meaningless in most 
instances, accounting relative measures can be viewed as an alternative method of 
utilizing industry-based RPE.  One possible reason for utilizing this method may be 
asymmetrical informational barriers that will not be overcome within the compensation 
horizon.  I define broad market relative measures as any measure where a firm’s market 
derived returns are compared to the market returns of some broad market measure or 
some static market level for a compensation calculation.  This method is included to 
account for the concerns of Gibbons and Murphy (1990).   Finally, I define the all relative 
measures as any of the above measures.  It is included to investigate the most liberal 
definitions of RPE.   
While the type of RPE pre-commitment is important, the compensation tool that a 
firm uses is also important.  Compensation committee reports stress that while retention 
is a key item in a compensation plan, they also frequently reference short-term and long-
term goals.  This provides the rationale for a firm to use a multi-faceted approach to 
compensation.  Therefore, I classify the data according to the compensation tool category 
where RPE commitment is found.  Thus, the classifications are: all compensation 
combined, bonus, all long-term compensation, all long-term compensation excluding 
options, and long-term compensation that is cash based such as performance, phantom 
and long-term cash incentive plans.  I include all compensation combined to capture all 
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possibilities and also to anticipate the data requirements in utilizing a maximum 
likelihood method on a relatively small data set.  I include bonus data to investigate short-
term incentive compensation.  Cash based plans do not create income statement penalties 
when utilizing RPE directly and should not be discarded when studying RPE pre-
commitment.  I analyze all long-term compensation to provide data for the maximum 
likelihood estimation process while broadly considering the entire long-term component 
as a single decision.  All long-term compensation excluding options effectively includes 
all restricted stock grants as well as long-term cash and performance plans.  As discussed 
in Appendix A, this category provides a low “income statement” cost method for 
delivering RPE.  Finally, I study long-term compensation that includes only cash and 
performance-based plans to investigate the use of pre-commitment based RPE in long-
term cash plans.    This category provides the study the most flexible portion of the long-
term compensation component but at a relatively high empirical cost of limited data.   
In order to test the relation of a firm’s willingness to commit to RPE, I employ a 
probit model where the likelihood of committing to an RPE mechanism is a function of a 
firm’s one’ or two-year return percentile within its 2-digit SIC code, the industry 
homogeneity percentile for the 2-digit SIC code that is a firm’s primary line of business, 
and an interaction term involving the firm’s one’ or two-year industry return percentile 
and its homogeneity percentile.  Industry percentile returns are utilized in order to capture 
a firm’s performance relative to its industry without the outlier distortions of significantly 
poor or great performance years.  The interaction term is utilized to help distinguish 
between the clarity of signal and replacement cost explanations concerning industry 
homogeneity. 
Control covariates account for the propensity to commit to RPE related to factors 
other than replacement cost issues.  The control covariates are revenue, research and 
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development as percent of revenue, the number of board meetings held by the firm in the 
prior year, the firm’s market-to-book value ratio, the firm’s common stock monthly 
return standard deviation for the previous sixty months, the dividend yield for the firm, 
and property and plant as a percent of book value for the firm.   
I use revenue to control for the possibility that larger firms might have greater 
resources that can be used to institute more intricate plans such as RPE.  The research and 
development variable is normalized by revenue to control for the Clinch (1991) finding 
that high R&D firms benchmark their compensation programs to market and accounting 
based measures to a greater extent than low R&D firms.  I use the number of board of 
director meetings during the year to control for the activity of the board of directors.  
More active boards should be more inclined to institute a compensation measure that 
involves a greater design and measurement.  I use the market-to-book ratio to control for 
the growth prospect of firms.  If growth prospects are large, then the financing constraints 
induced by the growth prospects may imply a greater inclination to compensate 
executives with non-cash methods such as restricted stock or options.  In light of the 
discussion in Appendix A, this could have positive or negative effects on a firms’ 
willingness to pre-commit.  I use standard deviation to control for the risk of the firm’s 
market equity returns.  If replacement costs are important to a firm, with respect to the 
probability of losing an executive, then a volatile return stream that induces a volatile 
compensation stream might negatively affect a firm’s willingness to commit to an RPE 
measure.  I use dividend yields to proxy for a firm’s ability to use cash payments as a 
major portion of its executive’s compensation packages.  Since cash payment plans that 
involve RPE do not introduce additional income statement costs over non-RPE related 
cash plans, then cash availability might have an impact on a firm’s ability to choose an 
RPE measure.  Finally, property and plant provide a measure concerning the maturity of a 
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firm.  This might proxy for low growth firms that bias compensation plans away from 
equity based incentives and toward cash plans that are relatively easy to include RPE in 
compensation.   
I collected data from firm proxies on file with the SEC for all firms in the S&P 
500 (as defined in ExecuComp) for the Standard and Poor’s defined year ending 2000.6  
For each proxy statement, I reviewed the Compensation Committee Report on Executive 
Compensation for committee intent on pre-commitment to RPE.  I collected and 
summarized data for each major category of performance related compensation.  If a firm 
stated that it was or will be using a relative performance based measure in either its grant 
calculations (pre-grant or post-grant), vesting conditions (pure performance based or 
accelerated performance), or post-grant payouts, then the firm qualified for using an RPE 
measure for the indicated portion of its compensation package.  If a firm did not mention 
RPE in its Compensation Committee Report on Executive Compensation, but evidence 
was found in the company’s compensation table and footnotes that it did, then that also 
qualified for RPE.   I should note that some executives have specific compensation 
contracts that may alter the overall plan of a compensation committee.  These contracts 
typically establish a guaranteed yearly compensation value or prescribe the progression 
and type of hiring grants to be made during the initial years in an executive’s tenure.  
Therefore, while the contracts may offer exceptions to the overall methodology 
sanctioned by a compensation committee, the overall RPE goal of the committee is not 
expected to deviate materially from the proxy disclosure.  I collected data for 462 firms in 
this manner.   
As a proxy for industry homogeneity, mean partial correlation calculations were 
taken from Parrino (1997, p. 189).  Parrino calculates partial correlation figures by 
                                                 
6 The Standard and Poor’s defined year for Year t runs from June 1 of Year t to May 31 of Year t +1. 
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regressing the monthly returns for each stock in the CRSP database from 1970 through 
1988 against an equally weighted return index for each 2-digit SIC code as well as the 
equally weighted market return.  He then averaged the partial correlation coefficient for 
each stock within the same 2-digit industry across a random selection maximum of 50 
firms (minimum 35 observations) to arrive at the mean partial correlation (MPC) for each 
2-digit SIC code.  Following the procedure in Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b),  I use the 
MPC data to calculate the industry homogeneity percentile for each 2-digit MPC.  That 
percentile variable is denoted F(M).  The largest MPC will have an F(M) value of 1.00 
while the lowest will have a value of 0.00.  While any updated mean partial correlation 
figures might change through time, it is assumed that the ranking of those figures would 
remain in an order very similar to that in the original calculations provided in Parrino 
(1997).   
I collected market return and price information from CRSP and compensation and 
accounting data from S&P Compustat and ExecuComp.  When combined with the 
necessary industry homogeneity data, the sample was reduced to 403 firms and then 
further reduced to 359 firms in the probit analysis where accounting, compensation, and 
market return data were required. 
Summary Statistics 
Table I presents the general characteristics for the sample.  Although the sample 
consists of the largest firms in the United States, market value, market value to book 
value and revenue data are skewed.  The median (average) total common stock value and 
revenue for the sample is $8.6 billion ($25.5 billion) and $5.2 billion ($11.4 billion), 
respectfully.  More than 50% of the firms had 0% of sales as research and development 
expenses and the median (mean) dividend yield is 1.12%  (1.59%).  The median (mean) 
percentage of property and plant as a percentage of book value is 26% (29%).  For both 
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the one’ and two-year industry returns, the mean and median percentiles are above the 
60th percentile.  Therefore, the sample consists of a group of reasonably high industry 
performers.  The minimums and maximums reflect that the sample includes some best 
performers within an industry but does not include any of the poorest performers in an 
industry.  The fewest number of firms used to calculate industry relative performance 
results is 16 while the largest number is 1014.  The median (mean) monthly standard 
deviation of common stock returns is 10.02% (11.01%) The mean and median industry 
homogeneity percentiles are close to .5, suggesting a reasonably symmetric distribution 
of firms in the total sample.  The median (mean) number of board meetings in 2000 is 8 
(8.12).    
Table II (also see Figures 1 through 5) details the frequency of RPE among the 
sample firms.  When RPE is confined to external industry related market measures, 94 
firms pre-committed.  Only 23 firms elected to have RPE influence their yearly bonus 
plans, while 79 utilized RPE for any long-term compensation.  Of those 79 firms, 76 
utilized RPE in their non-option related long-term choices and 57 firms utilized it in their 
long-term cash based plans.  The predominant RPE tool is restricted stock/units and long-
term cash based plans.  These choices generate minimal income statement effects vis-à-
vis non-RPE compensation versions of the same tools. 
After industry RPE measures, accounting measures next meet the closest 
definition of a peer performance benchmark.  When RPE is confined to accounting 
relative measures, the focus appears to shift to cash related plans.  While 65 firms chose 
an RPE method involving any compensation tool, 40 chose for it to influence their bonus 
plans.  With 32 firms pre-committing to RPE in their long-term plans, 21 did so in their 
long-term cash plans and another 8 pre-committed in restricted stock plans (long-term 
plans that exclude options are essentially restricted stock and long-term cash plans).  
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Therefore, out of the 65 firms that chose to pre-commit to an accounting relative 
measure, 61 chose that method for cash related plans.  It appears that cash related plans 
are the predominant method of utilizing accounting based RPE.  This is understandable 
because the purpose of many cash plans is to compensate executives for value 
contributions that may not yet be reflected in a market valuation.   
Only 27 firms in the 403 firm sample use the broad market RPE measure 
classification.  Of those, only 5 firms utilize it for bonus calculations while 23 utilize it in 
a long-term cash plan.  As with accounting RPE plans, it appears that broad market RPE 
is primarily used for cash plan calculations.  In this case, the proprietary information 
based argument is not valid.  The most logical justification for broad market involvement 
in cash related plans, rather than in equity related plans, is based on utilizing a method 
that does not require onerous accounting treatment or does not greatly complicate the 
compensation plan.   
When considering all forms of RPE based compensation that are benchmarked to 
any external accounting or market measure, 134 firms used RPE in any compensation 
delivery classification.  When limited to bonus compensation, only 53 firms pre-
committed to RPE, while 99 pre-committed for any long-term compensation component.  
Ninety-three firms utilized an RPE method for any long-term compensation component 
except options, while 69 firms used RPE in their long-term cash related plans.  The 
simple frequency of RPE suggests that the most common compensation tool utilized is 
non-option related long-term compensation such as restricted stock/units and long-term 
cash based plans. 
It appears that firms may choose to utilize RPE when the accounting implications 
for the RPE tool are not any more burdensome than the non-RPE version of that 
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compensation tool.  This means that accounting frictions may be important when 
studying relative performance evaluation. 
Industry homogeneity is central to the tests of Hypotheses I and II.  Table III 
details the correlation of variables to the constructed homogeneity percentile while Table 
IV displays the correlation coefficients between all of the variables for the entire sample.  
In Table III, the sample is partitioned by firms that have pre-committed to a named RPE 
method and those firms that have not pre-committed.  When broad market based RPE 
pre-commitment is the partitioning method, the market-to-book ratio is negatively 
correlated with a firm’s industry homogeneity percentile for those firms that did not pre-
commit, while the pre-commit sub-sample is not significantly correlated.  A possible 
explanation for this is that there might be greater expected cumulative economic 
profitability in the future for the less homogeneous industry firms that do not pre-commit. 
The correlation of firm revenue to industry homogeneity is also of particular 
interest.  When industry relative measure pre-commitment is the partitioning method, the 
data indicates that revenues are negatively correlated with industry homogeneity in the 
pre-commitment case, but positively related in the sub-sample that did not pre-commit.  It 
is premature to draw an inference from this simple result, but it indicates that the pre-
commit sub-sample has lower revenues when competing in a highly homogeneous 
industry while the non-committal sub-sample does not seem to suffer from the same 
problem.  While the result is not as distinct for the broad market RPE partitioning case, 
the pre-commit sub-sample is statistically negatively correlated with industry 
homogeneity.  The all relative RPE partitioning case is similar to the broad market RPE 
results.   
Looking at industry percentile return correlations, I find that the pre-commit sub-
sample is negatively correlated with industry homogeneity (only when two-year 
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performance is utilized) while a correlation coefficient that is not statistically significant 
is found for the sub-sample that does not pre-commit.  This suggests that lower industry-
ranked performing firms come from higher homogeneity industries in the pre-commit 
sample but there is no apparent correlation with the sub-sample that does not pre-commit.   
It also further supports the analysis concerning firm revenues above. 
For the standard deviation of returns variable, where industry and market RPE 
pre-commitment is partitioned, the non-committal sub-samples have a negative 
correlation between homogeneity and return volatility, whereas the pre-committal sub-
samples are not statistically significantly correlated.  This occurs despite the fact that the 
volatility for the pre-commit sub-samples is statistically higher than the volatility for the 
not pre-commit sub-samples (see Table V for a pre-commitment/no pre-commitment 
volatility summary analysis).  The non-committal firms appear to operate with low 
volatility when in homogeneous industries while the committal firms do not.   The only 
other notable difference in Table III concerns dividend yields.  With respect to broad 
market commitment, the sub-sample that does not pre-commit has a statistically positive 
correlation between dividend yields and industry homogeneity, whereas the pre-commit 
sub-sample does not have a statistically significant correlation coefficient.  This means 
that for the firms that do not pre-commit, free cash flow may be positively related to 
industry homogeneity.  This is the opposite of what we would expect if homogeneity 
were positively related to the level of competition within an industry.  Alternatively, it is 
consistent with the non-committal firms coming from a group of firms with a higher cash 
flow despite the fact that many compete in homogeneous markets.   
Table III suggests that the relationship between a firm’s industry homogeneity 
level and variables that are important to the RPE pre-commitment decision will differ 
based upon whether the firm pre-committed to RPE or not.  The results are consistent 
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with lower performing firms having a greater inclination to pre-commit to RPE than 
better performing firms.  They also indicate that the non-committal firms may be 
performing more successfully when in homogeneous industries than their pre-committal 
counterparts.   
Table VI, Panel A (see Figures 1 through 5 also) partitions the firms into 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing groups. From the sample of 403 firms, 207 have 
manufacturing 2-digit SIC codes (20-39) while the remaining 196 are non-manufacturing 
SIC codes.  The sample consists of 38 different 2-digit SIC codes with 16 representing 
manufacturing firms and the remaining 22 non-manufacturing firms.    While the rate of 
pre-commitment to an RPE method appears to be somewhat larger for manufacturing 
firms when the accounting and market based methods are the choice, manufacturing 
firms pre-commit at a slightly lower rate for industry based RPE.  Although 
manufacturing firms may pre-commit at a slightly higher rate, the mean (median) 
homogeneity percentile for the manufacturing sub-sample is .3083 (.2307) while that of 
the non-manufacturing sub-sample is .6647 (.7564) (not shown).  This is particularly 
interesting because Panel B of Table VI shows that the mean homogeneity level of firms 
that pre-commit is significantly greater than that for firms that do not pre-commit to the 
industry and accounting based RPE classifications.  This suggests that while the overall 
homogeneity of the manufacturing sample is lower than for the non-manufacturing sub-
sample, there is enough “high homogeneity” manufacturing firm variation in the pre-
commit sub-sample to generate a statistical difference in means shown in Panel B.  The 
mean industry homogeneity levels for firms that commit to market based RPE shows no 
difference.  This is not surprising because broad market based RPE choice is probably not 
directly related to industry ranked performance. 
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Hypothesis II predicts that better performing firms should be less inclined to 
institute an RPE mechanism.  Table VII reviews the industry percentile returns for firms 
that pre-commit and those that do not.  When industry return percentiles are based upon a 
one-year history, the data indicate no difference in performance for firms that pre-commit 
compared to those that do not pre-commit.  However, when the data is based upon a two-
year history, for industry based RPE the pre-commitment sub-sample has a significantly 
lower percentile return history than firms that did not pre-commit to industry based RPE.  
This may indicate that compensation choices are strategic rather than tactical.  The 
accounting and broad market based RPE measures find no statistical difference, while the 
all relative based measures find a statistical difference that is driven by the industry based 
RPE measure.  The accounting measure indicates no difference in industry return 
percentiles, and this may indicate that the reason for the accounting based benchmark is 
because the measure may contain information that is not expected to be impounded in 
efficient market prices.  As the analysis proceeds we would then expect accounting based 
RPE to differ from industry based RPE on some important points.   
Empirical Results 
Table VIII, Panel A reports the probit model results using one-year industry 
percentile rankings as the performance metric to model the likelihood of an industry 
relative commitment.  Industry homogeneity or F(M) is positive and significant when all 
compensation,  all long-term compensation and long-term compensation without options 
are the compensation categories, while it is positive and significant at the 10% level for 
bonus.  This is consistent with Hypothesis I.  The one-year performance and one-year 
performance - homogeneity interaction terms are insignificant in all cases.   This suggests 
that higher homogeneity industry firms are more likely to commit to an industry 
measured RPE method when it involves all of the compensation categories except long-
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term cash.  While long-term cash compensation works easily into RPE for accounting 
purposes, it is also primarily used in practice for multi-year incentive purposes.  
Therefore, a one-year measure of performance may not be closely related to the RPE pre-
commitment decision.  The data supports Hypothesis I but not Hypothesis II.  Firm 
revenues appear to have no relation to the likelihood of a firm to pre-commit.  This 
discounts the suggestion that there may be a critical firm size that is required to institute a 
complicated compensation plan.  Research and development expenses appear to be 
positively related to pre-commitment for all long-term compensation measures as well as 
for all long-term cash compensation measures.  This result is puzzling when we consider 
that it is the restricted stock portion of compensation in the data that appears to cause the 
insignificance in the long-term compensation without options category.  This may be 
affected by the fact that restricted stock issuance precipitates an income statement 
expense that may be difficult for high research and development firms to incur.  Clinch 
(1991) finds that research and development is positively related to equity related grants.  
Therefore, the results may indicate that high research and development firms may 
continue to make equity related grants but do so without RPE implementation.  The 
number of board meetings is positively related to pre-commitment for non-cash items, 
indicating a higher level of board level activity for firms that pre-commit.   This supports 
the view that firms that pre-commit tend to have more active boards.  The market-to-book 
ratio coefficients are all significantly negative (weakly significant for long-term 
compensation without options and long-term cash compensation) for all categories except 
bonus compensation.  It appears that firms with large growth options are less inclined to 
involve RPE in their long-term compensation plans.  This may be because it is difficult to 
define an industry benchmark for these firms or because of the large income statement 
expense required by RPE in those cases.  This agrees with the findings of Murphy (2001) 
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where his measure is book-to-market and is positively related to the likelihood that a firm 
will utilize a financial market standard versus an internal standard for compensation 
calculations.  The mostly negative and significant standard deviation coefficients suggest 
that firms with higher levels of risk are less likely to pre-commit to an RPE method.  If 
firm volatility impacts the likelihood of achieving a target level of compensation, then 
volatility might also negatively impact a firm’s ability to retain an executive within an 
RPE compensation framework.  It also supports Aggarwal and Samwick’s (1999a) 
finding that executive pay-performance sensitivity is decreasing in the variance of the 
firm.  Their result suggests that the power of incentives is decreasing in the variance of 
the returns of the firm.  Dividend yield is weakly negatively significantly related to RPE 
pre-commitment for long-term cash plans.  This appears to be related to the cash 
available for such plans.  Property and plant is weakly positively related for bonus plans.  
This may suggest that for capital intensive industries there are better opportunities for 
clear short-term results measurement. 
The accounting relative measures model, Table VIII, Panel B, finds a weak 
positive relation between the one-year performance - homogeneity interaction term for all 
long-term compensation and all long-term compensation except options.  More 
homogeneous, better industry performing firms are more likely to institute accounting 
based RPE in a portion of their long-term plans.    This occurs despite the insignificance 
of the performance and the homogeneity terms when taken separate.  The only other 
variables that are significantly related are research and development (positive) and 
standard deviation (weakly negative for all long-term compensation and negative for 
long-term cash compensation).  The research and development coefficients are at least 
weakly significant for all classifications.  This reinforces the point that high research and 
development firms may be compensating executives for results that are not yet available 
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to the investing public.  That point is further reinforced by the insignificant coefficients 
concerning the market-to-book value variable.   This is not consistent with the market 
based RPE measures of Panels A and C.  The negative relation of return volatility to pre-
committing to some long-term plans suggests that RPE may induce replacement cost risk 
on firms that utilize RPE.  This may imply that a retention concern is present. The result 
is consistent with Aggarwal and Samwick (1999 a).  The evidence in Panel B is weakly 
supportive of Hypothesis I and II. 
Table VIII, Panel C exhibits the results for the broad market relative commitment 
measure.  The results suggest that more homogeneous, higher performing firms are less 
likely to pre-commit for all categories (the results are weakly significant in three of the 
cases) except bonus.  However, homogeneity by itself does not appear to have an impact.  
Against the model’s predictions, there is a weakly positive significant value for the all 
compensation category for the one-year industry percentile return.  It suggests an 
increasing likelihood of RPE commitment by higher performing firms, when not 
controlling for industry homogeneity.  Although it is weakly significant, it is investigated 
in an additional specification that utilizes a dummy variable to control for upper 50th 
percentile firms.  The evidence in Panel C is consistent with Hypothesis I but is mixed for 
Hypothesis II. 
Table VIII, Panel D shows the probit model estimation when all forms of RPE are 
used at one time (industry, broad market, and accounting).  The results suggest that 
homogeneity is the only variable of concern that has a positive relation to the likelihood 
of a firm to commit to RPE.  That result is only significant for the “all categories of 
compensation” case.  With respect to the control variables, research and development 
tends to be positively related to commitment while standard deviation is once again 
negatively related to RPE commitment.  Market to book value is generally negatively 
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related to pre-commitment while the number of board meetings is weakly positive for 
only the all long-term compensation category.  The all relative RPE measure 
specification results appear to suffer from different justifications in the use of industry 
versus accounting relative performance evaluation. Although very weak, the evidence 
provides some support for Hypothesis I. 
While the results are weak when using one-year performance return percentiles, 
the evidence provides some support for both hypothesis.  Since RPE is defined in the 
model as relative to a firm’s industry peers, the most pertinent evidence should be found 
when commitment is classified in that manner.  Gibbons and Murphy (1990) suggest that 
in some cases, the correct industry benchmark is difficult to find.  The industry based 
measures find that homogeneity is more important, while performance has greater 
importance through the homogeneity-performance interaction term in the broad market 
specification.  The positive coefficient for the one-year firm performance variable found 
for the broad market specification is investigated in Table IX.  
Hypothesis II states that better performing firms should exhibit less of an 
inclination to pre-commit to RPE than weaker performing firms.  Therefore, it may be 
incorrect to assume that there is a monotonic performance - pre-committal relationship 
throughout the industry performance spectrum.  In order to investigate the possibility that 
firms performing in the top half of their industry pre-commit to RPE in a different 
manner than lower industry-performing firms, a modified specification is used.   
Table IX shows the results where the one-year industry percentile return is 
interacted with a dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm performed in the top 50th 
percentile of all firms in its industry and zero otherwise.  The top 50th percentile dummy 
variable enters the specification by itself and is also interacted with the one-year industry 
percentile return - homogeneity percentile interaction term.  As we proceed, the focus 
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will be on the variables that directly concern Hypotheses I and II or where the new 
specification changes the results concerning the control covariates. 
The results from this alternative specification for the industry RPE measure 
(Table IX, Panel A) also support Hypothesis I.   Only the coefficients concerning the 
homogeneity level are positive and significant (weakly for long-term compensation and 
long-term compensation without options).  They provide no support for Hypothesis II, as 
all of the performance coefficients are insignificant.  Industry homogeneity is once again 
the only variable of concern that has a significant impact on the likelihood of committing 
to RPE.   
The accounting relative results, Panel B, suggest an interesting change from the 
simple results in Table VIII.  The homogeneity coefficients for all compensation and 
bonus have become weakly positive where they were insignificant in the simple 
specification.  In addition, the performance-homogeneity interaction term for all long-
term compensation and long-term compensation except options has now become 
insignificant when confined to the top half of the industry performance group.  It appears 
that the lower-half performers are driving the result in Table VIII, Panel B where the 
better performing more homogeneous firms are more likely to pre-commit to a long-term 
accounting-defined RPE based mechanism. There is weak support of Hypothesis I, and 
Hypothesis II also has weak support but only if we consider the weaker firms in the 
sample. 
Panel C in Table IX shows the interestingly positive impact of performance on 
broad market based RPE commitment.  The dummy specification suggests that the 
positive impact of one-year firm performance found in Table VIII, Panel C is driven by 
the lower performing and not the upper 50th percentile firms.  The dummy specification 
finds that for top 50th percentile firms, homogeneity and performance has no impact on 
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the likelihood of commitment.  This suggests that for broad market based RPE 
commitment, the bottom 50th percentile firms are driving the results in Table VIII, Panel 
C.  Although we must be careful not to draw premature conclusions, the results suggest 
that the lower performing firms are driving the RPE commitment results.  We must also 
note that the level of broad market RPE is related to broad market adjusted performance 
rather than the industry-adjusted performance measure utilized in the performance 
measurement.  We must therefore be critical of industry homogeneity results when 
discussing broad market related RPE.  The results from Panel C, Table VIII, in 
conjunction with those in Table VII, imply that the lower performing firms weakly 
conform with Hypothesis II whereas the better performing firms appear neutral on the 
matter. 
The all relative top-dummy specifications are similar to the simple specification 
and provide little additional insight. 
The results from the probit models support Hypothesis I in that firms that are 
provided a more accurate signal of industry-ranked performance tend to be more likely to 
pre-commit to RPE when the RPE measure is industry-adjusted market performance. 
Accounting RPE appears to contain a mild homogeneity effect while broad 
market RPE measures appear to be mildly supportive of the Hypothesis I predictions, but 
only for the lower performing firms in the sample.  Hypothesis II is weakly supported 
when considering the weaker firms in the sample. 
Commitment to any RPE form is negatively related to the standard deviation of 
firm returns.  This indicates that riskier firms tend to be less inclined to commit to RPE. 
Two-Year Performance Relations 
Pre-commitment to RPE may be used by compensation committees as a strategic 
rather than a short-term tool.  It may be important to consider a firm’s industry rank over 
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a time period greater than one year when analyzing compensation design alternatives.  If 
a board needs to alter a firm’s compensation incentive drivers, then it is reasonable to 
assume that they would base their decisions on long-term competitive trends.  In order to 
investigate that possibility, the simple specification utilizing two-year industry rankings 
is first shown in Table X and a dummy specification is shown in Table XI.   
Table X reports the results using two-year rankings.  The results generally find 
that RPE pre-commitment is related to the two-year performance data to a greater extent 
than when using the one-year performance data.  The industry relative measures in Panel 
A support Hypothesis I and are mixed for Hypothesis II.  The homogeneity coefficient is 
positive and highly significant when all compensation, all long-term compensation, and 
all long-term compensation without options are the compensation categories, while long-
term cash compensation is positive and significant at the 10% level.  The homogeneity-
two-year percentile interaction terms are negative and highly significant in two of the five 
compensation categories, while the all compensation and long-term compensation 
without options are negative and significant at the 10% level.  Higher performance-higher 
homogeneity industry firms tend to be less likely to commit to an RPE choice while 
greater homogeneity alone appears to increase the likelihood that an RPE mechanism will 
be irrevocably put in place.  Note that the two-year percentile coefficients in columns (3) 
and (4) are marginally significant and positive.  This weakly suggests that higher ranked 
firms, absent their industry homogeneity, are more likely to commit to an RPE method 
when that method involves equity related compensation tools.  This is counter to the 
Hypothesis II predictions and is further investigated in a top performing dummy 
specification.  The control covariates research and development, the number of board 
meetings, market-to-book value, standard deviation, and property and plant have the 
same direction and significance level as when the one-year performance data is used in 
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the analysis.  The one exception is dividend yield (for long-term cash compensation) 
where the result is marginally significant for the one-year data and insignificant when 
using the two-year data.   
The two-year return percentile specification for accounting relative RPE results in 
Panel B measures appear not to be related to industry homogeneity or industry based 
performance.  While the homogeneity result is surprising, the performance result may be 
intuitive.  Since accounting returns by design are intended to report single year results, 
we should expect to find that a longer-run market based performance result would not be 
related to a RPE pre-commitment, which is based upon an accounting measure.  
The broad market results, Table X Panel C, using two-year percentile are similar 
to the one-year percentile specification.  Pre-commitment is weakly related to the two-
year percentile – homogeneity interaction term while apparently not related to 
homogeneity.  The two-year industry percentile has a significantly positive relation to the 
likelihood of a bonus level commitment.  This is surprising when we consider that most 
bonus plans are intended to compensate for a single year’s performance.  This is also 
further investigated with a dummy specification.  The results weakly support Hypothesis 
II in that the better industry-performing, more homogeneous firms are less inclined to 
pre-commit to market base RPE measures. 
The all relative measures RPE classification in Panel D is consistent with the 
results of the industry relative measure.  The homogeneity coefficients for all 
compensation, all long-term compensation, all long-term compensation except options, 
and long-term cash compensation are positive and significant (not at conventional levels 
for long-term cash compensation).   The two-year industry percentile - homogeneity 
interaction terms are negative and significant at the 10% level for all long-term 
compensation and all long-term compensation except options.  The results for the two-
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year industry percentile effects are insignificant in all cases.  Panel D finds that more 
homogeneous firms tend to be more inclined to pre-commit to any form of RPE while the 
better industry-performing, more homogeneous firms tend to be weakly less inclined to 
pre-commit to equity based long-term incentives. 
The results in Table X suggest that the high industry homogeneity firms are more 
likely to commit to an industry based RPE mechanism, usually through a long-term 
compensation choice.  This supports Hypothesis I.  The results also weakly support 
Hypothesis II because higher performing, more homogeneous firms are less likely to 
commit to broad market RPE than low performing, more homogeneous firms.  If higher 
industry performance ranked firms have greater retention concerns, then the results 
support the Hypothesis I interpretation that firms with lower retention concerns will be 
more likely to publicly announce their intention to utilize an RPE method.   The results 
concerning broad market based RPE suggest very weak support of Hypothesis II because 
performance, absent a homogeneity measure, appears to be weakly positively related to 
pre-commitment.   
In order to investigate the positive relation that Table X found for the positive 
return percentile relationship to the likelihood of pre-commitment (for industry and broad 
market RPE measures), the dummy specification for top 50th percentile firms is once 
again utilized.  Table XI shows the results of that specification.   
Table XI, Panel A shows that the two-year industry percentile return - top 50th 
percentile dummy term is insignificant in all cases.  This suggests that the positive 
inclination of better performing firms in Table X, Panel A, absent their homogeneity 
levels, to impose an RPE mechanism is not related to the upper 50th percentile.  In fact, it 
is the better performing firms in the lower 50th percentile, independent of industry 
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homogeneity, that are more likely to pre-commit.   The results provide support for 
Hypothesis I and II.    
The accounting RPE measure, in Panel B, has one change from the simple 
specification in Table X.  The coefficient on the homogeneity term is now weakly 
significant for all compensation and bonus.  This change from Table X is apparently 
caused by the lower performing firm characteristics that are being picked up by the 
homogeneity factor rather than the homogeneity-performance factor in the simple 
specification.  The dummy variable specifications provide weak support for an industry 
homogeneity factor in committing to accounting-based RPE compensation. 
As with the one-year dummy specifications, the results for the broad market 
measure, Table XI, Panel C find that the lower 50th percentile firms in the sample were 
driving the effects that supported Hypothesis II.   
The all relative measures give results that are very similar to the simple two-year 
specification.  Both Hypothesis I and II are supported. 
Murphy (1999) mentions that RPE is increasingly popular in utilities and cyclical 
industries.  Although he does not provide a formal definition of a cyclical industry, he 
defines a utility as any firm with a 2-digit SIC code of 49.  As a robustness check 
concerning the Table XI analysis, a separate probit analysis (not shown) was analyzed 
where a dummy variable representing a firm from the utility 2-digit SIC code (49) was 
added to the Table XI specification.  The results concerning the non-utility coefficients 
are the same with one exception.  For accounting relative measures, bonus RPE is 
positively related to homogeneity while the more homogeneous better performing firms 
are less likely to pre-commit.  Utilities do not appear to be driving the analysis.  In fact, 
utilities appear to be less likely to pre-commit to an accounting measure bonus RPE plan 
because the coefficient is negative and significant for the utility dummy variable. 
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The results from the probit models support Hypothesis I that firms in more 
homogeneous industries tend to be more likely to pre-commit to RPE when the RPE 
measure is industry adjusted market performance.  There is some weak evidence that 
firms in more homogeneous industries are also more likely to pre-commit to accounting 
and broad market based RPE.  Hypothesis II is also supported because weaker 
performing, more homogeneous industry firms are also more likely to commit to 
compensation based RPE when it is benchmarked to a firm’s industry.  That evidence is 
much stronger when the industry ranked performance is measured over two years rather 
than one year.  This provides some evidence of retention concerns in the pay-for-
performance relationship in executive compensation.  It also provides some evidence that 
compensation related decisions appear to be more related to long-term rather than short-
term performance measures. 
The broad market RPE measure appears to be related to homogeneity and to 
industry performance measures, but only for the lower 50th percentile industry firms in 
the sample.  Top 50th percentile firm commitment appears to have little relation to either 
homogeneity or two-year industry return percentiles.  One cause for this may be that 
firms are measuring their performance relative to the entire market rather than to an 
industry related market performance drift.   
The results concerning the control covariates are also telling of the way RPE is 
utilized.  In general it is found that research and development expenses and the number of 
board meetings are positively related to the likelihood of pre-commitment to a form of 
RPE.  This is indicative of firm’s rewarding executives for long-term results as well as 
the need for an active board to integrate an RPE mechanism.  RPE commitment is 
generally negatively related to market-to-book ratios, firm return volatility, and dividend 
yields.  This suggest that the greater growth prospects and risk characteristics of a firm, 
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the less the likelihood of pre-committing to RPE.  The growth prospects aspect is easy to 
reconcile since many RPE based plans require cash that may be limited for high growth 
firms.  However the negative relation to return volatility is counter to what some earlier 
theory based results would suggest if the volatility is not in the control of the executive.  
One explanation for this result is that return volatility may produce compensation 
volatility.  If compensation volatility creates voluntary departure difficulties for firms, 
then those with high return volatility may be less likely to introduce high powered 
incentives, such as RPE, to their compensation schemes.  This is similar to the Aggarwal 
and Samwick (1999a) findings. 
Summary 
The chapter provides evidence that an industry based RPE public pre-commitment 
occurs with greater frequency in more homogeneous industries; however, the more 
homogeneous an industry is, the less likely its top performers are to pre-commit.  This 
provides evidence of an increased concern for executive retention at the higher industry 
performance levels where quality replacements may be expensive to identify and hire.  
Top performing firms, independent of their homogeneity level, are neither more nor less 
likely to commit to any RPE system.   
Accounting based RPE appears be related to homogeneity or retention concerns 
for only the lower 50th percentile performers.  It is however negatively related to firm risk 
as with the other RPE measures.   
Broad market based RPE commitment has a mild negative relation to pre-
commitment for the more homogeneous, weaker performing firms in the industry.  The 
empirical evidence is consistent with the prediction that retention concerns are integrated 
into the decision to pre-commit to RPE.   
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The evidence suggests that retentions concerns may be an important factor to the 
difficulty in documenting RPE such as in Antle and Smith (1986), Gibbons and Murphy 
(1990), and Ely (1991). 
The financial market based results appear to be stronger when a firm’s two-year 
industry performance is used to proxy for replacement costs versus one-year performance 
results.  This is consistent with the suggestion that RPE compensation decisions are 
strategic rather than tactical tools.  
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Chapter 5: Clarity of Signal Tests in Post-Performance RPE 
Compensation 
The previous chapter analyzed the likelihood of a firm pre-committing to a 
specific form of RPE when executive replacement costs vary.  The results support the 
Chapter 3 prediction that high replacement cost firms will be less likely to pre-commit to 
RPE than low replacement cost firms.  They do not, however, completely distinguish 
between committing to RPE for replacement cost reasons or for clarity of signal reasons.    
The model’s prediction is concerned with ex ante pre-commitment and is not intended to 
apply to post-performance RPE pay-performance variation.  That is because post-
performance RPE will be the result of the explicit RPE pre-commitment choice as well as 
an implicit RPE choice where a firm may exercise its option to include RPE in its 
compensation levels at the end of the performance period without the burden of a pre-
commitment choice.   
The post-performance data creates an opportunity to discriminate between two 
competing homogeneity based arguments: 1) a firm competing in a more homogeneous 
industry will receive a more meaningful signal for its industry-adjusted performance and 
should therefore find RPE easier to implement after performance can be estimated, versus 
2) better industry performers are subject to greater retention concerns than industry 
laggards and are therefore more concerned that the post-performance payouts to their 
executives are reconcilable to their firm’s industry-adjusted performance.  If RPE 
variation is related to the clarity of an RPE signal instead of replacement cost issues, then 
we would expect greater post-performance RPE for firms that compete in more 
homogeneous industries.  If post-performance RPE variation is not related to 
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homogeneity, but is related to performance, then that would suggest replacement costs to 
be more important than signal clarity.   
This chapter proceeds by testing the relationship between the post-performance 
(or ex post) pay between executives and their firm’s industry-adjusted performance as 
well as the firm’s degree of industry homogeneity.  The higher performing sample should 
consist of the higher performing firms that have committed to RPE and then earned a 
higher calculated payout as well as the higher performing firms that did not commit to 
RPE and yet utilized their option after the performance period to compensate at a higher 
discretionary level in order to protect against losing an executive for compensation 
reasons.  The lower performing sample consists of firms that pre-committed, and 
therefore had a lower compensation level, as well as firms that did not pre-commit who 
are free to compensate their executives with a base level of compensation that may have 
little relation to firm performance.  That argument predicts that higher performing firm 
executives should have greater RPE in their ex post payouts than lower performing firm 
executives.  It also predicts a lessened effect from clarity of signal issues.   
With the premise that replacement costs will play an important role in 
implementing compensation RPE, Hypothesis III is presented to help discriminate 
between the clearer signal argument and the retention cost argument. 
 
Hypothesis III:  If firms are in need of a more meaningful signal in order to successfully 
implement a relative performance mechanism in their compensation plans, then the ex 
post pay-performance relation in more homogeneous industries will exhibit greater RPE 
than for firms from less homogeneous industries. 
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A rejection of Hypothesis III will not be sufficient to provide support for the 
central role of replacement costs in RPE implementation.  Support for the replacement 
costs argument also requires that industry-adjusted performance is important to whether a 
firm compensates in a manner consistent with RPE or not.   
Empirical Setup and Data Description  
The ex post empirical tests concerning Hypothesis III generally follow the 
specification of Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b).  Instead of regressing compensation on 
industry adjusted firm returns, the independent variables are the firm’s dollar returns and 
the dollar returns on the firm’s industry (the index).  This specification will indicate RPE 
if there is a negative coefficient for the index returns.  The benefit to this specification is 
that the pay-to-own-firm-performance relationship can also be estimated.  RPE is tested 
in this study for variation related to changes in levels of performance and homogeneity.  
In the ex post analysis, homogeneity will serve primarily as a proxy for the clarity of the 
performance signal received by the firm.  The initial specification is as follows: 


























=ijtw compensation in thousands (total direct compensation, TDC1) received by 
 executive i at firm j in year t. 
0
jtπ = the total 1995-level adjusted dollar (millions) return to all shareholders of firm j 
  during period t-1 to t. 
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r
jtπ = the total 1995-level adjusted dollar (millions) return from investing an amount equal
 to the total common stock value of firm j at time t-1 in an index composed of 
  value weighted firms in the same 2-digit industry as firm j during period t-1 to t.
 The index is rebalanced monthly. 
)F(H j = the cumulative density function (percentile) value associated with the  
  Herfindahl index value for the 4-digit SIC code that is firm j’s primary  
  line of business. 
)MF( j = the cumulative density function value (percentile) associated with a  
  mean partial correlation for the 2-digit SIC code that is firm j’s primary line of 
  business. 
ψt    = a dummy variable to indicate whether the compensation was received in  
  1994 -  2000. 
itCEO = a dummy variable indicating whether executive i is the CEO during  
  period t.   
 
The specification is designed to test whether firms are filtering out (indexing) the 
returns of their own industry when they make their payouts or grants to their executives.  
If firms filter for the industry drift in their returns, then η2 would be negative.  If it is 
related to either the level of industry competition or the level of industry homogeneity, 
then η4, or η7, respectfully, will be negative. 
Compensation and firm return performance is denominated in dollars 
(compensation is in thousands, while firm performance is in millions) in order to provide 
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a sharing rule interpretation.  The Herfindahl data is utilized in the initial specification in 
order to provide a baseline comparison to Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b).  Industry 
homogeneity is included per the prediction of Hypothesis III.  Year dummies are included 
to account for increases in compensation related to time trends rather than to a firm’s 
performance and a dummy to control for CEOs, who generally earn more than non-
CEOs. 
Equation (36) also includes the following control variables: revenue, research and 
development as a percentage of revenue, market-to-book value, monthly standard 
deviation of equity returns for the firm for the preceding 60 months prior to time t, an 
indicator variable when the executive is a member of the board of directors, the number 
of board meetings, and property plant and equipment as a percentage of book value.  In 
addition to the discussion below, prior research has indicated that these factors might 
impact compensation decisions.7  
Revenue is included to control for increased levels of compensation related to 
span of control factors.  Per the Chapter 4 finding that research and development is 
positively related to a firm’s inclination to pre-commit to RPE, it is also included in the 
ex post analysis.  Market-to-book ratios and standard deviation of firm returns were 
found to have a negative relationship with pre-commitment and are appropriately 
included in the ex post analysis.  The board member variable is included to control for the 
higher levels of compensation awarded to executives whose importance to the firm is 
great enough to merit a seat on the board.  The number of board meetings is included to 
control for the positive inclination of more active boards to enact pre-commitment RPE.  
Finally, property and plant as a percentage of book value is included to account for any 
differences in compensation that occur for firms with a large assets-in-place strategy. 
                                                 
7 See Murphy (1998).  In a specification not shown, a variable is introduced to control for the equity-based 
holdings of each executive in his or her firm.  The holdings variable did not affect the results. 
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An additional specification is used to check for changes in compensation: 























  (37) 
Equation (37) is also adjusted for the control variables previously mentioned.    
If industry homogeneity has an effect on firm use of RPE, then η7 < 0 in 
equations (36) and (37).   
While Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b) used median regressions in the majority of 
their paper, I use OLS with standard errors robust to intra-company covariation in this 
analysis.  If industry-adjusted performance is central to ex post RPE use, then we should 
expect higher performing firms to utilize RPE in a different manner than weaker 
performing firms.  Therefore the skewed compensation data evident in Table XIV may 
contain meaningful information that OLS will not de-emphasize.  The time series data is 
pooled.   
Data 
The tests utilize the same methodology as Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b) and 
consequently utilize a similar data set and time period (1993-1995) as well as more recent 
data (1994-2000).   The market return data is from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) database.   Compensation data from Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp 
database is combined with data from Compustat and with Herfindahl data from the 
Commerce Department’s Census of Manufacturers.  As in Chapter 4, industry 
homogeneity calculations are from Parrino (1997, p. 189) and are converted to a sample 
cumulative distribution function value (percentile) for each 2-digit mean partial 
correlation coefficient to create the variable F(M), or homogeneity percentile.  A similar 
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calculation is made for the Herfindahl indices.   That data is provided at the 4-digit SIC-
code level and is then used to calculate the Herfindahl percentile variable or F(H).  F(H) 
is included in the early regressions to ensure that it is not highly correlated with F(M).  
Although not reported in the tables, the Pearson Correlation Coefficient for F(M) and 
F(H) is  -.1508 for the sample.  It seems unlikely that the homogeneity variable is a proxy 
for the level of competition in an industry.  The Herfindahl data is available for 4-digit 
manufacturing SIC codes 2000 through 3999 and therefore cannot be used to analyze the 
non-manufacturing data.  
The ExecuComp data set includes compensation information for the top five 
compensated executives of a firm (one of which must be the CEO), ranked by salary plus 
bonus.  The sample includes data for firms in the S&P 500, S&P Midcap 400, and S&P 
SmallCap 600 which I will collectively call the S&P 1500.  The data include firms in the 
1993 through 2000 years as defined by Compustat.   
Summary Statistics 
The summary statistics for the firms in the sample are provided in Table XII.  
Both the market-to-book ratios and revenue data are heavily skewed because the sample 
consists of the very largest firms in the U.S. as well smaller firms with very high 
valuations compared to their book values.  Less than fifty percent of the firms had 
research and development expenses, but the heavy distribution skew produced an average 
revenue multiple of 12.15%.  The data appear to be heavily skewed for growth value, 
size, and research and development.  This is partially a result of the mix of very large and 
very small public firms in the sample. The average (median) property and plant as a 
percentage of book value was 31.36% (25.45%).  The mean (median) sixty-month 
standard deviation of returns was 10.61% (9.52%).  The homogeneity and Herfindahl 
percentiles are fairly symmetric, with means close to the 50th percentile in both instances.  
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There are on average 7.24 board meetings per year with a median of seven meetings.  Of 
the CEO data points, about 99% of the CEOs were also on the board of directors. 
Table XIII lists the correlation coefficients between all of the variables used in the 
analysis.  Note that industry homogeneity is negatively correlated with levels of 
compensation, as well as with dollar returns to firm and dollar returns to the industry 
index, research and development, and the common stock return volatility.  This is the 
expected result of an industry with many similar products and services.   
Table XIV compares the compensation summary data for 1995 to 2000, stated in 
December 1995 dollars.  While compensation has increased in all categories by a 
considerable amount, the largest increases occurred in the option portion of long-term 
compensation.  CEO median (mean) total compensation increased from $1.307 ($2.257) 
million to $2.327 ($6.363) million for an increase of about 78% (182%) during the 
period.  Short-term compensation increased from $.76 million ($1.052 million) to $.862 
million ($1.352 million) or about 13% (29%) during the period while long-term 
compensation increased about 147% (316%).  Of that, median (mean) option grants 
increased by about 237% (389%).  As a percent of total compensation, long-term 
compensation increased from about 36.7% (36.8%) of the total package in 1995 to about 
55.8% (51.8%) in 2000.  While this is consistent with greater pay-performance sensitivity 
for the sample, it is also consistent with firms endeavoring to increase the target level of 
pay for executives with minimal income statement expense.   
The non-CEO sample finds a similar trend.  Median (mean) total compensation 
increased about 72% (158%) during the period while the short-term component increased 
23% (40%) reflecting greater cash compensation percentage increases for non-CEOs than 
for CEOs.  The long-term component increased by 188% (287%) during the period and is 
primarily composed of a 277% (377%) increase in the size of option grants.  The greatest 
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percentage increases came from long-term compensation components.  Long-term 
compensation was 30.5% (32.1%) of total compensation in 1995 and increased to 49.8% 
(48.1%) in 2000. 
Executive compensation increased at a much faster rate than inflation during the 
period.  The simple statistics suggest that firms shifted a greater percentage of total 
compensation to long-term (performance related) components, and options in particular.  
Option related compensation is a tool that generally has the weakest RPE component.  
This should make RPE more difficult to detect in the sample as the firms age.   From 
1995 to 2000, the non-CEO compensation increases are similar to the CEO compensation 
increases.  If the large increases in compensation were indicative of the demand for high-
powered talent, then the demand for sub-CEO talent was also high.   
Also of interest, both sub-samples show that more than 75% of the observations 
did not grant restricted stock/units.  As discussed in Appendix A, while restricted 
stock/units are expensed in all cases and should therefore be RPE neutral, it is not a 
compensation delivery choice for the majority of the firms in the sample. This should 
also limit RPE documentation in the sample.  
Empirical Results 
The total compensation results for manufacturing firms are presented in columns 
(1) – (4) of Table XV.  The specifications in columns (1) and (2) utilize Herfindahl 
percentiles, F(H), in order to compare to the results to those of Aggarwal and Samwick 
(1999b).  The results are similar to Aggarwal and Samwick except that those in Table XV 
are less statistically significant.  One departure from their results is in column (1) where 
F(H) is positive but insignificant and the dollar returns to firm  -  F(H)  interaction term is 
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also insignificantly positive.8  The Table XV specification finds that the dollar returns to 
industry index  -  F(H) interaction term is negative and significant.  The magnitude of the 
index  -  F(H) interaction term is large enough to indicate that at high levels of F(H), 
complete filtering of the industry return (or RPE) may be occurring where it was not in 
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b).  The difference in results may be caused by using 2-
digit SIC codes to construct the index returns, while Aggarwal and Samwick calculate 
index returns using 3’ and 4-digit SIC codes.  Another alternative is that the data set 
covers 1993- 2000, while the Aggarwal and Samwick data stops at 1995.  A similar 
comparison can be made for the change in compensation specification in column (2) of 
Table XV.   
With respect to industry homogeneity, F(M), the specifications in columns (1) and 
(2) suggest that homogeneity has no relation to industry return filtering, while the F(M)-
dollar returns to firm are negative and weakly significant.  This counter-intuitive result 
suggests that compensation is negatively related to firm performance at higher levels of 
industry homogeneity.  Further analysis suggests that this may be caused by the weaker 
performing firms in the sample where the performance-compensation relation may be 
different than for better performing firms.  Note that throughout the regression analysis, 
the number of observations is quite large.  In Table XV there are as many as 23,600 
observations.  With such a large number of observations, the statistical tests may find 
significant results that might not occur with a smaller, more reasonable number of 
observations.  One means for adjusting for this problem is to require a higher statistical 
significance threshold.  However, in the tests that follow, the homogeneity-related 
filtering variables are not generally significant at conventional test levels while the index 
filtering variables are significant at high test levels. Therefore, the results that follow 
                                                 
8 Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b) find that the own performance interaction term is positive and significant 
while the index interaction term is negative and significant. 
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should be robust to reasonable adjustments for the large number of variables in the 
samples. 
The results in columns (1) and (2) of Table XV provide no support for industry 
homogeneity in RPE.  They do indicate a mild form of RPE but only for firms with very 
little competition in their industry.  
While Aggarwal and Samwick confine their analysis to manufacturing firms 
where U.S. Census Bureau data is available, this study investigates homogeneity and 
retention effects on non-manufacturing firms as well.  Columns (3) and (4) in Table XV 
show the results from the specifications listed in equations (38) and (39) for the 
manufacturing firms in order to investigate the effects of excluding the Herfindahl data as 
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Although additional data is available when not utilizing the Herfindahl related 
variables, the sample size is kept constant for comparability.  Comparing columns (3) and 
(4) to (1) and (2) shows that the results are altered in three respects.  First, the 
homogeneity coefficient that was negative and insignificant is now negative and 
marginally significant in column (3).  Second, the dollar returns to firm - homogeneity 
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interactive terms have changed from negative and marginally significant to insignificant.  
Finally, the dollar returns to firm variable has weakened in significance for the levels 
specification, while it has stayed positive but has become significant in the changes in 
compensation specification.  For the regressions with and without the Herfindahl index 
data, the dollar returns to industry index  -  homogeneity percentile interaction terms are 
insignificant.  This suggests that industry homogeneity is not consequential to firms when 
filtering for industry return drifts.  The results are the same for the specifications that 
include the Herfindahl data as well as those that do not.  To get some perspective 
concerning the sharing rule that the firms in the sample are collectively employing, the 
levels specification finds that for each $1,000 in shareholder wealth that is created, an 
additional 5.7 cents of compensation is paid to the executive, while the changes 
specification shows the sensitivity to be about 8.2 cents.   
For the control variables, the results are generally consistent with expectations.  
Compensation levels and changes are positively related to whether the executive is the 
CEO as well as the level of revenues for the firm.  Both suggest that larger 
responsibilities are rewarded with larger levels and changes in levels of compensation.  
That is consistent with Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b).  Research and development is 
negatively related to the levels and changes in compensation but only for the non-
manufacturing sample.  The manufacturing sample contains research and development 
coefficients that have the same sign but are not as significant as with Aggarwal and 
Samwick (1999b).  One explanation for the difference could be the wider defined index 
that I have used compared to the narrower defined indices for their sample.  However, 
Himmelberg and Hubbard (1999) find research and development to be positively related 
to the level of compensation.  One difference between the results is that Himmelberg and 
Hubbard use very parsimonious models in their empirical work.  The additional control 
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variables in my study might account for the difference. If research and development 
expenses proxy for the demand for specific human capital, then my results are not 
consistent with retention concerns in compensation arrangements.  Market-to-book values 
are positively related to compensation.  That is not surprising because market values are a 
cumulative measurement value for firm historical returns.  In addition, Smith and Watts 
(1992) find that firms with more growth options generally compensate their executives at 
a higher level.  Standard deviations are negatively related to compensation levels and 
changes.  Manufacturing firms appear to be providing incentives to reduce firm return 
volatility.  This is somewhat consistent with Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) where firms 
with volatile return streams have a reduced pay-performance sensitivity.   Executives 
who are board members tend to be paid more and get larger raises than their non-board 
counterparts.  This is the opposite of the Aggarwal and Samwick finding.  However, 
since executive board members are generally perceived to be central to a firm’s strategic 
operation, I believe that the higher pay result is intuitively correct.  Compensation is 
positively related to the number of board meetings that occur during the year.  This 
suggests that the number of board meetings required throughout the year may be related 
to the amount of effort required by an organization.  The result is also consistent with 
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b).  Property and plant is negatively related to levels and 
changes.  An explanation for this is that property and plant may be a proxy for a reduced 
span of influence for firms where there are a large number of assets in place.  
The non-manufacturing compensation data exhibits little relation to any form of 
indexing.   Homogeneity is positively and significantly related to both the levels and 
changes in compensation.  The sign of the homogeneity coefficients are positive for non-
manufacturing, but negative for manufacturing firms. This may indicate that the 
fundamental compensation relationship for non-manufacturing firms differs from that of 
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manufacturing firms.  Alternatively, industry homogeneity in manufacturing may indicate 
less of a requirement for specific expertise while it has a different meaning for non-
manufacturing firms.  There is also a different effect for the two sub-samples indicated 
with a positive non-manufacturing coefficient for return standard deviation.  This means 
that risk reduction incentives are provided in manufacturing firms while they are not in 
non-manufacturing firms.  For compensation levels and changes, all of the dollar returns 
to industry index related coefficients are insignificant.  
The results from Table XV suggest that industry homogeneity has little impact on 
the decision for a firm to compensate with respect to RPE.  In fact, once the Herfindahl 
data is excluded there is no indication of an industry filtering effect.  The manufacturing 
data does not support Hypothesis III.   While the non-manufacturing data also does not 
support the hypothesis, no evidence of industry filtering is provided. 
The Total Cash Compensation (TCC) specification results are shown in Table 
XVI.  The results are similar to those for total compensation data, with the exception that 
for the non-manufacturing sample, the changes in cash compensation specification 
indicates a weak anti-indexing effect for higher homogeneous firms.  This is puzzling 
because the coefficients on the own firm returns are insignificant.  Lewellen, Loderer, 
and Martin (1987) explain that compensation should be viewed as a balance between 
short-term and long-term incentives.  Although it is important to view the entire 
compensation package, the result indicates that non-manufacturing firms may be shifting 
compensation delivery from longer-term compensation to cash.  In the process, they 
appear to be rewarding more for industry good fortune than for firm performance.  The 
results are consistent with Janakiraman, Lambert, and Larcker (1992), where little 
evidence of RPE is found in salary and bonus compensation data.   
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High and low performing firms may compensate their executives through 
formulae that are affected differently by minimum compensation level guarantees.  If 
true, then by forcing top and bottom industry performer effects onto the same 
performance variable, the regressions will dilute the RPE results that are being measured.  
Table XVII utilizes the same specifications of columns (3) through (6) of Table XV with 
the added introduction of a dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm has performed 
in the top 50th percentile of its 2-digit SIC code and zero otherwise.  The top dummy 
variable is then interacted with the dollar returns to firm, dollar returns to industry index, 
homogeneity, dollar returns to firm  -  homogeneity, and dollar returns to industry index  
-  homogeneity variables in order to isolate the effects of top performers on the variables.   
The manufacturing and non-manufacturing data is combined for columns (1) and 
(2).  For both the levels and changes in levels specifications, top performing firms have a 
positive pay relation to firm returns and a negative relation for index returns.  For 
example, where a lower 50%ile firm would actually lose 36.5 cents of compensation per 
$1,000 of firm return, the top 50%ile firms would benefit by a net amount of 23.1 (-36.5 
+ 59.6) cents per $1,000 of firm dollar return.  The homogeneity interaction coefficients 
are not significant.  The negative dollar returns to firm coefficient implies that the weaker 
performing firms in the industry may be disconnecting compensation from their own firm 
performance.  The dollar returns to industry and dollar returns to industry - top 
interaction terms are also opposite signs in column (1).  The results suggest that the top 
firms filter out the industry return, whereas the weaker performing firms compensate for 
the industry return (for changes in compensation only).  Homogeneity tends to increase 
both levels and changes in compensation for the top performers in an industry.  However, 
homogeneity has no impact on the use of RPE or the firm dollar return relationship.  The 
results do not support Hypothesis III.  In addition, top performing firms appear to filter 
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for industry returns more than bottom performing firms.  The degree of filtering is not 
related to industry homogeneity.  The evidence for the all- firm sample suggests that the 
clarity of the RPE signal is not central to the RPE decision.  It is also consistent with 
replacement costs being central to the RPE decision. 
Columns (3) and (4) use the prior specification with the manufacturing data 
subset.  The tendency for top performers to filter out the industry return and compensate 
for firm returns, absent a homogeneity interaction effect, is similar to the all-firm sample.  
However, for the levels regression in column (3), homogeneity has an impact on the own 
firm pay-performance relationships.  The top 50th percentile industry-performing, more 
homogeneous firms have a negative pay-performance relationship with their own firm 
returns, whereas the lesser performing firms have a positive relationship.  Also logically 
reversed is the positive coefficient for the dollar returns to industry index  –  homogeneity  
-  top interactive term, which means that a portion of the index return was given to these 
executives and not filtered out.  It appears that top performing firms are filtering out the 
industry return, yet the top performing, more homogeneous firms are reversing out that 
industry filtering.  The positive effect of industry homogeneity on the level and changes 
in compensation is again positive for the top performers.  The coefficients on the standard 
deviation terms are negative, indicating an incentive to reduce firm risk in the 
manufacturing sample.  The evidence weakly rejects Hypothesis III because more 
homogeneous firms did not exhibit greater RPE.  In fact, industry filtering is being 
reversed for the more homogeneous, better performing firms.  RPE is once again more 
prevalent in higher performing firms. 
The non-manufacturing data in columns (5) and (6) suggests a similar trend.  As 
with the manufacturing sub-sample, the higher performing non-manufacturing firms tend 
to be compensated positively for their own-firm returns where the poorer firms tend to 
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have a negative relationship to such returns.  Only the levels specification in column (5) 
finds industry return filtering for the top firms (at less than conventional levels of 
significance).  Homogeneity once again tends to positively affect both the levels and 
changes in compensation with no relationship to industry filtering or own-firm 
performance based compensation.  Only the levels regression finds a positive weakly 
significant relationship between risk and compensation.   This indicates a weak incentive 
to incur additional firm risk.  Columns (5) and (6) do not support Hypothesis III.   
The results in Table XVII suggest that firm performance has the greatest impact 
on the RPE compensation relation.  Homogeneity has very little impact and tends to work 
against ex post RPE measurement when it has an impact. 
As a robustness check concerning the covariation of compensation among 
executives within a firm, an additional cross-section of the data is analyzed.  First, CEOs 
and non-CEOs are split into separate samples.  Then the non-CEO sample is aggregated 
and averaged to create a single non-CEO data point for each firm for each year the firm 
appears in the sample.  Finally, the specifications in Table XVI are utilized for the two 
samples and are shown in Table XVIII. 
For the CEO levels specification in column (1), the earlier findings are confirmed.  
Top performing CEO compensation has a positive relationship with firm performance 
whereas the compensation of the lower performing firm CEOs does not.  The top 
performing CEO compensation levels exhibit some index filtering while the general 
sample population shows the reverse.  Homogeneity has a positive relation with the level 
of CEO pay for the general sample population.  In the changes in compensation 
specification shown in column (2), the results are similar but slightly weaker. 
Homogeneity has a positive impact on the size of the changes in the general CEO 
population with an additional positive impact for the top performing CEOs.  For CEOs, 
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industry return filtering occurs for the top performers but it is not related to the level of 
industry homogeneity for the firm.  This provides evidence against Hypothesis III and is 
also consistent with RPE being related to replacement costs.  
For the non-CEO aggregated sample, the levels specification in column (3) also 
confirms the earlier findings.  Top performing firms have a positive and highly 
significant dollar returns to firm coefficient whereas the weaker firms have coefficients 
with significantly negative signs.  Similarly, the top performing firms have a negative and 
significant dollar returns to industry coefficient.  It is positive for the general population 
in the levels specification.  The top performing firms receive a higher level of 
compensation if they are in more homogeneous industries.   
In the changes in compensation specification in column (4), the results are 
significant only for the dollar returns to firm variables.  The coefficient on the dollar 
returns to firm  -  top interaction coefficient is positive and highly significant, while the 
result for the weaker firms is negative.  As with the levels specification, homogeneity for 
the top performing firms has a positive and significant relation to the changes in 
compensation.  The non-CEO data also provides evidence against Hypothesis III while 
also indicating that replacement costs impact the level of ex post RPE that a firm exhibits. 
While the results in Table XVIII are not as definitive as in prior tables, they are 
indicative of the same general trends.  Top performing firms (those performing in the top 
50th percentile of their 2-digit SIC code industry) exhibited a greater pay-for-performance 
relationship to their own firm performance, but they also exhibited a greater filtering 
tendency for their industry performance.  RPE was found for top performers but not for 
the lower 50th percentile performers.  In only one circumstance did homogeneity have an 
impact on RPE, and the impact was the opposite required for RPE.  The results do not 
support Hypothesis III because homogeneity does not appear to impact ex post measured 
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RPE.  Higher performing firms tend to exhibit more ex post RPE than lower performing 
firms.   
An interesting aspect of the results is that lower 50th percentile firms have a pay-
performance relationship that is at times negatively related to their own firm performance 
and positively related to their industry index performance.  From a pay-performance 
perspective, this may indicate that for lower performance percentile firms, the pay-
performance relationship breaks down in favor of minimum guaranteed compensation 
levels that rewards performers but does not reduce compensation for poor performers.  A 
simple representation of what this might look like is shown in Figure 7.   The figure 
clearly describes a limited liability contract. 
An additional OLS analysis concerning the behavior of firms, conditioning upon 
pre-commitment/no pre-commitment is provided in Table XIX.  The S&P 500 sample of 
firms used in the Chapter 4 analysis is analyzed for their pay-performance relationships.  
Due to the availability of compensation and accounting related data, the sample allowed 
analysis for the 2001 Standard & Poor’s defined year. Columns (1) and (2) concern firms 
that pre-committed to RPE while columns (3) and (4) concern the remaining firms in the 
sample that did not commit to RPE.   
Some summary data will first be helpful in interpreting the data.  From the sample 
that pre-committed to RPE, the sample is once again sub-categorized according to 
whether the firm performed in the top 50%ile of its industry or not.  The correlation 
coefficient between the total one-year change in total direct compensation and firm dollar 
returns, as well as industry index returns, is then calculated.9  For the pre-committal sub-
sample of firms that performed in the top 50%ile of their industry, the correlation 
                                                 
9 Total compensation is used in order to capture the value of changes in all levels of compensation. While 
this will include all compensation changes, it would be difficult to omit a portion of compensation on the 
grounds that it was not related to performance. 
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coefficient concerning index dollar returns is -.4837 and highly significant while the 
value for firm returns is insignificant.  For the lower 50%ile firms, the correlation 
coefficient between changes in compensation and firm returns is -.1684 and significant at 
the 95% level, while the value for index returns is insignificant.  Based on simple 
statistics, it appears that the top performing firms were more likely than poorly 
performing firms to pay in a manner that is consistent with RPE.  This also appears to 
conform with the representation in Figure 7.  The correlation between the dollar changes 
in compensation and a modified measure of the firm’s industry percentile improvement 
was also calculated.10  The correlation coefficient between percentile improvement and 
the change in total compensation for the poorly performing firms was insignificant while 
the value for the top performing firms is -.1320 and significant at the 95% level.  This 
result is counter-intuitive.  One explanation for this might be the result of a down market 
that was also in the midst of a corporate governance crisis. 
The complete set of regressions for the regrouped sample are found in Table XIX.  
For the complete pre-committal sample, the homogeneity-own firm/index return 
coefficients are not significant in either the levels or changes regressions.  The sub-
sample conditions upon a higher level of industry homogeneity and this may be one cause 
for the result. For the levels regression, the firm pay-performance coefficient is positive 
with the top pay-performance variable insignificant.  It appears that top performing pre-
committal firms do not have a greater firm pay-performance payout than the weaker 
firms.  In addition, top-performing pre-committal firms filter out the index to a greater 
extent than the lower performing pre-committal firms.  For the changes in compensation 
specification, the results are much weaker but with the general conclusion that higher 
performing firms filter out the industry index to a greater extent than the bottom 
                                                 
10 The value is calculated as the difference between a firm’s one-year industry performance percentile and 
the firm’s two-year figure.  If a firm made an improvement, then the value would be positive. 
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performing firm (the bottom performing firms do not filter).  The results suggest that 
firms that pre-commit to RPE are compensating in a manner that is consistent with RPE 
in the levels of compensation, while only the top performing firms are RPE consistent in 
the changes in compensation relationship.  Pre-committal firm top-performers filter to a 
greater extent than bottom performer without regard to industry homogeneity.  The 
results suggest that pre-committal firms are serious in their commitment to compensating 
via an RPE formula. 
For the firms that did not pre-commit to RPE, the results are different.  For the 
levels specification, the data finds no evidence of RPE.  Interestingly, bottom performing 
firms appear to pay negatively for own-firm performance while the top performing firms 
attempt to cancel out this effect with a close to net neutral firm-performance relationship.  
As with the 1993-2000 sample, it appears that poor performing firms are providing a 
baseline level of compensation to their executives. The changes specification suggests a 
similar finding with respect to own firm performance.  However, the homogeneity  -  firm 
return and the homogeneity  -  index interaction terms are weakly significantly positive 
and negative, respectfully.  These signs are consistent with positive own-firm-pay 
positive sensitivity and negative industry-pay sensitivity for the more homogeneous firms 
in the non-committal sub-sample.  It appears that more homogeneous firms are filtering 
the changes in compensation to a greater extent than less homogeneous firms.  This result 
is consistent with Hypothesis III.  This suggests that the clarity of the signal is related to 
the degree that compensation-based RPE is utilized for firms that did not pre-commit to 
RPE.  From Table VI, note that the mean homogeneity percentile for firms that did not 
pre-commit is .4469.  This suggests that the total industry dollar return that is paid to 
executives, at the mean, is –4.32 cents per thousand dollars of index dollar return 
(.261214 + (-.6811044 X .4469)).  This effectively means that the more homogeneous 
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firms are neutralizing the industry-return giveaway and the less homogeneous firms are 
granting the industry return to their executives.  Industry return filtering appears to be 
related to the clarity of the signal available in a more homogeneous market.  While this 
result occurs for only the changes in compensation, it does indicate that the clarity of the 
signal that a firm receives concerning its industry adjusted performance is important to 
the degree that RPE is instituted in the post-performance pay relation. 
The results should be compared to the 1993-2000 sample results where 
homogeneity did not have a significant relationship concerning the degree of post-
performance RPE that was measured.  A few interpretations of this result must be 
considered.  One possibility is that the 2000 sample occurs in the corporate governance 
crisis of 2001.  The effect of such a crisis on retention concerns is outside of the Chapter 
3 model but it is plausible that in such an environment, executive retention concerns may 
become secondary.  A second possibility which can be ruled out is that when pooled, the 
effect of homogeneity on the pre-committal and non-committal samples have opposing 
effects that cancels out in the pooled regression.  As a robustness check (not shown) the 
two 2001 sub-samples were pooled.  The homogeneity effect on filtering out the index 
remained in the changes in compensation sample.  Therefore, the effect of homogeneity 
on filtering appears to be a result of the 2001 sample and is not an artifact of mixing the 
pre-committal and non-committal samples.   
Based on the results, the clarity of signal argument for the effect of homogeneity 
on RPE cannot be ruled out even though it has an insignificant effect on the levels 
regression.  Equivalently, replacement costs must also be considered when analyzing 
post-performance RPE implementation. 
 85
Summary 
This chapter provides mixed evidence that higher performing firms exhibit greater 
post-performance RPE than lower performing firms.  It provides evidence that top and 
bottom performing firms may utilize RPE differently and that it is necessary to control 
for performance when documenting RPE.  Without properly controlling for performance, 
very weak RPE is found.  This may be an explanation for the results found in Antle and 
Smith (1986), Ely (1991), and Gibbons and Murphy (1990).   
Separate sample results suggest that performance is a factor for whether firms 
implement RPE but they also suggest that the clarity of an RPE signal is also important to 
whether RPE is implemented ex post.  
Using industry performance ranking as a proxy for firm retention costs in a 
sample of S&P 1500 firms, where higher performing firms should have greater retention 
concerns than weaker performing firms, the results suggest an interesting aspect to the 
RPE story.  The evidence in Chapter 4 suggests that weaker performing firms (which also 
have a greater need to improve their industry measured performance) have greater 
retention flexibility to incorporate and commit to an RPE based compensation plan.  
However, the sample provides evidence that the stronger performing firms (which have a 
reduced need to improve their industry performance) may have a greater retention need to 
compensate their executives at a higher post-performance level than their weaker industry 
performing counterparts.  Since homogeneity does not appear to be a significant factor 
for filtering industry returns in the compensation payout, then the clearer signal generated 
in a more homogeneous industry is less central to the analysis than the retention aspect of 
homogeneity.  
Alternatively, in a sample of S&P 500 firms where the firms are sub-categorized 
into firms that have previously committed to industry-related RPE and those who have 
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not committed to any form of RPE, the pre-committal sample produced results that are 
essentially the same as with the larger S&P 1500 sample.  The sample also suggests that 
pre-committal firms are serious in their commitment to RPE.  However, the non-
committal sample displayed an RPE-like payout (for changes in compensation levels 
only) that is greater for more homogeneous firms.  This result is not a function of whether 
the firm is in the top or bottom percentile of firms in their industries.  The evidence 
suggests that while replacements costs appear to be important to the degree that RPE is 
implemented, the clarity of the RPE signal that a firm receives is also important.  This 
supports Murphy’s (1999) conclusions. 
There is also evidence suggesting that the pay-performance relationship may 
break down in weaker performing firms (suggested by both samples).  This seems to 
conform with prior results by Brenner, Sundram, and Yermack (2000) and Chance, 
Kumar, and Todd 2000) that find that the value granted to executives when repricing 
options does not substitute for yearly compensation.  While the empirical study did not 
include involuntary turnover issues, future research may offer insight into the 
compensation practices of poorly performing firms.  Previous research has shown that the 
threat of firing and pay-performance sensitivity are substitutes in the presence of career 
concerns (see Hartzell 1998).  Future empirical work concerning pay-performance 
sensitivity and the involuntary turnover relation may offer greater insight concerning the 
overall principal-agent relationship.  Future research may also help describe the effect of 
corporate governance crises on the pay-performance relationships of firms.
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
RPE has recently received a great deal of attention in the literature.  Most of the 
focus has been on the advantages of insuring executives from industry trends that are 
beyond their control or the impact of the competitive environment on the implementation 
of RPE.  The literature has not examined costs that firms may incur to replace lost 
executives and the impact of these costs on the willingness to implement RPE.  This 
dissertation investigates how executive replacements costs affect RPE implementation.  
The evidence reveals that the degree to which RPE is utilized is related to the ability of 
firms to gather accurate information on their relative performance and the costs of 
replacing departed executives. 
A model of RPE is presented that considers both replacement costs to the firm and 
costs that executives incur when they voluntarily leave a firm.  It predicts that the power 
of the incentives a firm can offer to its executives are non-increasing in the costs that an 
executive will incur to switch firms.  It also suggests that a firm’s ability to introduce 
high powered incentives is reduced if the costs of replacing an executive are great.  
Consequently, firms with higher retention costs will find it difficult to use RPE, which 
qualifies as a high powered incentive.   
The predictions of the model are tested by empirically estimating the likelihood 
that a firm will pre-commit to RPE at the beginning of a performance period.  The 
evidence indicates that, overall, firms competing in more homogeneous industries are 
more likely to commit to RPE contracts.  However, higher performing firms in more 
homogeneous industries are less likely to commit to RPE than poorly performing firms in 
similar industries.  Because homogeneity is a proxy for both replacement costs and the 
 88
clarity of an RPE signal, the results suggest that both of these factors influence the 
likelihood that a firm will commit to RPE. 
The empirical analysis also examines differences in the actual compensation paid 
by firms that pre-commit to RPE and firms that do not to pre-commit to RPE.  Although 
somewhat mixed, the results are generally consistent with the evidence on which firms 
commit to RPE.  For a sample of S&P 1,500 firms over the 1993 to 2000 period, industry 
homogeneity is found to have either no-effect, or at best, a very weak detrimental effect 
on the RPE pay-performance relation.  The evidence is similar for a sample of S&P 500 
firms that pre-committed to RPE in 2000, for their 2001 performance year compensation.  
In both cases, contemporaneous industry-performance is significantly negatively related 
to the degree to which observed compensation payouts are consistent with RPE.  
However, evidence for firms in the S&P 500 sample that did not pre-commit to an RPE 
mechanism indicates that the observed level of RPE suggested by changes in 
compensation is positively related to the homogeneity for the industry in which the firm 
competes.  In contrast, industry performance is not a significant predictor of 
compensation in this sample.  Overall, the results suggest that replacement costs, as well 
as the availability of a clear RPE signal, are important predictors of the use of RPE.  The 
analysis also suggests that compensation at weaker firms tends to include guaranteed 
minimum compensation thresholds.     
The evidence in this dissertation suggests that replacement costs affect the 
decision to either its pre-commitment to RPE or to pay executives in a manner consistent 
with RPE.  Although the decision to pre-commitment to RPE is different from the 
decision to actually pay based on RPE once firm performance is observed, both decisions 
appear to be affected by the cost of replacing a departing executive. 
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There are three broad implications of the evidence from this study.  First, RPE 
implementation is influenced by the replacement costs that a firm must incur when 
replacing a departed executive and the precision of the signal regarding the relative 
performance of the firm.  The importance of the precision of performance signal supports 
Murphy’s (1999) conclusions.  It also suggests that replacement costs and the clarity of a 
RPE signal should be considered when analyzing RPE and that empirical work may be 
subject to errors if they are not incorporated when testing for RPE.  This may also be 
contributing to the apparent lack of RPE documented by Antle and Smith (1986), Ely 
(1991), and Gibbons and Murphy (1990).  For example, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) 
find that the results of compensation regressions may be altered if stock return volatility 
is omitted from the analysis.   
A second implication of the evidence supports Murphy’s (1999) suggestion that 
the explicit RPE choices may be different from the implicit RPE choices.  The 
preliminary evidence in this study suggests that the decision to pre-commit to RPE is 
related more strongly to the precision of an RPE signal than the actual post-performance 
payout. 
Last, the evidence indicates that compensation at poorly performing firms tends to 
be partially disconnected from actual industry-performance.  Managers at top and bottom 
-performing firms in an industry appear to be paid according to different formulae.  This 
suggests that further study of the pay-performance relation for poorly performing 
executives may be a fruitful avenue for future research.   
Limitations of a single-period study such as this should also be noted.  The 
empirical tests that examine pre-commitment to RPE rely on a public decision at a point 
in time.  The evidence is incomplete on how pre-commitment to RPE changes as industry 
performance rankings evolve over time.  Likewise, the evidence in this study does not 
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indicate how firms that have not yet pre-committed to RPE may choose to pre-commit in 
later periods.   
The assumption that firm-industry choice is exogenous, as well as the assumption 
that firm performance may serve as a proxy for replacement costs, should also be noted.  
To the extent that these are empirical issues, further research is warranted.  Finally, the 
results indicate that the importance of replacement costs and signal precision can change 
with significant macroeconomic regime changes, such as during a corporate governance 
crisis.  Further work concerning the effect on these changes would likely significantly 
contribute to our understanding executive compensation. 
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Mean Median Minimum Maximum
Market value (millions) 25,500 8,639 473 475,000
Market value to book value 2.06 1.00 0.03 14.24
Revenues (millions) 11,457 5,207 271 181,803
Research and development as a percent 3.49% 0.00% 0.00% 95.70%
   of revenues
Dividend yield percentage 1.59% 1.12% 0.00% 12.07%
Property and plant as percent 29.27% 25.78% 0.00% 91.77%
   of book value
One-year 2-digit industry return percentile 0.6197 0.6364 0.0546 1.0000
Two-year 2-digit industry return percentile 0.6054 0.6316 0.0313 1.0000
Number of 2-digit SIC code peers 301 174 16 1,014
Monthly stock return standard deviation
    measured over the prior 60 months 11.01% 10.02% 4.82% 30.61%
Homogeneity percentile for firm 2-digit
   SIC code 0.4817 0.4871 0.0000 1.0000
Number of board meetings 8.12 8 1 29
Table I:  General Summary Statistics for Year 2000 Sample Proxy Companies
This table reports summary statistics for the 2000 sample year of 403 firms. Data is from the Standard and Poor's
ExecuComp S&P500 dataset. Market/book value is the ratio of the market value of all common stock outstanding to
the book value of the common stock. Revenues for the firm are denominated in millions of dollars. Homogeneity
percentile is the cumulative density function value of the firm's 2-digit SIC code where the initial values are taken
from Parrino (1997), P. 189. Industry percentile returns reflect a firm's percentile return compared to all the firm's in
that firm's 2-digit SIC code defined industry. Research & development as percent of revenues is the total amount
spent on research and development as a percentage of the fiscal year revenues. Standard deviation is the
standard deviation of the returns on common stock, measured monthly over the preceding 5-year period. Dividend
yield is the dividend yield of the common stock taken from Compustat at fiscal year end. Property & plant as a
percentage of book value is the book value of Property and plant as a percentage of the book value of the firm.
 92
Frequency
Industry (Financial Market) Relative
   Compensation Measures
   All comp choices  94
   Bonus only  23
   All long-term compensation  79
   All long-term compensation except
      options  76
   Long-term cash related plans only  57
Accounting Relative
   Compensation Measures
   All comp choices  65
   Bonus only  40
   All long-term compensation  32
   All long-term compensation except
      options  29
   Long-term cash related plans only  21
Broad Market (Financial Market) Relative
   Compensation Measures
   All comp choices  27
   Bonus only   5
   All long-term compensation  23
   All long-term compensation except
      options  23
   Long-term cash related plans only  19
All Relative Compensation Measures
   All comp choices 134
   Bonus only  53
   All long-term compensation  99
   All long-term compensation except
      options  93
   Long-term cash related plans only 69
Table II:  Relative Performance Compensation Frequency Table
This table reports the frequency of the categories of relative performance mechanisms for the
2000 sample year of 403 firms. Data is from the Standard and Poor's 500 firm proxy statements.
Industry Relative Compensation Measures refers to relative performance compensation
measures which only include an industry benchmark that is market determined. Accounting
Relative Compensation Measures refers to relative performance compensation measures based
upon an external accounting derived benchmark. Broad Market Relative Measures refer to
relative performance compensation which only include a broad market measure which is
externally determined. All Relative Compensation Measures refers to any relative performance

























Pre- Not Pre- Pre- Not Pre- Pre- Not Pre- Pre- Not Pre-
commit commit commit commit commit commit commit commit
Market value to book value (0.2412)** (0.2584)*** (0.4048)*** (0.2459)*** (0.0796) (0.2973)*** (0.3037)*** (0.2313)***
Revenues (millions) (0.3130)***  0.0993*  0.0390 (0.0041) (0.3822)**  0.0648 (0.2265)***  0.0934
One-year percentile returns (0.1205)  0.0588  0.1251 (0.0159) (0.2572)  0.0229 (0.0656)  0.0440
Two-year percentile returns (0.1752)*  0.0154 (0.0974) (0.0512) (0.3030) (0.0435)  0.1387  0.0202
Number of board meetings (0.0520)  0.0674  0.0450  0.0768 (0.1030)  0.0791 (0.0311)  0.0205
Research and development as a percent (0.3690)*** (0.2588)*** (0.6182)*** (0.2434)*** (0.5868)*** (0.2874)*** (0.4380)*** (0.2284)***
   of revenues
Monthly stock return standard deviation (0.0672) (0.1969)*** (0.2679)*** (0.1913)*** (0.0796) (0.2973)*** (0.1447)*** (0.1764)***
     measured over the prior 60 months
Dividend yield percentage  0.1521  0.0721  0.2202*  0.1237**  0.0513  .1686***  0.1771**  0.0428)
Property and plant as percent  0.4447***  0.1876***  0.2613**  0.2778***  0.4120**  .2804***  0.3725***  0.1831***
   of book value
*** Denotes significance at the 99% confidence level.
**  Denotes significance at the 95% confidence level.
*   Denotes significance at the 90% confidence level.
Industry relative measure Accounting relative measure Broad market relative measure All relative measures
Correlation with industry homogeneity percentile partitioned by definition of pre-commitment
Table III:  Variable Correlations with Industry Homogeneity Percentile
This table reports the correlation coefficient for control variables with industry homogeneity percentile summary for the 2000 sample year firms. Data is from the Standard and
Poor's ExecuComp S&P500 dataset. Variables are listed in the order that they appear in the probit model. Industry homogeneity measure is the percentile value of the firm's 2-
digit SIC code where the initial values are taken from Parrino (1997), P. 189. Industry Relative Compensation Measures refers to relative performance compensation measures
which only include an industry benchmark that is market determined. Accounting Relative Compensation Measures refers to relative performance measures based upon an
external accounting derived benchmark. Broad Market Relative Measures refer to relative performance compensation which only include a broad mareket measure which is




Pre- Pre- Pre- Pre- and Devel- stock Dividend and plant
commitment commitment commitment commitment One-year Two-year Homo- opment as Number Market return yield plant as a
to industry to accounting to broad to any percentile percentile geneity a percent of board to book standard percent- percent
RPE RPE market RPE RPE returns returns percentile Revenue of revenue meetings value deviation age book value
Pre-commitment to industry RPE 1.0000
Pre-commitment to accounting RPE 0.2048 1.0000
Pre-commitment to broad market RP 0.4154 0.0984 1.0000
Pre-commitment to any RPE 0.7815 0.6213 0.3797 1.0000
One-year percentile returns (0.0501) (0.0013) 0.0131 (0.0170) 1.0000
Two-year percentile returns (0.1370) (0.0207) (0.0426) (0.1189) 0.6091 1.0000
Homogeneity percentile for firm 2-digit
    SIC code 0.2091 0.1554 (0.0491) 0.2318 0.0027 (0.0601) 1.0000
Revenue 0.0605 0.0093 0.1181 0.0573 (0.0744) (0.0541) 0.0011 1.0000
Research and development as a percent 
   of revenues (0.0982) (0.0233) (0.0653) (0.0854) (0.0130) 0.1530 (0.2835) (0.1008) 1.0000
Number of board meetings 0.1257 (0.0352) 0.1041 0.0851 (0.1001) (0.1414) 0.0621 0.0884 0.1264 1.0000
Market value to book value (0.1885) (0.0725) (0.1275) (0.1742) 0.1834 0.3410 (0.2768) (0.1036) 0.4450 (0.1167) 1.0000
Monthly stock return standard deviation
     measured over the prior 60 month (0.2396) (0.0870) (0.1018) (0.2447) (0.0396) 0.1522 (0.2120) (0.1809) 0.4575 (0.0361) 0.3153 1.0000
Dividend yield percentage 0.2791 0.0831 0.1438 0.2570 (0.2227) (0.4225) 0.1478 0.0650 (0.2625) 0.1523 (0.3895) (0.4958) 1.0000
Property and plant as percent 
   of book value 0.1966 0.1139 0.0251 0.1912 (0.1265) (0.1512) 0.2871 0.0234 (0.2433) 0.0140 (0.1956) (0.2389) 0.1847 1.0000
Bold values denotes significance at the 95% confidence level or better.
Table IV: Correlation Table for Pre-Commitment/No Pre-Commitment to RPE Sample
This table reports the correlation coefficient between all variables utilized in the probit analysis for the 2000 sample year firms. Data is from the Standard and Poor's ExecuComp S&P500 dataset as well as
from proxy statements. Industry relative compensation measures refers to relative performance compensation measures which only include an industry benchmark that is market determined. Accounting
relative compensation measures refers to relative performance measures based upon an external accounting derived benchmark. Broad market relative measures refer to relative performance compensation
which only include a broad mareket measure that is externally determined. All Relative Compensation refers to any relative performance compensation measure that includes all accounting and market
measures. One (two) year industry percentile return is the percentile level return for a firm within all CRSP firms in the same 2-digit SIC-code. Industry percentile returns reflect a firm's percentile return
compared to all the firm's in that firm's 2-digit SIC code defined industry. Homogeneity percentile is the cumulative density function value of the firm's 2-digit SIC code where the initial values are taken from
Parrino (1997), P. 189. Research & development as percent of revenues is the total amount spent on research and development as a percentage of the fiscal year revenues. Number of board meetings is the
number of board meetings held by the board of directors during the fiscal year. Market/book value is the ratio of the market value of all common . Standard deviation is the standard deviation of the returns
on common stock, measured monthly over the preceding 5-year period. Dividend yield is the dividend yield of the common stock taken from Compustat at fiscal year end. Property & plant as a percentage of
book value is the book value of Property and plant as a percentage of the book value of the firm.stockoutstanding to the book value of the commons stock. Standard deviation is the standard deviation of
the returns on common stock, measured monthly over the preceding 5-year period. Dividend yield is the dividend yield of the common stock taken from Compustat at fiscal year end. Property & plant as a
percentage of book value is the book value of Property and plant as a percentage of the book value of the firm.  
 
Industry Accounting Market All Relative
relative relative relative relative 
measure measure measure measure
Pre-commitment 0.1153 0.1116 0.1111 0.1169
No pre-commitment 0.0941 0.1028 0.0957 0.0974
Difference 0.0212*** 0.0088*** 0.0155*** 0.0195***
***  Denotes a significant difference in means at the 99% level.
Sixty-month return standard deviation means 
This table reports the mean return standard deviations of stock returns over the preceding 60 months.
The samples are partitioned by firms that have pre-commited or not pre-committed to a relative
performance mechanism for the 2000 sample year firms.  Co
Table V:  Percentile Return Mean Standard Deviations Partitioned by 

















Number of of 2-digit
companies Industry Accounting Market All relative SIC codes
relative relative relative relative
measure measure measure measure
Manufacturing 207 47/160 39/168 18/189 72/135 16
Non-manufacturing 196 47/149 26/170 9/187 62/134 22
   Total 403 94/309 65/338 27/376 134/269 38
Industry Accounting Market All relative
relative relative relative relative
measure measure measure measure
Pre-commitment 0.5960 0.5885 0.4263 0.5807
No pre-commitment 0.4469 0.4611 0.4856 0.4323
Difference 0.1491*** 0.1274*** (0.0593) 0.1484***
***  Denotes a significant difference in means at the 99% level.
Table VI:  Pre-Commitment Frequency and Mean Homogeneity Factors 
Mean homogeneity factor partitioned by pre-commitment or no pre-commitment
This table reports the frequency of pre-com m iting to a relative perform ance m echanism as well as the correlation coefficient for
regress ion variables with industry hom ogeneity measures sum m ary for the 2000 sam ple year firm s. Confirm ation of a pre-
comm itm ent is obtained from a firm 's SEC files proxy s tatem ents . Data is from the Standard and Poor's ExecuCom p S&P500 dataset.
The industry hom ogeneity m easure is the cum ulative dens ity function value of the firm 's 2-digit SIC code where the initial values are
taken from Parrino (1997), P. 189. Industry relative com pensation m easures refers to relative performance compensation m easures
which only include an industry benchmark that is m arket determ ined. Accounting relative com pensation m easures refers to relative
perform ance compensation m easures based upon an external accounting derived benchm ark. Broad m arket relative m easures refer
to relative perform ance com pensation which only include a broad m arket m easure which is externally determ ined. All relative
compensation m easures refers to any relative perform ance com pensation m easure which includes all accounting and m arket
m easures .
Pre-commit to RPE/Not pre-commit to RPE ratio
Panel A: Pre-commitment frequency 
Panel B: Mean homogeneity levels 
 
 
Industry Accounting Market All relative
relative relative relative relative
measure measure measure measure
Pre-commitment 0.5995 0.6191 0.6307 0.6144
No pre-commitment 0.6260 0.6199 0.6189 0.6225
Difference (0.0265) (0.0008) 0.0117 (0.0081)
Industry Accounting Market All Relative
relative relative relative relative
measure measure measure measure
Pre-Commitment 0.5472 0.6075 0.5675 0.5660
No Pre-Commitment 0.6234 0.5943 0.6080 0.6255
Difference (0.0762)*** 0.0132 (0.0405) (0.0594)***
***  Denotes a significant difference in the means at the 99% level.
Two-year percentile returns with respect to a firm's industry
Table VII:  Percentile Returns Partitioned by Pre-Commitment/ 
       No Pre-Commitment
One-year percentile returns with respect to a firm's industry
This table reports the indus try percentile return of firm s that have pre-com m ited to a relative
perform ance m echanism for the 2000 sam ple year firm s . Confirm ation of a pre-com m itm ent is
obtained from  a firm 's  SEC files  proxy s tatem ents .  Indus try relative com pensation m easures  refers  
to relative perform ance com pensation m easures which only include an industry benchm ark that is
m arket determ ined. Accounting relative com pensation m easures refers to relative perform ance
com pensation m easures based upon an external accounting derived benchm ark. Broad m arket
relative m easures refer to relative perform ance com pensation which only include a broad m arket
m easure which is externally determ ined. All relative com pensation m easures refers to any relative





All All LT- without LT
comp Bonus comp options cash
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
One-year industry percentile return 0.2946976 0.08653 0.2424439 0.2464569 0.1893647
(0.1650) (0.4040) (0.2070) (0.2000) (0.2020)
Homogeneity percentile for 2-digit SIC code: F(M 0.456624 0.1473212 0.367474 0.3627895 0.2004919
(0.0230) (0.0620) (0.0400) (0.0410) (0.1310)
One-year industry percentile return X  -0.4880829 -0.1398542 -0.4403413 -0.4255872 -0.307478
                    homogeneity percentile (0.1280) (0.2980) (0.1230) (0.1310) (0.1500)
Revenues (billions) -0.0000456 -0.0005645 0.0002866 0.0002564 0.0006793
(0.9680) (0.2640) (0.7600) (0.7800) (0.2860)
Research and development as a percent 0.0116253 0.0002985 0.0116172 0.0067044 0.0073943
                    of revenues (0.0280) (0.8660) (0.0170) (0.1590) (0.0460)
Number of board meetings 0.012156 0.0000971 0.0120992 0.0096691 0.0054439
(0.0730) (0.9760) (0.0360) (0.0820) (0.1990)
Market / book value -0.0363 -0.00968 -0.0321 -0.0256 -0.0275
(0.0220) (0.1200) (0.0340) (0.0860) (0.0790)
Standard deviation -2.766393 0.1533694 -3.213203 -2.980919 -2.408322
(0.0300) (0.6040) (0.0010) (0.0020) (0.0000)
Dividend yield 0.0125166 -0.0027535 0.0153665 0.0185946 0.0163555
(0.4180) (0.6360) (0.2590) (0.1570) (0.0970)
Property & plant as a percentage of book value 0.0016609 0.00086 0.0002677 0.0002385 0.0001687
(0.1090) (0.0530) (0.7590) (0.7760) (0.7980)
Sample size 359 359 359 359 359
Model likelihood ratio  (p > chi-square) 0.0000 0.0411 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table VIII: Panel A :  (1 year percentile version) Probit Model of the Likelihood of Pre-Committing to
respect to the independent variables
Partial derivatives of outcome probabilities with 
        Industry Relative Performance in the Respective Portion of Executive Compensation. 
This table provides estimates of a probit model where the likelihood of formalizing a relative performance formula into a
portion(s) of the executive compensation package is calculated. In the analysis, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if a firm
committed to a relative performance mechanism and equal to zero if no committment has occurred. Data is gathered from firm
proxies covering the S&P Compustat defined 2000 (fiscal years ending between June 2000 and May 2001) fiscal year for S&P
500 firms. One year industry percentile return is the percentile level return for a firm within all CRSP firms in the same 2-digit SIC
code. Homogeneity percentile is the cumulative density function value of the firm's 2-digit SIC code where the initial values are
taken from Parrino (1997), P. 189. Revenues for the firm are denominated in billions of dollars. Research & development as
percent of revenues is the total amount spent on research and development as a percentage of the fiscal year revenues.
Number of board meetings is the number of board meetings held by the board of directors during the fiscal year. Market/book
value is the ratio of the market value of all common stock outstanding to the book value of the common stock. Standard
deviation is the standard deviation of the returns on common stock,measured monthly over the preceding 5-year period.
Dividend yield is the dividend yield of the common stock taken from Compustat at fiscal year end. Property & plant as a
percentage of book value is the book value of Property and plant as a percentage of the book value of the firm. Industry
relatives measures are those that explicitly compensate the executive team, through vesting measures or grant calculations, by
calculating the firm's market return compared to that of an industry return. All comp refers to all measures of compensation,
Bonus refers only to bonus compensation, All LT comp refers only to all Long-term compensation, LT comp without options
refers to only the long-term compensation which was not delivered in options, and LT cash refers only to long-term




All All LT- without LT
comp Bonus comp options cash
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
One-year industry percentile return -0.1210146 -0.0816972 -0.1794257 -0.1714984 -0.0611823
(0.5030) (0.5820) (0.1680) (0.1770) (0.5150)
Homogeneity percentile for 2-digit SIC code: F(M 0.0053479 0.0534484 -0.1383289 -0.1267239 -0.057374
(0.9730) (0.6630) (0.1990) (0.2140) (0.4560)
One-year industry percentile return X  0.2935945 0.1521798 0.3218533 0.3118267 0.1572082
                    homogeneity percentile (0.2620) (0.4480) (0.0810) (0.0790) (0.2380)
Revenues (billions) -0.0001554 -0.0002519 -0.0000774 0.0000817 0.0001257
(0.8350) (0.6520) (0.8540) (0.8200) (0.5700)
Research and development as a percent 0.0100364 0.0047883 0.0046873 0.004384 0.0043368
                    of revenues (0.0100) (0.0810) (0.0400) (0.0400) (0.0020)
Number of board meetings -0.0067558 -0.0050627 -0.0021264 -0.0006161 -0.0017191
(0.2850) (0.3250) (0.5640) (0.8450) (0.4400)
Market / book value -0.00942 0.000926 -0.0164 -0.0149 -0.00968
(0.4010) (0.9070) (0.1660) (0.2100) (0.2700)
Standard deviation -0.9028092 -0.1645009 -0.9242692 -0.8541559 -0.7609322
(0.1660) (0.7270) (0.0950) (0.1140) (0.0180)
Dividend yield 0.0075321 0.0041558 0.0001334 0.0018191 0.0053353
(0.5630) (0.6560) (0.9880) (0.8200) (0.3550)
Property & plant as a percentage of book value 0.0010683 0.00004936 0.0001039 -0.002702 -0.0000834
(0.2480) (0.4880) (0.8580) (0.5950) (0.8350)
Sample size 359 359 359 359 359
Model likelihood ratio  (p > chi-square) 0.0158 0.1540 0.1090 0.0690 0.0037
Table VIII: Panel B :  (1 year percentile version) Probit Model of the Likelihood of Pre-Committing to
respect to the independent variables
Partial derivatives of outcome probabilities with 
        Accounting Relative Performance in the Respective Portion of Executive Compensation. 
This table provides estimates of a probit model where the likelihood of formalizing a relative performance formula into a
portion(s) of the executive compensation package is calculated. In the analysis, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if a
firm committed to a relative performance mechanism and equal to zero if no committment has occurred. Data is gathered
from firm proxies covering the S&P Compustat defined 2000 (fiscal years ending between June 2000 and May 2001) fiscal
year for S&P 500 firms. One year industry percentile return is the percentile level return for a firm within all CRSP firms in
the same 2-digit SIC-code. Homogeneity percentile is the cumulative density function value of the firm's 2-digit SIC code
where the initial values are taken from Parrino (1997), P. 189. Revenues for the firm are denominated in billions of dollars.
Research & development as percent of revenues is the total amount spent on research and development as a percentage of
the fiscal year revenues. Number of board meetings is the number of board meetings held by the board of directors during
the fiscal year. Market/book value is the ratio of the market value of all common stock outstanding to the book value of the
common stock. Standard deviation is the standard deviation of the returns on common stock,measured monthly over the
preceding 5-year period. Dividend yield is the dividend yield of the common stock taken from Compustat at fiscal year end.
Property & plant as a percentage of book value is the book value of Property and plant as a percentage of the book value of
the firm. Accounting relative measures include any relative measure that will depend upon a comparison that can be
calculated through external financial statement performance measures. All comp refers to all measures of compensation,
Bonus refers only to bonus compensation, All LT comp refers only to all Long-term compensation, LT comp without options
refers to only the long-term compensation which was not delivered in options, and LT cash refers only to long-term
compensation which is to be settled in cash. Values in parenthesis are P-values for a two-tailed test that the coefficient
estimate equals zero. 
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LT comp
All All LT- without LT
comp Bonus comp options cash
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
One-year industry percentile return 0.1089978 0.00564 0.0679019 0.0679019 0.0304854
(0.0760) (0.3100) (0.1130) (0.1130) (0.2700)
Homogeneity percentile for 2-digit SIC code: F(M 0.0557683 0.0031771 0.0336817 0.0336817 0.0273086
(0.2900) (0.4690) (0.3540) (0.3540) (0.2170)
One-year industry percentile return X  -0.1660877 -0.0059975 -0.1158833 -0.1158833 -0.0882616
                    homogeneity percentile (0.0550) (0.3250) (0.0560) (0.0560) (0.0140)
Revenues (billions) 0.0002838 -0.0000124 0.0002346 0.0002346 0.0000937
(0.2710) (0.3650) (0.1750) (0.1750) (0.4150)
Research and development as a percent 0.000313 -0.0000796 0.0004927 0.0004927 0.0006532
                    of revenues (0.8650) (0.2720) (0.7190) (0.7190) (0.4870)
Number of board meetings 0.0027999 0.0005459 0.0008864 0.0008864 0.0005248
(0.1280) (0.0840) (0.4630) (0.4630) (0.4850)
Market / book value -0.0264 0.000274 -0.0229 -0.0229 -0.0138
(0.0280) (0.2860) (0.0180) (0.0180) (0.0390)
Standard deviation -0.5099711 -0.0434767 -0.304708 -0.304708 -0.3949782
(0.1880) (0.0880) (0.2630) (0.2630) (0.0200)
Dividend yield -0.0045479 0.0001985 -0.0044633 -0.0044633 -0.0030601
(0.2430) (0.6580) (0.0770) (0.0770) (0.0590)
Property & plant as a percentage of book value 0.0002006 0.00011 -0.0000477 -0.0000477 -0.0001515
(0.5270) (0.0060) (0.8420) (0.8420) (0.3900)
Sample Size 359 359 359 359 359
Model likelihood ratio  (p > chi-square) 0.2308 0.0000 0.1420 0.1420 0.0012
Partial derivatives of outcome probabilities with 
respect to the independent variables
Table VIII: Panel C :  (1 year percentile version) Probit Model of the Likelihood of Pre-Committing to 
        Broad Market Relative Performance in the Respective Portion of Executive Compensation. 
This table provides estimates of a probit model where the likelihood of formalizing a relative performance formula into a
portion(s) of the executive compensation package is calculated. In the analysis, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if a
firm committed to a relative performance mechanism and equal to zero if no committment has occurred. Data is gathered
from firm proxies covering the S&P Compustat defined 2000 (fiscal years ending between June 2000 and May 2001) fiscal
year for S&P 500 firms. One year industry percentile return is the percentile level return for a firm within all CRSP firms in
the same 2-digit SIC-code. Homogeneity percentile is the cumulative density function value of the firm's 2-digit SIC code
where the initial values are taken from Parrino (1997), P. 189. Revenues for the firm are denominated in billions of dollars.
Research & development as percentage of revenues is the total amount spent on research and development as a
percentage of the fiscal year revenues. Number of board meetings is the number of board meetings held by the board of
directors during the fiscal year. Market/book value is the ratio of the market value of all common stock outstanding to the
book value of the common stock. Standard deviation is the standard deviation of the returns on common stock, measured
monthly over the preceding 5-year period. Dividend yield is the dividend yield of the common stock taken from Compustat
at fiscal year end. Property & plant as a percentage of book value is the book value of property and plant as a percentage
of the book value of the firm. Broad market relative measures are those that explicitly compensate the executive team
through vesting measures or grant caluclations by calculating the firm's market return and comparin it to that of a broad
market return. All comp refers to all measures of compensation, bonus refers only to bonus compensation, all LT comp
refers only to all long-term compensation, LT comp without options refers to only the long-term compenation which was not
delivered in options, and LT cash refers only to long-term compensation which is to be settled in cash. Values in
parenthesis are P-values for a two-tailed test that the coefficient estimate equals zero.
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LT comp
All All LT- without LT
comp Bonus comp options cash
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
One-year industry percentile return 0.2815817 0.0174547 0.1429054 0.1536086 0.1536794
(0.2450) (0.9240) (0.4950) (0.4590) (0.3480)
Homogeneity percentile for 2-digit SIC code: F(M 0.4742923 0.1993928 0.2486039 0.2554561 0.1721129
(0.0480) (0.2020) (0.2080) (0.1860) (0.2390)
One-year industry percentile return X  -0.3538945 -0.0105677 -0.2532538 -0.2401096 -0.21286
                    homogeneity percentile (0.3460) (0.9670) (0.4210) (0.4360) (0.3690)
Revenues (billions) 0.0000452 -0.0006801 0.0002493 0.003455 0.0008455
(0.9740) (0.3260) (0.8160) (0.7340) (0.2530)
Research and development as a percent 0.0177126 0.0037306 0.0144145 0.0087155 0.0093895
                    of revenues (0.0040) (0.2470) (0.0080) (0.0970) (0.0220)
Number of board meetings 0.0096758 -0.00183 0.0118019 0.0102764 0.0034224
(0.2420) (0.7540) (0.0800) (0.1050) (0.4810)
Market / book value -0.0308 -0.000703 -0.0463 -0.0382 -0.0374
(0.0450) (0.9390) (0.0090) (0.0340) (0.0440)
Standard deviation -3.362892 -0.2573038 -3.868305 -3.566698 -2.873188
(0.0010) (0.6300) 0.0000 (0.0010) 0.0000
Dividend yield 0.0186463 -0.0029548 0.0187852 0.0241845 0.020555
(0.3200) (0.7910) (0.2280) (0.1020) (0.0680)
Property & plant as a percentage of book value 0.0018409 0.000948 0.0009147 0.000399 0.0002327
(0.1390) (0.2370) (0.3630) (0.6720) (0.7240)
Sample Size 359 359 359 359 359
Model likelihood ratio  (p > chi-square) 0.0000 0.0498 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Partial derivatives of outcome probabilities with 
respect to the independent variables
Table VIII: Panel D :  (1 year percentile version) Probit Model of the Likelihood of Pre-Committing to
        All Relative Performance in the Respective Portion of Executive Compensation. 
This table provides estimates of a probit model where the likelihood of formalizing a relative performance formula into a
portion(s) of the executive compensation package is calculated. In the analysis, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if a
firm committed to a relative performance mechanism and equal to zero if no committment has occurred. Data is gathered
from firm proxies covering the S&P Compustat defined 2000 (fiscal years ending between June 2000 and May 2001) fiscal
year for S&P 500 firms. One year industry percentile return is the percentile level return for a firm within all CRSP firms in
the same 2-digit SIC-code. Homogeneity percentile is the cumulative density function value of the firm's 2-digit SIC code
where the initial values are taken from Parrino (1997), P. 189. Revenues for the firm are denominated in billions of dollars.
Research & development as percentage of revenues is the total amount spent on research and development as a
percentage of the fiscal year revenues. Number of board meetings is the number of board meetings held by the board of
directors during the fiscal year. Market/book value is the ratio of the market value of all common stock outstanding to the
book value of the common stock. Standard deviation is the standard deviation of the returns on common stock, measured
monthly over the preceding 5-year period. Dividend yield is the dividend yield of the common stock taken from Compustat
at fiscal year end. Property & plant as a percentage of book value is the book value of property and plant as a percentage
of the book value of the firm. All relative measures include any relative measures, accounting or market related where
compensation will depend upon a comparison to some external performance measure. All comp refers to all measures of
compensation, bonus refers only to bonus compensation, all LT comp refers only to all long-term compensation, LT comp
without options refers to only the long-term compenation which was not delivered in options, and LT cash refers only to long-
term compensation which is to be settled in cash. Values in parenthesis are P-values for a two-tailed test that the
coefficient estimate equals zero.
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LT comp
All All LT- without LT
comp Bonus comp options cash
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
One-year industry percentile return X -0.0371677 -0.04379 -0.014044 0.0189004 -0.0122838
                             top 50% dummy (0.8740) (0.6880) (0.9460) (0.9260) (0.9400)
Top 50% dummy 0.1241 0.0706 0.0836 0.0612 0.0522
(0.3740) (0.1840) (0.4940) (0.6160) (0.5910)
Homogeneity percentile for firm 2-digit SIC code 0.2627087 0.1094016 0.1847917 0.185213 0.0523733
                   F(M) (0.0280) (0.0320) (0.0820) (0.0750) (0.4830)
One-year industry percentile return X -0.2031882 -0.0910326 -0.1692062 -0.163173 -0.0811282
     homogeneity percentile X top 50% dummy (0.3220) (0.3250) (0.3500) (0.3580) (0.5370)
Revenues (billions) 0.0000616 -0.0004865 0.0003714 0.0003323 0.0007548
(0.9570) (0.3230) (0.6960) (0.7200) (0.2390)
Research and development as a percent 0.0112396 0.0001079 0.0113549 0.0063879 0.0070998
                    of revenues (0.0330) (0.9480) (0.0200) (0.1890) (0.0620)
Number of board meetings 0.0133187 0.000756 0.0131028 0.0104864 0.0061916
(0.0500) (0.8010) (0.0250) (0.0630) (0.1520)
Market / book value -0.036 -0.00894 -0.0317 -0.0251 -0.0272
(0.0220) (0.1260) (0.0350) (0.0910) (0.0800)
Standard deviation -2.714384 0.1684488 -3.156595 -2.936165 -2.389128
(0.0030) (0.5240) (0.0010) (0.0020) 0.0000
Dividend yield 0.0117244 -0.0030923 0.0153396 0.0185718 0.0158708
(0.4410) (0.5660) (0.2540) (0.1510) (0.0970)
Property & plant as a percentage of book value 0.0016254 0.00084 0.0002541 0.0002306 0.0001613
(0.1140) (0.0420) (0.7680) (0.7820) (0.8050)
Sample Size 359 359 359 359 359
Model likelihood ratio  (p > chi-square) 0.0000 0.0254 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
       Respective Portion of Executive Compensation.
Table IX: Panel A:  (1 year percentile version) Probit Model with a Dummy Variable for the Top 50% 
respect to the independent variables
        of the Industry for the Likelihood of Pre-Committing to Industry Relative Performance in the
Partial derivatives of outcome probabilities with 
This table provides estimates of a probit model where the likelihood of formalizing a relative performance formula into a
portion(s) of the executive compensation package is calculated. In the analysis, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if a
firm committed to a relative performance mechanism and zero if no committment occurred. Data is gathered from firm
proxies covering the S&P Compustat defined 2000 (fiscal years ending between June 2000 and May 2001) fiscal year for
S&P 500 firms. Top 50% dummy is a dummy variable whose value is 1 if the firm's 1-year return ranked in the top 50% of
firms in its industry. One- year industry percentile return is the percentile level return for a firm within all CRSP firms in the
same 2-digit SIC-code. Homogeneity percentile is the cumulative density function value of the firm's 2-digit SIC code where
the initial values are taken from Parrino (1997), P. 189. Revenues for the firm are denominated in billions of dollars.
Research & development as percentage of revenues is the total amount spent on research and development as a
percentage of the fiscal year revenues. Number of board meetings is the number of board meetings held by the board of
directors during the fiscal year. Market/book value is the ratio of the market value of all common stock outstanding to the
book value of the common stock. Standard deviation is the standard deviation of the returns on common stock, measured
monthly over the preceding 5-year period. Dividend yield is the dividend yield of the common stock taken from Compustat
at fiscal year end. Property & plant as a percentage of book value is the book value of property and plant as a percentage
of the book value of the firm. Industry relative measures are those that explicitly compensate the executive team, through
vesting measures or grant calculations, by calculating the firm's market return compared to that of an industry return. All
comp refers to all measures of compensation, bonus refers only to bonus compensation, all LT comp refers only to all long-
term compensation, LT comp without options refers to only the long-term compenation which was not delivered in options,
and LT cash refers only to long-term compensation which is to be settled in cash. Values in parenthesis are P-values for a
two-tailed test that the coefficient estimate equals zero.
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LT comp
All All LT- without LT
comp Bonus comp options cash
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
One-year industry percentile return X -0.2538597 -0.1991594 -0.1118932 -0.0927029 -0.0139159
                             top 50% dummy (0.1930) (0.1810) (0.3950) (0.4500) (0.8750)
Top 50% dummy 0.1713 0.1254 0.0413 0.0243 (0.0045)
(0.1150) (0.1030) (0.6020) (0.7450) (0.9390)
Homogeneity percentile for firm 2-digit SIC code 0.1624684 0.1312221 -0.0027853 -0.005632 -0.0033164
                   F(M) (0.0880) (0.0730) (0.9640) (0.9230) (0.9310)
One-year industry percentile return X 0.0521227 0.0299487 0.1161058 0.1312857 0.0788674
     homogeneity percentile X top 50% dummy (0.7530) (0.8140) (0.2840) (0.2030) (0.2580)
Revenues (billions) -0.0001164 -0.0002172 -0.0000679 0.0000939 0.0001522
(0.8770) (0.6990) (0.8760) (0.8020) (0.4970)
Research and development as a percent 0.0094209 0.0042464 0.0047537 0.0045016 0.0044224
                    of revenues (0.0180) (0.1160) (0.0490) (0.0460) (0.0020)
Number of board meetings -0.0056926 -0.0041394 -0.0019599 -0.0005383 -0.0018689
(0.3480) (0.3940) (0.5860) (0.8630) (0.3990)
Market / book value -0.00976 -0.000921 -0.0176 -0.0161 -0.0101
(0.3940) (0.9080) (0.1460) (0.1870) (0.2550)
Standard deviation -0.9381487 -0.1714325 -0.9330597 -0.8597478 -0.7493065
(0.1390) (0.7050) (0.0920) (0.1160) (0.0200)
Dividend yield 0.0046798 0.0023387 -0.0002118 0.0017424 0.0056836
(0.7170) (0.7940) (0.9810) (0.8320) (0.3100)
Property & plant as a percentage of book value 0.0009418 0.0004367 0.0001079 -0.0002518 -0.0000695
(0.3000) (0.5270) (0.8510) (0.6170) (0.8560)
Sample Size 359 359 359 359 359
Model likelihood ratio  (p > chi-square) 0.0169 0.1896 0.1613 0.0825 0.0015
       Respective Portion of Executive Compensation.
Table IX: Panel B:  (1 year percentile version) Probit Model with a Dummy Variable for the Top 50% 
respect to the independent variables
        of the Industry for the Likelihood of Pre-Committing to Accounting Relative Performance in the
Partial derivatives of outcome probabilities with 
This table provides estimates of a probit model where the likelihood of formalizing a relative performance formula into a
portion(s) of the executive compensation package is calculated. In the analysis, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if a
firm committed to a relative performance mechanism and zero if no committment occurred. Data is gathered from firm
proxies covering the S&P Compustat defined 2000 (fiscal years ending between June 2000 and May 2001) fiscal year for
S&P 500 firms. Top 50% dummy is a dummy variable whose value is 1 if the firm's 1-year return ranked in the top 50% of
firms in its industry. One- year industry percentile return is the percentile level return for a firm within all CRSP firms in the
same 2-digit SIC-code. Homogeneity percentile is the cumulative density function value of the firm's 2-digit SIC code where
the initial values are taken from Parrino (1997), P. 189. Revenues for the firm are denominated in billions of dollars.
Research & development as percentage of revenues is the total amount spent on research and development as a
percentage of the fiscal year revenues. Number of board meetings is the number of board meetings held by the board of
directors during the fiscal year. Market/book value is the ratio of the market value of all common stock outstanding to the
book value of the common stock. Standard deviation is the standard deviation of the returns on common stock, measured
monthly over the preceding 5-year period. Dividend yield is the dividend yield of the common stock taken from Compustat
at fiscal year end. Property & plant as a percentage of book value is the book value of property and plant as a percentage
of the book value of the firm. Accounting relative measures include any relative measure that will depend upon a
comparison that can be calculated through external financial statement performance measures. All comp refers to all
measures of compensation, bonus refers only to bonus compensation, all LT comp refers only to all long-term
compensation, LT comp without options refers to only the long-term compenation which was not delivered in options, and LT
cash refers only to long-term compensation which is to be settled in cash. Values in parenthesis are P-values for a two-
tailed test that the coefficient estimate equals zero.
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LT comp
All All LT- without LT
comp Bonus comp options cash
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
One-year industry percentile return X 0.0747774 0.00919 0.0323859 0.0323859 -0.0003993
                             top 50% dummy (0.3430) 0.1080 (0.5580) (0.5580) (0.9920)
Top 50% dummy (0.0348) (0.0556) (0.0093) (0.0093) 0.0053
(0.5970) (0.1840) (0.8250) (0.8250) (0.8400)
Homogeneity percentile for firm 2-digit SIC code -0.0127365 0.000825 -0.019431 -0.019431 -0.0103817
                   F(M) (0.6790) (0.5430) (0.3520) (0.3520) (0.4570)
One-year industry percentile return X -0.0688536 -0.0032492 -0.0394412 -0.0394412 -0.0344003
     homogeneity percentile X top 50% dummy (0.2040) (0.1320) (0.2990) (0.2990) (0.1520)
Revenues (billions) 0.0002851 -0.0000155 0.0002484 0.0002484 0.0001001
(0.2770) (0.1320) (0.1710) (0.1710) (0.4140)
Research and development as a percent 0.0002037 -0.0000222 0.0004099 0.0004099 0.0006269
                    of revenues (0.9140) (0.7340) (0.7750) (0.7750) (0.5400)
Number of board meetings 0.002841 0.0003264 0.0010761 0.0010761 0.0007856
(0.1370) (0.0640) (0.4020) (0.4020) (0.3510)
Market / book value -0.0265 0.000111 -0.0232 -0.0232 0.0143
(0.0260) (0.4440) (0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0390)
Standard deviation -0.5341476 -0.0326077 -0.3266694 -0.3266694 -0.42398
(0.1660) (0.0530) (0.2370) (0.2370) (0.0190)
Dividend yield -0.005172 0.0001315 -0.0049248 -0.0049248 -0.0033603
(0.1850) (0.6170) (0.0650) (0.0650) (0.0630)
Property & plant as a percentage of book value 0.0001806 0.00007 -0.0000564 -0.0000564 -0.0001698
(0.5800) (0.0010) (0.8230) (0.8230) (0.3700)
Sample Size 359 359 359 359 359
Model likelihood ratio  (p > chi-square) 0.2925 0 0.2360 0.2360 0.0042
       the Respective Portion of Executive Compensation.
Table IX: Panel C:  (1 year percentile version) Probit Model with a Dummy Variable for the Top 50% 
respect to the independent variables
        of the Industry for the Likelihood of Pre-Committing to Broad Market Relative Performance in
Partial derivatives of outcome probabilities with 
This table provides estimates of a probit model where the likelihood of formalizing a relative performance formula into a
portion(s) of the executive compensation package is calculated. In the analysis, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if a
firm committed to a relative performance mechanism and zero if no committment occurred. Data is gathered from firm
proxies covering the S&P Compustat defined 2000 (fiscal years ending between June 2000 and May 2001) fiscal year for
S&P 500 firms. Top 50% dummy is a dummy variable whose value is 1 if the firm's 1-year return ranked in the top 50% of
firms in its industry. One- year industry percentile return is the percentile level return for a firm within all CRSP firms in the
same 2-digit SIC-code. Homogeneity percentile is the cumulative density function value of the firm's 2-digit SIC code where
the initial values are taken from Parrino (1997), P. 189. Revenues for the firm are denominated in billions of dollars.
Research & development as percentage of revenues is the total amount spent on research and development as a
percentage of the fiscal year revenues. Number of board meetings is the number of board meetings held by the board of
directors during the fiscal year. Market/book value is the ratio of the market value of all common stock outstanding to the
book value of the common stock. Standard deviation is the standard deviation of the returns on common stock, measured
monthly over the preceding 5-year period. Dividend yield is the dividend yield of the common stock taken from Compustat
at fiscal year end. Property & plant as a percentage of book value is the book value of property and plant as a percentage
of the book value of the firm. Broad market relative measures are those that explicitly compensate the executive team
through vesting measures or grant caluclations by calculating the firm's market return and comparin it to that of a broad
market return. All comp refers to all measures of compensation, bonus refers only to bonus compensation, all LT comp
refers only to all long-term compensation, LT comp without options refers to only the long-term compenation which was not
delivered in options, and LT cash refers only to long-term compensation which is to be settled in cash. Values in
parenthesis are P-values for a two-tailed test that the coefficient estimate equals zero.
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LT comp
All All LT- without LT
comp Bonus comp options cash
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
One-year industry percentile return X -0.1350818 -0.1324196 -0.0970618 -0.0299834 -0.0182066
                             top 50% dummy (0.6140) (0.4620) (0.6740) (0.8930) (0.9200)
Top 50% dummy 0.2506 0.1344 0.1492 0.1000 0.0541
(0.1210) (0.1690) (0.2730) (0.4550) (0.6230)
Homogeneity percentile for firm 2-digit SIC code 0.3778833 0.2215137 0.1648346 0.1646915 0.0606829
                   F(M) (0.0090) (0.0170) (0.1640) (0.1520) (0.4630)
One-year industry percentile return X -0.2261204 -0.0566 -0.1368503 -0.1122155 -0.0393991
     homogeneity percentile X top 50% dummy (0.3450) (0.7180) (0.4930) (0.5620) (0.7850)
Revenues (billions) 0.00205 -0.0005981 0.0003568 0.00004473 0.0009298
(0.8850) (0.3890) (0.7420) (0.6630) (0.2080)
Research and development as a percent 0.0171206 0.0031652 0.0141888 0.0084598 0.009123
                    of revenues (0.0060) (0.3190) (0.0090) (0.1170) (0.0290)
Number of board meetings 0.011403 -0.0009358 0.0129954 0.0111935 0.004104
(0.1650) (0.8690) (0.0550) (0.0800) (0.4070)
Market / book value -0.0306 -0.000557 -0.0469 -0.0384 -0.0371
(0.0510) (0.9520) (0.0080) (0.0320) (0.0430)
Standard deviation -3.341075 -0.2338175 -3.798031 -3.496379 2.843052
0.0000 (0.6480) 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000
Dividend yield 0.018021 -0.0036777 0.0194694 0.0250856 0.0204073
(0.3340) (0.7320) (0.2060) 0.0860 (0.0630)
Property & plant as a percentage of book value 0.0017652 0.0009361 0.0009037 0.0004228 0.0002589
(0.1550) (0.2310) (0.3650) (0.6510) (0.7260)
Sample Size 359 359 359 359 359
Model likelihood ratio  (p > chi-square) 0.0000 0.0475 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
       Respective Portion of Executive Compensation.
Table IX: Panel D:  (1 year percentile version) Probit Model with a Dummy Variable for the Top 50% 
respect to the independent variables
        of the Industry for the Likelihood of Pre-Committing to All Relative Performance in the
Partial derivatives of outcome probabilities with 
This table provides estimates of a probit model where the likelihood of formalizing a relative performance formula into a
portion(s) of the executive compensation package is calculated. In the analysis, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if a
firm committed to a relative performance mechanism and zero if no committment occurred. Data is gathered from firm
proxies covering the S&P Compustat defined 2000 (fiscal years ending between June 2000 and May 2001) fiscal year for
S&P 500 firms. Top 50% dummy is a dummy variable whose value is 1 if the firm's 1-year return ranked in the top 50% of
firms in its industry. One- year industry percentile return is the percentile level return for a firm within all CRSP firms in the
same 2-digit SIC-code. Homogeneity percentile is the cumulative density function value of the firm's 2-digit SIC code where
the initial values are taken from Parrino (1997), P. 189. Revenues for the firm are denominated in billions of dollars.
Research & development as percentage of revenues is the total amount spent on research and development as a
percentage of the fiscal year revenues. Number of board meetings is the number of board meetings held by the board of
directors during the fiscal year. Market/book value is the ratio of the market value of all common stock outstanding to the
book value of the common stock. Standard deviation is the standard deviation of the returns on common stock, measured
monthly over the preceding 5-year period. Dividend yield is the dividend yield of the common stock taken from Compustat
at fiscal year end. Property & plant as a percentage of book value is the book value of property and plant as a percentage
of the book value of the firm. elative measures include any relative measures, accounting or market related where
compensation will depend upon a comparison to some external performance measure. All comp refers to all measures of
compensation, bonus refers only to bonus compensation, all LT comp refers only to all long-term compensation, LT comp
without options refers to only the long-term compenation which was not delivered in options, and LT cash refers only to long-
term compensation which is to be settled in cash. Values in parenthesis are P-values for a two-tailed test that the
coefficient estimate equals zero.
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LT comp
All All LT- without LT
comp Bonus comp options cash
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
One-year industry percentile return 0.3022334 0.00038 0.3291894 0.3258766 0.1839555
(0.1500) (0.9960) (0.0810) (0.0740) (0.1990)
Homogeneity percentile for 2-digit SIC code: F(M 0.5094162 0.099679 0.4729067 0.4648643 0.2130318
(0.0070) (0.1550) (0.0060) (0.0050) (0.0810)
One-year industry percentile return X  -0.6056324 -0.0638059 -0.6603044 -0.6386363 -0.3542778
                    homogeneity percentile (0.0520) (0.5970) (0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0840)
Revenues (billions) -0.0000617 -0.0006125 0.0002698 0.0002352 0.0006957
(0.9550) (0.2800) (0.7650) (0.7890) (0.2630)
Research and development as a percent 0.01142 0.000233 0.011579 0.0067137 0.0072151
                    of revenues (0.0290) (0.8940) (0.0150) (0.1490) (0.0500)
Number of board meetings 0.0118345 -0.0001423 0.0118306 0.0094606 0.0055092
(0.0890) (0.9660) (0.0440) (0.0960) (0.2030)
Market / book value -0.0377 -0.00867 -0.0342 -0.0277 -0.0282
(0.0180) (0.1640) (0.0230) (0.0620) (0.0730)
Standard deviation -2.900391 0.1059513 -3.40166 -3.164009 -2.458105
(0.0010) (0.6830) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Dividend yield 0.0077272 -0.0051385 0.0113551 0.0146573 0.014059
(0.6370) (0.3670) (0.4370) (0.2940) (0.1760)
Property & plant as a percentage of book value 0.0016177 0.00087 0.000135 0.0001041 0.0000817
(0.1250) (0.0530) (0.8800) (0.9040) (0.9040)
Sample size 359 359 359 359 359
Model likelihood ratio  (p > chi-square) 0.0000 0.0194 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table X: Panel A :  (2 year percentile version) Probit Model of the Likelihood of Pre-Committing to
respect to the independent variables
Partial derivatives of outcome probabilities with 
        Industry Relative Performance in the Respective Portion of Executive Compensation. 
This table provides estimates of a probit model where the likelihood of formalizing a relative performance formula into a
portion(s) of the executive compensation package is calculated. In the analysis, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if a
firm committed to a relative performance mechanism and equal to zero if no committment has occurred. Data is gathered
from firm proxies covering the S&P Compustat defined 2000 (fiscal years ending between June 2000 and May 2001) fiscal
year for S&P 500 firms. Two year industry percentile return is the percentile level return for a firm within all CRSP firms in
the same 2-digit SIC-code. Homogeneity percentile is the cumulative density function value of the firm's 2-digit SIC code
where the initial values are taken from Parrino (1997), P. 189. Revenues for the firm are denominated in billions of dollars.
Research & development as percent of revenues is the total amount spent on research and development as a percentage of
the fiscal year revenues. Number of board meetings is the number of board meetings held by the board of directors during
the fiscal year. Market/book value is the ratio of the market value of all common stock outstanding to the book value of the
common stock. Standard deviation is the standard deviation of the returns on common stock,measured monthly over the
preceding 5-year period. Dividend yield is the dividend yield of the common stock taken from Compustat at fiscal year end.
Property & plant as a percentage of book value is the book value of Property and plant as a percentage of the book value of
the firm. Industry relatives measures are those that explicitly compensate the executive team, through vesting measures or
grant calculations, by calculating the firm's market return compared to that of an industry return. All comp refers to all
measures of compensation, Bonus refers only to bonus compensation, All LT comp refers only to all Long-term
compensation, LT comp without options refers to only the long-term compensation which was not delivered in options, and
LT cash refers only to long-term compensation which is to be settled in cash. Values in parenthesis are P-values for a two-
tailed test that the coefficient estimate equals zero. 
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LT comp
All All LT- without LT
comp Bonus comp options cash
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
One-year industry percentile return 0.0869945 0.0226076 -0.0453707 -0.0877875 -0.0134317
(0.6190) (0.8760) (0.7040) (0.4380) (0.8470)
Homogeneity percentile for 2-digit SIC code: F(M 0.2119678 0.1983708 -0.0170425 -0.0192072 -0.0270695
(0.2000) (0.1430) (0.8770) (0.8450) (0.5960)
One-year industry percentile return X  -0.0540491 -0.0951309 0.1211153 0.1418727 0.1085148
                    homogeneity percentile (0.8330) (0.6520) (0.4850) (0.3810) (0.2290)
Revenues (billions) -0.0002288 -0.0003007 -0.0001071 0.0000418 0.0000966
(0.7580) (0.5930) (0.7970) (0.9070) (0.6450)
Research and development as a percent 0.0101454 0.0047224 0.0049258 0.0045518 0.0044895
                    of revenues (0.0110) (0.0840) (0.0470) (0.0480) (0.0030)
Number of board meetings -0.0069189 -0.0056058 -0.0023442 -0.0009905 -0.0015734
(0.2710) (0.2740) (0.5270) (0.7500) (0.4810)
Market / book value -0.0121 -0.000182 -0.0183 -0.0164 -0.00972
(0.2880) (0.9820) (0.1480) (0.1890) (0.2780)
Standard deviation -0.9758174 -0.2323704 -0.9036477 -0.8718348 -0.7895027
(0.1220) (0.6050) (0.0820) (0.0810) (0.0130)
Dividend yield 0.0080417 0.0013065 0.0015161 0.0011692 0.0074282
(0.5650) (0.8980) (0.8710) (0.8900) (0.2130)
Property & plant as a percentage of book value 0.0010245 0.0004511 0.000141 -0.0002605 -0.0000595
(0.2670) (0.5340) (0.8090) (0.6090) (0.8770)
Sample size 359 359 359 359 359
Model likelihood ratio  (p > chi-square) 0.0207 0.1610 0.2347 0.1908 0.0080
Table X: Panel B :  (2 year percentile version) Probit M odel of the Likelihood of Pre-Committing to
respect to the independent variables
Partial derivatives of outcome probabilities with 
        Accounting Relative Performance in the Respective Portion of Executive Compensation. 
This table provides estimates of a probit model where the likelihood of formalizing a relative performance formula into a
portion(s) of the executive compensation package is calculated. In the analysis, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if a
firm committed to a relative performance mechanism and equal to zero if no committment has occurred. Data is gathered
from firm proxies covering the S&P Compustat defined 2000 (fiscal years ending between June 2000 and May 2001) fiscal
year for S&P 500 firms. Two year industry percentile return is the percentile level return for a firm within all CRSP firms in
the same 2-digit SIC-code. Homogeneity percentile is the cumulative density function value of the firm's 2-digit SIC code
where the initial values are taken from Parrino (1997), P. 189. Revenues for the firm are denominated in billions of dollars.
Research & development as percent of revenues is the total amount spent on research and development as a percentage of
the fiscal year revenues. Number of board meetings is the number of board meetings held by the board of directors during
the fiscal year. Market/book value is the ratio of the market value of all common stock outstanding to the book value of the
common stock. Standard deviation is the standard deviation of the returns on common stock,measured monthly over the
preceding 5-year period. Dividend yield is the dividend yield of the common stock taken from Compustat at fiscal year end.
Property & plant as a percentage of book value is the book value of Property and plant as a percentage of the book value of
the firm. Accounting relative measures include any relative measure that will depend upon a comparison that can be
calculated through external financial statement performance measures. All comp refers to all measures of compensation,
Bonus refers only to bonus compensation, All LT comp refers only to all Long-term compensation, LT comp without options
refers to only the long-term compensation which was not delivered in options, and LT cash refers only to long-term
compensation which is to be settled in cash. Values in parenthesis are P-values for a two-tailed test that the coefficient
estimate equals zero. 
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LT comp
All All LT- without LT
comp Bonus comp options cash
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
One-year industry percentile return 0.883059 0.00687 0.0498366 0.0498366 0.0132892
(0.1110) (0.0470) (0.1840) (0.1840) (0.6730)
Homogeneity percentile for 2-digit SIC code: F(M 0.0485735 0.0032037 0.0236108 0.0236108 -0.0090835
(0.3760) (0.4870) (0.5230) (0.5230) (0.7610)
One-year industry percentile return X  -0.1678144 -0.0061165 -0.1060679 -0.1060679 -0.0350467
                    homogeneity percentile (0.0680) (0.3870) (0.0950) (0.0950) (0.4880)
Revenues (billions) 0.0002552 -0.00000876 0.0002078 0.0002078 0.0001181
(0.2740) (0.5400) (0.1810) (0.1810) (0.3680)
Research and development as a percent 0.000269 -0.000064 0.000425 0.000425 0.0006655
                    of revenues (0.8800) (0.3450) (0.7410) (0.7410) (0.5520)
Number of board meetings 0.0028616 0.0005649 0.0010662 0.0010662 0.0009151
(0.1130) (0.0690) (0.3480) (0.3480) (0.3050)
Market / book value -0.0262 0.000245 -0.022 -0.022 -0.0154
(0.0290) (0.3160) (0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0500)
Standard deviation -0.5847225 -0.0441721 -0.3577386 -0.3577386 -0.4404946
(0.0660) (0.1810) (0.0990) (0.0990) (0.0290)
Dividend yield -0.0006096 0.0002768 -0.0053077 -0.0053077 -0.0034708
(0.1460) (0.5520) (0.0570) (0.0570) (0.1360)
Property & plant as a percentage of book value 0.0001511 0.00011 -0.0000709 -0.0000709 -0.0001458
(0.6280) (0.0070) (0.7630) (0.7630) (0.4940)
Sample Size 359 359 359 359 359
Model likelihood ratio  (p > chi-square) 0.1253 0.0000 0.1746 0.1746 0.3523
Partial derivatives of outcome probabilities with 
respect to the independent variables
Table X: Panel C :  (2 year percentile version) Probit Model of the Likelihood of Pre-Committing to 
        Broad Market Relative Performance in the Respective Portion of Executive Compensation. 
This table provides estimates of a probit model where the likelihood of formalizing a relative performance formula into a
portion(s) of the executive compensation package is calculated. In the analysis, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if a
firm committed to a relative performance mechanism and equal to zero if no committment has occurred. Data is gathered
from firm proxies covering the S&P Compustat defined 2000 (fiscal years ending between June 2000 and May 2001) fiscal
year for S&P 500 firms. Two-year industry percentile return is the percentile level return for a firm within all CRSP firms in
the same 2-digit SIC-code. Homogeneity percentile is the cumulative density function value of the firm's 2-digit SIC code
where the initial values are taken from Parrino (1997), P. 189. Revenues for the firm are denominated in billions of dollars.
Research & development as percentage of revenues is the total amount spent on research and development as a
percentage of the fiscal year revenues. Number of board meetings is the number of board meetings held by the board of
directors during the fiscal year. Market/book value is the ratio of the market value of all common stock outstanding to the
book value of the common stock. Standard deviation is the standard deviation of the returns on common stock, measured
monthly over the preceding 5-year period. Dividend yield is the dividend yield of the common stock taken from Compustat
at fiscal year end. Property & plant as a percentage of book value is the book value of property and plant as a percentage
of the book value of the firm. Broad market relative measures are those that explicitly compensate the executive team
through vesting measures or grant caluclations by calculating the firm's market return and comparin it to that of a broad
market return. All comp refers to all measures of compensation, bonus refers only to bonus compensation, all LT comp
refers only to all long-term compensation, LT comp without options refers to only the long-term compenation which was not
delivered in options, and LT cash refers only to long-term compensation which is to be settled in cash. Values in
parenthesis are P-values for a two-tailed test that the coefficient estimate equals zero.
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LT comp
All All LT- without LT
comp Bonus comp options cash
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
One-year industry percentile return 0.3111882 -0.0440433 0.3115644 0.2591808 0.2072162
(0.2000) (0.7860) (0.1410) (0.1990) (0.1950)
Homogeneity percentile for 2-digit SIC code: F(M 0.5955825 0.1978623 0.4292853 0.415979 0.2422763
(0.0100) (0.1800) (0.0270) (0.0240) (0.0720)
One-year industry percentile return X  -0.5767352 -0.0044813 -0.5876146 -0.5398856 -0.3505209
                    homogeneity percentile (0.1150) (0.9850) (0.0590) (0.0700) (0.1210)
Revenues (billions) -0.0000236 -0.0007032 0.0002053 0.0002981 0.0008271
(0.9860) (0.3130) (0.8450) (0.7660) (0.2570)
Research and development as a percent 0.0175481 0.003647 0.0144752 0.0087229 0.0093412
                    of revenues (0.0050) (0.2570) (0.0070) (0.0930) (0.0220)
Number of board meetings 0.0091699 -0.0022109 0.0114115 0.0097698 0.0033856
(0.2740) (0.7060) (0.0940) (0.1260) (0.4930)
Market / book value -0.0327 0.000158 -0.0488 -0.0404 -0.0384
(0.0330) (0.9860) (0.0060) (0.0250) (0.0410)
Standard deviation -3.582057 -0.3033021 -4.025353 -3.779802 -2.943157
0.0000 (0.5560) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Dividend yield 0.0128603 -0.0061403 0.0165859 0.0193431 0.019109
(0.5220) (0.6050) (0.3210) (0.2200) (0.1090)
Property & plant as a percentage of book value 0.0017274 0.000895 0.0008201 0.002467 0.0001791
(0.1670) (0.2670) (0.4220) (0.7960) (0.8120)
Sample Size 359 359 359 359 359
Model likelihood ratio  (p > chi-square) 0.0000 0.0511 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Partial derivatives of outcome probabilities with 
respect to the independent variables
Table X: Panel D :  (2 year percentile version) Probit Model of the Likelihood of Pre-Committing to
        All Relative Performance in the Respective Portion of Executive Compensation. 
This table provides estimates of a probit model where the likelihood of formalizing a relative performance formula into a
portion(s) of the executive compensation package is calculated. In the analysis, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if a
firm committed to a relative performance mechanism and equal to zero if no committment has occurred. Data is gathered
from firm proxies covering the S&P Compustat defined 2000 (fiscal years ending between June 2000 and May 2001) fiscal
year for S&P 500 firms. Two-year industry percentile return is the percentile level return for a firm within all CRSP firms in
the same 2-digit SIC-code. Homogeneity percentile is the cumulative density function value of the firm's 2-digit SIC code
where the initial values are taken from Parrino (1997), P. 189. Revenues for the firm are denominated in billions of dollars.
Research & development as percentage of revenues is the total amount spent on research and development as a
percentage of the fiscal year revenues. Number of board meetings is the number of board meetings held by the board of
directors during the fiscal year. Market/book value is the ratio of the market value of all common stock outstanding to the
book value of the common stock. Standard deviation is the standard deviation of the returns on common stock, measured
monthly over the preceding 5-year period. Dividend yield is the dividend yield of the common stock taken from Compustat
at fiscal year end. Property & plant as a percentage of book value is the book value of property and plant as a percentage
of the book value of the firm. elative measures include any relative measures, accounting or market related where
compensation will depend upon a comparison to some external performance measure. All comp refers to all measures of
compensation, bonus refers only to bonus compensation, all LT comp refers only to all long-term compensation, LT comp
without options refers to only the long-term compenation which was not delivered in options, and LT cash refers only to long-
term compensation which is to be settled in cash. Values in parenthesis are P-values for a two-tailed test that the
coefficient estimate equals zero.
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LT comp
All All LT- without LT
comp Bonus comp options cash
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
One-year industry percentile return X 0.1373264 -0.04804 0.1813911 0.1464993 0.0474913
                             top 50% dummy (0.5800) (0.6230) (0.4090) (0.5000) (0.7870)
Top 50% dummy 0.0906 0.0395 0.0655 0.0801 0.0614
(0.5610) (0.5020) (0.6340) (0.5500) (0.5650)
Homogeneity percentile for firm 2-digit SIC code 0.3962383 0.0886202 0.3337238 0.3279174 0.1465033
                   F(M) (0.0010) (0.0550) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0450)
One-year industry percentile return X -0.4924685 -0.046568 -0.5095857 -0.4841894 -0.2917625
     homogeneity percentile X top 50% dummy 0.0140 (0.5760) (0.0040) (0.0050) (0.0260)
Revenues (billions) -0.0002414 -0.0006078 0.0001136 0.000092 0.0005947
(0.8470) (0.2710) (0.9020) (0.9190) (0.3570)
Research and development as a percent 0.0111289 0.0000538 0.0113901 0.0064857 0.0068407
                    of revenues (0.0320) (0.9760) (0.0160) (0.1600) (0.0600)
Number of board meetings 0.0126049 0.0000941 0.0126925 0.01029 0.0058385
(0.0670) (0.9770) (0.0280) (0.0640) (0.1610)
Market / book value -0.0372 -0.00821 -0.0336 -0.0269 -0.0278
(0.0200) (0.1780) (0.0260) (0.0720) (0.0760)
Standard deviation -2.763925 0.1614555 -3.259473 -3.015166 -2.36746
(0.0020) (0.5410) 0.0000 (0.0010) 0.0000
Dividend yield 0.0081135 -0.0045288 0.0124543 0.0151252 0.011673
(0.6150) (0.4240) (0.3840) (0.2700) (0.2390)
Property & plant as a percentage of book value 0.0015334 0.00084 0.0000367 -0.0000124 -0.0000399
(0.1480) (0.0570) (0.9670) (0.9880) (0.9530)
Sample Size 359 359 359 359 359
Model likelihood ratio  (p > chi-square) 0.0000 0.0326 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
       Respective Portion of Executive Compensation.
Table XI: Panel A:  (2 year percentile version) Probit Model with a Dummy Variable for the Top 50% 
respect to the independent variables
        of the Industry for the Likelihood of Pre-Committing to Industry Relative Performance in the
Partial derivatives of outcome probabilities with 
This table provides estimates of a probit model where the likelihood of formalizing a relative performance formula into a
portion(s) of the executive compensation package is calculated. In the analysis, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if a
firm committed to a relative performance mechanism and zero if no committment occurred. Data is gathered from firm
proxies covering the S&P Compustat defined 2000 (fiscal years ending between June 2000 and May 2001) fiscal year for
S&P 500 firms. Top 50% dummy is a dummy variable whose value is 1 if the firm's 1-year return ranked in the top 50% of
firms in its industry. Two- year industry percentile return is the percentile level return for a firm within all CRSP firms in the
same 2-digit SIC-code. Homogeneity percentile is the cumulative density function value of the firm's 2-digit SIC code where
the initial values are taken from Parrino (1997), P. 189. Revenues for the firm are denominated in billions of dollars.
Research & development as percentage of revenues is the total amount spent on research and development as a
percentage of the fiscal year revenues. Number of board meetings is the number of board meetings held by the board of
directors during the fiscal year. Market/book value is the ratio of the market value of all common stock outstanding to the
book value of the common stock. Standard deviation is the standard deviation of the returns on common stock, measured
monthly over the preceding 5-year period. Dividend yield is the dividend yield of the common stock taken from Compustat
at fiscal year end. Property & plant as a percentage of book value is the book value of property and plant as a percentage
of the book value of the firm. Industry relative measures are those that explicitly compensate the executive team, through
vesting measures or grant calculations, by calculating the firm's market return compared to that of an industry return. All
comp refers to all measures of compensation, bonus refers only to bonus compensation, all LT comp refers only to all long-
term compensation, LT comp without options refers to only the long-term compenation which was not delivered in options,
and LT cash refers only to long-term compensation which is to be settled in cash. Values in parenthesis are P-values for a
two-tailed test that the coefficient estimate equals zero.
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LT comp
All All LT- without LT
comp Bonus comp options cash
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
One-year industry percentile return X -0.249264 -0.2217026 -0.0924038 -0.1367024 -0.06113966
                             top 50% dummy (0.2280) (0.1830) (0.4970) (0.2900) (0.4860)
Top 50% dummy 0.1693 0.1364 0.0332 0.0441 0.0154
(0.1510) (0.1340) (0.6780) (0.5300) (0.7530)
Homogeneity percentile for firm 2-digit SIC code 0.1652145 0.1515648 0.0014607 0.0069249 -0.0033064
                   F(M) (0.0990) (0.0670) (0.9810) (0.9000) (0.9190)
One-year industry percentile return X 0.0765643 0.0137418 0.1188786 0.1314293 0.0974969
     homogeneity percentile X top 50% dummy (0.6480) (0.9210) (0.2590) (0.1890) (0.1550)
Revenues (billions) -0.0002209 -0.0003002 -0.000083 0.0000603 0.0001133
(0.7620) (0.5850) (0.8420) (0.8660) (0.5980)
Research and development as a percent 0.0096582 0.0042889 0.0048339 0.0043577 0.0043104
                    of revenues (0.0170) (0.1260) (0.0500) (0.0570) (0.0040)
Number of board meetings -0.0062885 -0.0049267 -0.0023439 -0.0009381 -0.0017241
(0.3090) (0.3280) (0.5180) (0.7570) (0.4320)
Market / book value -0.0072 0.00277 -0.017 -0.0151 -0.00904
(0.4950) (0.7270) (0.1610) (0.2010) (0.2980)
Standard deviation -0.813823 -0.0663786 -0.8867749 -0.8290063 -0.7932167
(0.2060) (0.8840) (0.1060) (0.1160) (0.0140)
Dividend yield 0.0084768 0.0028381 0.0021973 0.0020688 0.0058378
(0.5280) (0.7730) (0.8020) (0.7910) (0.2850)
Property & plant as a percentage of book value 0.0008694 0.0003374 0.0001156 -0.000295 -0.0000925
(0.3450) (0.6360) (0.8420) (0.5520) (0.8040)
Sample Size 359 359 359 359 359
Model likelihood ratio  (p > chi-square) 0.0234 0.1742 0.3129 0.2933 0.0075
       Respective Portion of Executive Compensation.
Table XI: Panel B:  (2 year percentile version) Probit Model with a Dummy Variable for the Top 50% 
respect to the independent variables
        of the Industry for the Likelihood of Pre-Committing to Accounting Relative Performance in the
Partial derivatives of outcome probabilities with 
This table provides estimates of a probit model where the likelihood of formalizing a relative performance formula into a
portion(s) of the executive compensation package is calculated. In the analysis, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if a
firm committed to a relative performance mechanism and zero if no committment occurred. Data is gathered from firm
proxies covering the S&P Compustat defined 2000 (fiscal years ending between June 2000 and May 2001) fiscal year for
S&P 500 firms. Top 50% dummy is a dummy variable whose value is 1 if the firm's 1-year return ranked in the top 50% of
firms in its industry. Two- year industry percentile return is the percentile level return for a firm within all CRSP firms in the
same 2-digit SIC-code. Homogeneity percentile is the cumulative density function value of the firm's 2-digit SIC code where
the initial values are taken from Parrino (1997), P. 189. Revenues for the firm are denominated in billions of dollars.
Research & development as percentage of revenues is the total amount spent on research and development as a
percentage of the fiscal year revenues. Number of board meetings is the number of board meetings held by the board of
directors during the fiscal year. Market/book value is the ratio of the market value of all common stock outstanding to the
book value of the common stock. Standard deviation is the standard deviation of the returns on common stock, measured
monthly over the preceding 5-year period. Dividend yield is the dividend yield of the common stock taken from Compustat
at fiscal year end. Property & plant as a percentage of book value is the book value of property and plant as a percentage
of the book value of the firm. Accounting relative measures include any relative measure that will depend upon a
comparison that can be calculated through external financial statement performance measures. All comp refers to all
measures of compensation, bonus refers only to bonus compensation, all LT comp refers only to all long-term
compensation, LT comp without options refers to only the long-term compenation which was not delivered in options, and LT
cash refers only to long-term compensation which is to be settled in cash. Values in parenthesis are P-values for a two-
tailed test that the coefficient estimate equals zero.
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LT comp
All All LT- without LT
comp Bonus comp options cash
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
One-year industry percentile return X -0.100579 0.00002 -0.0018187 -0.0018187 -0.02966
                             top 50% dummy (0.8950) (0.9950) (0.9730) (0.9730) (0.5150)
Top 50% dummy 0.0505 0.0048 0.0267 0.0267 0.0278
(0.2190) (0.1950) (0.3680) (0.3680) (0.2540)
Homogeneity percentile for firm 2-digit SIC code 0.0070089 0.0028065 -0.0025749 -0.0025749 -0.0140251
                   F(M) (0.8460) (0.0510) (0.9140) (0.9140) (0.4200)
One-year industry percentile return X -0.0998033 -0.0040031 -0.0669639 -0.0669639 -0.0238439
     homogeneity percentile X top 50% dummy (0.1120) (0.1320) (0.1240) (0.1240) (0.4610)
Revenues (billions) -0.0002377 -0.00000247 0.0001989 0.0001989 0.0001011
(0.3220) (0.6690) (0.2180) (0.2180) (0.4300)
Research and development as a percent 0.0001892 -0.0000377 0.0004068 0.0004068 0.0006458
                    of revenues (0.9200) (0.4770) (0.7650) (0.7650) (0.5630)
Number of board meetings 0.0030986 0.0003002 0.0011508 0.0011508 0.0009181
(0.0910) (0.0590) (0.3260) (0.3260) (0.3030)
Market / book value -0.0252 0.000229 -0.022 -0.022 -0.0145
(0.0340) (0.0080) (0.0230) (0.0230) (0.0530)
Standard deviation -0.5028261 -0.0189176 -0.312519 -0.312519 -0.4166808
(0.1530) (0.2750) (0.1910) (0.1910) (0.0290)
Dividend yield -0.0049875 0.0002362 -0.0049363 -0.0049363 -0.0031689
(0.2560) (0.3310) (0.0880) (0.0880) (0.1700)
Property & plant as a percentage of book value 0.0001145 0.00005 -0.0000902 -0.0000902 -0.0001702
(0.7160) (0.0140) (0.7090) (0.7090) (0.4090)
Sample Size 359 359 359 359 359
Model likelihood ratio  (p > chi-square) 0.1079 0.0006 0.1771 0.1771 0.1099
       the Respective Portion of Executive Compensation.
Table XI: Panel C:  (2 year percentile version) Probit Model with a Dummy Variable for the Top 50% 
respect to the independent variables
        of the Industry for the Likelihood of Pre-Committing to Broad Market Relative Performance in
Partial derivatives of outcome probabilities with 
This table provides estimates of a probit model where the likelihood of formalizing a relative performance formula into a
portion(s) of the executive compensation package is calculated. In the analysis, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if a
firm committed to a relative performance mechanism and zero if no committment occurred. Data is gathered from firm
proxies covering the S&P Compustat defined 2000 (fiscal years ending between June 2000 and May 2001) fiscal year for
S&P 500 firms. Top 50% dummy is a dummy variable whose value is 1 if the firm's 1-year return ranked in the top 50% of
firms in its industry. Two- year industry percentile return is the percentile level return for a firm within all CRSP firms in the
same 2-digit SIC-code. Homogeneity percentile is the cumulative density function value of the firm's 2-digit SIC code where
the initial values are taken from Parrino (1997), P. 189. Revenues for the firm are denominated in billions of dollars.
Research & development as percentage of revenues is the total amount spent on research and development as a
percentage of the fiscal year revenues. Number of board meetings is the number of board meetings held by the board of
directors during the fiscal year. Market/book value is the ratio of the market value of all common stock outstanding to the
book value of the common stock. Standard deviation is the standard deviation of the returns on common stock, measured
monthly over the preceding 5-year period. Dividend yield is the dividend yield of the common stock taken from Compustat
at fiscal year end. Property & plant as a percentage of book value is the book value of property and plant as a percentage
of the book value of the firm. Broad market relative measures are those that explicitly compensate the executive team
through vesting measures or grant caluclations by calculating the firm's market return and comparin it to that of a broad
market return. All comp refers to all measures of compensation, bonus refers only to bonus compensation, all LT comp
refers only to all long-term compensation, LT comp without options refers to only the long-term compenation which was not
delivered in options, and LT cash refers only to long-term compensation which is to be settled in cash. Values in
parenthesis are P-values for a two-tailed test that the coefficient estimate equals zero.
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LT comp
All All LT- without LT
comp Bonus comp options cash
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
One-year industry percentile return X 0.021634 -0.2346232 0.1319249 0.0480022 0.0298831
                             top 50% dummy 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Top 50% dummy 0.1725 0.1319 0.0991 0.1231 0.0698
0.3450 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Homogeneity percentile for firm 2-digit SIC code 0.4886747 0.1890845 0.3157174 0.3107283 0.1654244
                   F(M) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
One-year industry percentile return X -0.4514648 0.0430033 -0.4649531 -0.420471 -0.2577037
     homogeneity percentile X top 50% dummy 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Revenues (billions) -0.0001588 -0.0007007 0.0000675 0.0001693 0.000746
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Research and development as a percent 0.011479 0.0032436 0.0142637 0.0083879 0.0089523
                    of revenues 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Number of board meetings 0.0100495 -0.0018134 0.0122885 0.0106436 0.0036829
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Market / book value -0.031 0.0025 -0.0478 -0.0392 -0.0376
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Standard deviation -3.403928 -0.1655658 -3.884313 -3.613258 -2.883015
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Dividend yield 0.0128605 -0.004947 0.0179407 0.0200966 0.0161303
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Property & plant as a percentage of book value 0.0015937 0.0007808 0.0007155 0.0001136 0.0000603
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Sample Size 359 359 359 359 359
Model likelihood ratio  (p > chi-square) 0.0000 0.0621 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
       Respective Portion of Executive Compensation.
Table XI: Panel D:  (2 year percentile version) Probit Model with a Dummy Variable for the Top 50% 
respect to the independent variables
        of the Industry for the Likelihood of Pre-Committing to All Relative Performance in the
Partial derivatives of outcome probabilities with 
This table provides estimates of a probit model where the likelihood of formalizing a relative performance formula into a
portion(s) of the executive compensation package is calculated. In the analysis, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if a
firm committed to a relative performance mechanism and zero if no committment occurred. Data is gathered from firm
proxies covering the S&P Compustat defined 2000 (fiscal years ending between June 2000 and May 2001) fiscal year for
S&P 500 firms. Top 50% dummy is a dummy variable whose value is 1 if the firm's 1-year return ranked in the top 50% of
firms in its industry. Two- year industry percentile return is the percentile level return for a firm within all CRSP firms in the
same 2-digit SIC-code. Homogeneity percentile is the cumulative density function value of the firm's 2-digit SIC code where
the initial values are taken from Parrino (1997), P. 189. Revenues for the firm are denominated in billions of dollars.
Research & development as percentage of revenues is the total amount spent on research and development as a
percentage of the fiscal year revenues. Number of board meetings is the number of board meetings held by the board of
directors during the fiscal year. Market/book value is the ratio of the market value of all common stock outstanding to the
book value of the common stock. Standard deviation is the standard deviation of the returns on common stock, measured
monthly over the preceding 5-year period. Dividend yield is the dividend yield of the common stock taken from Compustat
at fiscal year end. Property & plant as a percentage of book value is the book value of property and plant as a percentage
of the book value of the firm. elative measures include any relative measures, accounting or market related where
compensation will depend upon a comparison to some external performance measure. All comp refers to all measures of
compensation, bonus refers only to bonus compensation, all LT comp refers only to all long-term compensation, LT comp
without options refers to only the long-term compenation which was not delivered in options, and LT cash refers only to long-
term compensation which is to be settled in cash. Values in parenthesis are P-values for a two-tailed test that the





Market value to book value 11,871 1.72 0.99
Revenues (millions) 11,922 3,302.75 818.36
Research and development as a percent
    of revenues 11,914 12.15% 0.00%
Property & plant as a percentage
    of book value 11,927 31.36% 25.45%
Monthly stock return standard deviation
    measured over the prior 60 months 9,704 10.61% 9.52%
Homogeneity percentile for firm 2-digit
   SIC code 11,933 44.51% 41.02%
Herfindahl percentile for firm 4-digit 3,898 50.12% 46.60%
   SIC code
Number of board meetings 11,422 7.24 7
Percentage who are board members* 10,649 98.92% N/A
*  Statistics represent data for CEOs.
Table XII:  General Summary Statistics Year 1993-2000 Sample Firms
This table reports summary statistics for the 1993-2000 sample of 11949 firm year
observations. Data is from the Standard and Poor's ExecuComp dataset and is composed of
the S&P500, S&P Midcap400, and S&P600 SmallCap firms. Homogeneity percentile is the
cumulative density function value of the firm's 2-digit SIC code where the initial values are
taken from Parrino (1997), P. 189. Industry percentile returns reflect a firm's percentile return






Dollar Homog- Research Common Property
returns to geneity and devel- stock and plant
Total Dollar industry percentile opment as Market  return Number plant as
direct returns index for firm CEO a percent to book standard Director of board a percent
compensation to firm 2-digit SIC 2-digit SIC dummy Revenue of revenue value deviation dummy meetings book value
Total direct compensation 1.0000
Dollar returns to firm 0.0972 1.0000
Dollar returns to industry index
    2-digit SIC code 0.0730 0.3862 1.0000
Homogeity percentile for firm 2-digit
    SIC code (0.0094) (0.0200) (0.0212) 1.0000
CEO dummy 0.1455 0.0014 (0.0003) 0.0063 1.0000
Revenue 0.1734 0.2562 0.1802 0.0141 0.0077 1.0000
Research and development as a percent 
   of revenues (0.0049) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0103) (0.0027) (0.0097) 1.0000
Market value to book value 0.0624 0.2254 0.0579 (0.1278) (0.0042) (0.0512) 0.0478 1.0000
Monthly stock return standard deviation
     measured over the prior 60 months 0.0158 (0.0450) (0.0392) (0.1971) (0.0016) (0.1670) 0.0523 0.2200 1.0000
Director dummy 0.1349 0.0032 0.0023 0.0110 0.5865 0.0181 (0.0084) (0.0080) (0.0168) 1.0000
Number of board meetings 0.0605 0.0226 0.0198 0.1062 (0.0054) 0.1246 (0.0195) (0.0539) (0.0281) (0.0476) 1.0000
Property and plant as percent 
   of book value (0.0768) (0.0367) (0.0167) 0.3366 0.0096 0.0185 (0.0136) (0.1320) (0.2565) (0.0060) 0.0395 1.0000
Bold values denotes significance at the 95% confidence level or better.
Table XIII: Correlation Table for Variables in the 1993-2000 Post-Performance Sample
This table reports the correlation coefficient between all variables utilized in the regression analysis for the 1993-2000 sample year firms. Data is from the Standard and Poor's ExecuComp
S&P500 dataset as well as from CRSP. Dollar returns to the firm are 1995-inflation adjusted dollar returns to total common shareholders. Dollar returns to the industry index are 1995-inflation
adjusted dollar returns invested in the index with an initial investment equal to that of the firm's total beginning common stock value. Homogeneity percentile is the cumulative density function
value of the firm's 2-digit SIC code where the initial values are taken from Parrino (1997), P. 189. Research & development as percent of revenues is the total amount spent on research and
development as a percentage of the fiscal year revenues. Number of board meetings is the number of board meetings held by the board of directors during the fiscal year. Market/book value is
the ratio of the market value of all common stock outstanding to the book value of the commons stock. Standard deviation is the standard deviation of the returns on common stock, measured
monthly over the preceding 5-year period. Director dummy is equal to one if an executive was a member of the company's board of directors. Number of board meetings is the number of board
meetings held by the board of directors during the fiscal year.    Property & plant as a percentage of book  value of the firm.  
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Panel A
1995 Year 25th 75th Standard
Mean Median percentile percentile Deviation
CEOs (N = 1552)
  Total compensation (TDC) 2257 1307 731 2520 3602
    Short-term compensation 1052 760 484 1206 1863
      Salary 528 467 330 656 293
      Bonus 492 252 67 550 1778
      Total current compensation (TCC) 1020 745 474 1169 1849
      Other annual 31 0 0 5 137
    Long-term compensation 1205 468 90 1203 2724
      Restricted stock grant 147 0 0 0 627
      Stock option grant 848 240 0 808 2439
      LT incentive plan payouts 117 0 0 0 506
      All other 92 17 5 65 351
    Long-term share of total 0.368 0.367 0.125 0.569 0.261
Non-CEOs (N = 9061)
  Total compensation (TDC) 908 529 310 987 1434
    Short-term compensation 434 323 211 514 428
      Salary 251 216 157 305 144
      Bonus 170 90 28 200 332
      Total current compensation (TCC) 421 316 207 500 411
      Other annual 13 0 0 0 78
    Long-term compensation 450 146 317 430 1170
      Restricted stock grant 57 0 0 0 285
      Stock option grant 298 75 0 260 966
      LT incentive plan payouts 43 0 0 0 233
      All other 43 8 2 23 342
    Long-term share of total 0.321 0.305 0.096 0.496 0.243
Table XIV A:  Summary Statistics for Executive Compensation Components
        For 1995
This table reports summary statistics for the 1995 sample year executive compensation
components, in 1995 dollars. All amounts data amounts are in thousands of dollars and are based
on data from the Standard and Poor's ExecuComp dataset. Short-term compensation consists of
Salary, Bonus and Other annual compensation. Total Current Compensation (TCC) consists of
Salary and Bonus. Long-term compensation consists of restricted stock grants, stock option
grants (valued using a Black-Scholes value), LT incentive plan payouts, and All other LT





2000 Year 25th 75th Standard
Mean Median percentile percentile Deviation
CEOs (N = 1414)
  Total compensation (TDC) 6363 2327 1079 5114 21856
    Short-term compensation 1352 862 529 1496 2579
      Salary 551 507 352 706 301
      Bonus 757 327 80 761 2494
      Total current compensation (TCC) 1308 838 525 1428 2560
      Other annual 44 0 0 7 263
    Long-term compensation 5012 1157 279 3556 19963
      Restricted stock grant 465 0 0 0 2787
      Stock option grant 4143 808 88 2677 19321
      LT incentive plan payouts 178 0 0 0 1033
      All other 225 21 4 76 1466
    Long-term share of total 0.518 0.558 0.307 0.762 0.297
Non-CEOs (N = 5971)
  Total compensation (TDC) 2347 912 470 1926 6086
    Short-term compensation 606 397 259 658 946
      Salary 290 246 185 353 165
      Bonus 300 132 44 288 867
      Total current compensation (TCC) 590 388 253 635 931
      Other annual 16 0 0 1 132
    Long-term compensation 1740 421 120 1251 5779
      Restricted stock grant 157 0 0 0 767
      Stock option grant 1421 283 55 949 5418
      LT incentive plan payouts 65 0 0 0 432
      All other 97 10 3 29 1067
    Long-term share of total 0.481 0.498 0.27 0.706 0.278
Table XIV B:  Summary Statistics for Executive Compensation Components
        For 2000
This table reports summary statistics for the 2000 sample year executive compensation
components, in 1995 dollars. All amounts data amounts are in thousands of dollars and are based
on data from the Standard and Poor's ExecuComp dataset. Short-term compensation consists of
Salary, Bonus and Other annual compensation. Total Current Compensation (TCC) consists of
Salary and Bonus. Long-term compensation consists of restricted stock grants, stock option
grants (valued using a Black-Scholes value), LT incentive plan payouts, and All other LT
compensation. Total compensation consists of short-term compensation plus long-term
compensation. 
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Total Changes in Total Changes in Total Changes in
direct total direct direct total direct direct total direct
comp comp comp comp comp comp
Dependent variable is total direct compensation (TDC1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept -519.506 -525.2921 -310.847 -358.228 -1262.74 -1341.373
(0.082) (.118) (.022) (.246) (.007) (.011)
Dollar returns to firm 0.060301 0.0805331 0.057432 0.08286 -0.23552 -0.309533
(0.049) (.102) (.089) (.037) (.286) (.206)
Dollar returns to industry index 2-digit SIC code 0.21905 0.2049995 0.016146 -0.00209 0.18274 0.2396166
(.032) (.080) (.664) (.947) (.268) (.191)
Herfindahl percentile for firm 4-digit SIC code: F(H) 331.3618 254.4366
(.166) (.345)
Dollar returns to firm X Herfindahl percentile 0.001498 0.0186936
(.978) (.816)
Dollar returns to industry index X Herfindahl percentile -0.39517 -0.4155952
(.017) (.056)
Homogeneity percentile for firm 2-digit SIC code: F(M) -409.977 -309.965 -414.801 -296.848 781.4804 627.826
(.107) (.323) (.079) (.329) (.003) (.029)
Dollar returns to firm X homogeneity percentile -0.13518 -0.1708829 -0.10401 -0.13923 0.448365 0.5873671
(.052) (.056) (.206) (.134) (.200) (.144)
Dollar returns to industry index X homogeneity percentil -0.02206 0.0502361 -0.03756 0.03815 -0.06495 -0.146962
(.878) (.706) (.809) (.777) (.808) (.629)
CEO indicator 1469.122 1667.75 1460.42 1665.57 1435.842 1539.787
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Revenue 64.93658 63.14842 68.43975 64.8627 132.329 133.3079
(.000) (.000) (.001) (.000) (.013) (.021)
Research and development as a percent of revenue -2.79488 -2.935139 -1.49429 -1.61707 -8.12103 -9.96231
(0.680) (.682) (.824) (.822) (.048) (.033)
Market/book value 365.8203 350.8581 353.7716 338.385 373.7057 409.8106
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.001) (.001)
Standard deviation -2908.45 -3998.232 -3045.64 -4056.2 2860.379 2672.582
(0.073) (0.044) (.07) (.042) (.097) (.146)
Director indicator 863.4124 677.3111 876.8386 686.194 1256.108 1124.849
(0.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Number of board meetings 116.0144 137.3957 112.7899 133.039 84.58242 84.63091
(0.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.029) (.08)
Property & plant as a percent of book value -10.2381 -9.889906 -10.9127 -10.5473 -17.4711 -15.74776
(0.004) (0.021) (.003) (.016) (.000) (.000)
Sample Size 18023 14268 18023 14268 23632 18824
Adjusted R2 0.223 0.0923 0.201 0.0842 0.0883 0.0732
Table XV:   OLS Regressions of Pay Sensitivity (Total Compensation) of All Proxy Named Executives
Non-manufacturing firmsManufacturing firms
1993-2000 total direct compensation (TDC1) data for all proxy named executives
Table estimates OLS regressions of the pay-performance sensitivity based on the ExecuComp and U.S. Census of Manufacturing
datasets. The dependent variable is total direct compensation (TDC1) and its changes where noted. Values in parenthesis are p-
values based on robust standard errors from relaxing the assumption of intra-firm independence. Variables are listed in the order that
they appear in the regression model. Dollar returns to the firm are 1995-inflation adjusted dollar returns to total common shareholders.
Dollar returns to the industry index are 1995-inflation adjusted dollar returns invested in the index with an initial investment equal to
that of the firm's total beginning common stock value. Herfindahl percentile is the cumulative density function value of the firm's 4-digit
SIC code that is taken from The Commerce Departments's Census of Manufacturers. Homogeneity percentile is the cumulative
density function value of the firm's 2-digit SIC code where the initial values are taken from Parrino (1997), P. 189. CEO indicator
equals 1 if the executive was the firm's CEO for the majority of the year and zero otherwise. Revenues for the firm are denominated in
billions of dollars. Research and development as percent of revenue is the total amount spent on research and development as a
percentage of the fiscal year revenue. Standard Deviation is the standard deviation of the firm's real returns over the prior 60-months.
Director Indicator equals 1 if the executive is a director of the firm and zero otherwise. No. of Board Meetings is the number of board
meetings held by the board of directors during the fiscal year. Property & Plant as a percent of Book Value is the book value of




Total Changes in Total Changes in Total Changes in
direct total direct direct total direct direct total direct
comp comp comp comp comp comp
Dependent variable is total cash compensation (TCC) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 409.961 435.851 436.5217 458.6843 337.938 170.2655
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (.226)
Dollar returns to firm 0.011705 0.0108765 0.015131 0.014058 -0.01184 -0.008258
(0.224) (.359) (.019) (.096) (.412) (.599)
Dollar returns to industry index 2-digit SIC code 0.022594 0.0194122 -0.00401 -0.00221 -0.01326 -0.023319
(.022) (.042) (.508) (.802) (.248) (.071)
Herfindahl percentile for firm 4-digit SIC code: F(H) 44.73617 38.0153
(.365) (.573)
Dollar returns to firm X Herfindahl percentile 0.00766 0.0071877
(.549) (.627)
Dollar returns to industry index X Herfindahl percentile -0.0537 -0.0438796
(.000) (.006)
Homogeneity percentile for firm 2-digit SIC code: F(M) -45.9005 -58.23247 -44.9591 -58.233 252.7316 450.5804
(.514) (.462) (.519) (.470) (0.000) (.022)
Dollar returns to firm X homogeneity percentile -0.02761 -0.0244843 -0.02466 -0.02217 0.052133 0.0420865
(.162) (.394) (.248) (.450) (.100) (.237)
Dollar returns to industry index X homogeneity percentile 0.024624 0.0185265 0.02043 0.014797 0.041967 0.0601277
(.360) (.660) (.496) (.721) (.122) (.074)
CEO indicator 511.5994 429.8962 510.3889 428.667 382.3851 169.8612
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.349)
Revenue 15.96491 15.28901 16.41894 15.75759 26.72557 29.46848
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.004) (.005)
Research and development as a percent of revenue -0.04039 -0.0660933 0.116854 0.071227 -0.84007 -0.589566
(0.954) (.940) (.872) (.937) (.147) (.296)
Market/book value 14.3324 19.3227 12.9222 18.0786 3.3951 17.2943
(.172) (.099) (.220) (.118) (.825) (.366)
Standard deviation -1842.71 -2256.187 -1853.89 -2267.35 -472.703 -494.123
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.071) (.173)
Director indicator 276.4412 280.0796 278.328 282.0009 356.3065 356.4514
(0.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Number of board meetings 15.61427 16.7176 15.2414 16.37304 4.290782 4.604106
(0.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.441) (.502)
Property & plant as a percent of book value -3.00489 -3.6863224 -3.07859 -3.74995 -6.01229 -6.50405
(.000) (.000) (.001) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Sample Size 20901 18292 20901 18292 26782 23354
Adjusted R2 0.4084 0.0677 0.397 0.0663 0.1537 0.0068
Table XVI:  OLS Regressions of Pay Sensitivity (Total Cash Compensation) of All Proxy Named Executives
Non-manufacturingManufacturing Firms 
1993-2000 total cash compensation (TCC) data for all proxy named executives
Table estimates OLS regressions of the pay-performance sensitivity based on the ExecuComp and U.S. Census of Manufacturing datasets. The
dependent variable is total cash compensation (TCC) and its changes where noted. Values in parenthesis are p-values based on robust
standard errors from relaxing the assumption of intra-firm independence. Dollar returns to the firm are 1995-inflation adjusted dollar returns to
total common shareholders. Dollar returns to the industry index are 1995-inflation adjusted dollar returns invested in the index with an initial
investment equal to that of the firm's total beginning common stock value. Herfindahl percentile is the cumulative density function value of the
firm's 4-digit SIC code that is taken from The Commerce Departments's Census of Manufacturers. Homogeneity percentile is the cumulative
density function value of the firm's 2-digit SIC code where the initial values are taken from Parrino (1997), P. 189. CEO indicator equals 1 if the
executive was the firm's CEO for the majority of the year and zero otherwise. Revenues for the firm are denominated in billions of dollars.
Research and development as percent of revenue is the total amount spent on research and development as a percentage of the fiscal year
revenue. StandardDeviation is the standard deviation of the firm's real returns over the prior 60-months. Director Indicator equals 1 if the
executive is a director of the firm and zero otherwise. No. of Board Meetings is the number of board meetings held by the board of directors
during the fiscal year. Property & Plant as a percent of Book Value is the book value of Property and Plant as a percentage of the book value of
the firm.  The coefficients for the year indicator variables are not shown.
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Total Changes in Total Changes in Total Changes in
direct total direct direct total direct direct total direct
comp comp comp comp comp comp
Dependent variable is total direct compensation (TDC1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept -447.553 -513.5177 -26.0112 -39.7172 -1113.45 -1195.717
(0.032) (0.034) (0.892) (0.846) (0.009) (0.014)
Dollar returns to firm -0.36469 -0.2800964 -0.28374 -0.1031 -0.62522 -0.761936
(0.002) (.048) (.006) (.517) (.025) (.025)
Dollar returns to firm X top 0.595824 0.5149133 0.550837 0.379238 0.777105 0.8844034
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.036) (0.025) (0.031)
Dollar returns to industry index 2-digit SIC code 0.141814 0.0869208 0.180632 0.083732 0.39364 0.4352533
(.045) (.269) (.005) (.084) (.048) (.045)
Dollar returns to industry index X top -0.34547 -0.2636125 -0.42396 -0.3096 -0.6366 -0.596155
(0.004) (0.077) (0.000) (0.026) (0.089) (0.130)
Homogeneity percentile for firm 2-digit SIC code: F(M) 380.2855 403.4602 -517.088 -384.314 886.3741 762.5542
(.101) (.156) (.011) (.224) (.007) (.044)
Homogeneity percentile  X top 496.4966 600.6317 415.9489 719.023 310.8169 299.697
(.010) (0.007) (0.004) (0.001) (0.113) (0.187)
Dollar returns to firm X homogeneity percentile 0.408638 0.2147895 0.405854 -0.00139 0.86908 1.101186
(.242) (.636) (.075) (.997) (.147) (.155)
Dollar returns to firm X homogeneity percentile X top -0.53844 -0.320306 -0.72451 -0.30159 -0.89446 -1.038321
(.131) (0.471) (.016) (.509) (.215) (.238)
Dollar returns to industry index X homogeneity percentile 0.171977 0.358277 -0.28189 0.010736 -0.34015 -0.383048
(.537) (.284) (.278) (.967) (.444) (.446)
Dollar returns to industry index X homogeneity percentile X top -0.14571 -0.4619046 0.61582 0.204971 0.487525 0.2789407
(.736) (.371) (.040) (.533) (.534) (.742)
CEO indicator 1499.427 1418.217 1555.859 1342.609 1445.344 1548.291
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Revenue 68.54576 68.98668 50.3818 52.94499 107.5479 106.4594
(.001) (.001) (.000) (.000) (.042) (.064)
Research and development as a percent of revenue -0.37046 -0.336396 -0.11366 -0.01515 -4.23783 -5.374187
(.013) (.021) (.128) (.884) (.149) (.103)
Market/book value 146.5198 177.5168 158.5341 208.3546 227.4764 241.4237
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.001) (.004) (.003)
Standard deviation 601.0428 -648.5185 -2611.28 -5435.28 2828.147 2659.521
(.497) (0.585) (.013) (.014) (.086) (.133)
Director indicator 1032.96 871.4606 821.176 575.8638 1257.993 1136.291
(0.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Number of board meetings 78.30634 80.98488 94.06649 102.8343 74.4526 76.54003
(0.000) (.003) (.000) (.000) (.038) (.093)
Property & plant as a percent of book value -17.2043 -14.8722 -10.605 -4.97058 -18.3854 -16.84461
(0.000) (0.000) (.001) (.243) (.000) (.000)
Sample Size 49018 38646 25386 19822 23632 18824
Adjusted R2 0.1067 0.0451 0.1234 0.0268 0.1061 0.0903
Table XVII:   OLS Regressions of Pay Sensitivity (Total Compensation) of All Proxy Named Executives
All firms Non-manufacturing firmsManufacturing firms
1993-2000 total direct compensation (TDC1) data for all proxy named executives
Table estimates OLS regressions of the pay-performance sensitivity based on the ExecuComp and U.S. Census of Manufacturing datasets. The
dependent variable is total rirect compensation (TDC1) and its changes where noted. Values in parenthesis are p-values based on robust standard
errors from relaxing the assumption of intra-firm independence. Dollar returns to the firm are 1995-inflation adjusted dollar returns to total common
shareholders. Dollar returns to the industry index are 1995-inflation adjusted dollar returns invested in the index with an initial investment equal to that
of the firm's total beginning common stock value. Top is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has performed in the top half of its industry in the
preceding year. Homogeneity percentile is the cumulative density function value of the firm's 2-digit SIC code where the initial values are taken from
Parrino (1997), P. 189. CEO indicator equals 1 if the executive was the firm's CEO for the majority of the year and zero otherwise. Revenues for the
firm are denominated in billions of dollars. Research and development as percent of revenue is the total amount spent on research and development
as a percentage of the fiscal year revenue. Standard Deviation is the standard deviation of the firm's real returns over the prior 60-months. Director
indicator equals 1 if the executive is a director of the firm and zero otherwise. Number of Board Meetings is the number of board meetings held by the
board of directors during the fiscal year. Property & plant as a percent of book value is the book value of property and plant as a percentage of the
book value of the firm. The coefficients for the year indicator variables are not shown.
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Total Changes in Total Changes in
direct total direct direct total direct
comp comp comp comp
Dependent variable is total direct compensation (TDC1) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept -505.7969 -529.6185 297.3887 204.4398
(0.536) (0.554) (0.014) (0.168)
Dollar returns to firm -0.747078 -0.249933 -0.2905742 -0.2881334
(0.019) (.562) (.004) (.002)
Dollar returns to firm X top 1.494455 1.002659 0.415576 0.3654208
(0.000) (0.040) (0.000) (0.000)
Dollar returns to industry index 2-digit SIC code 0.2970928 0.0737317 0.1045776 0.0823132
(.076) (.662) (.071) (.141)
Dollar returns to industry index X top -0.9749509 -0.7585883 -0.2053639 -0.0907158
(0.002) (0.021) (0.031) (0.363)
Homogeneity percentile for firm 2-digit SIC code: F(M) 1175.353 1451.119 143.0867 50.52352
(.028) (.042) (.433) (.818)
Homogeneity percentile  X top 635.0401 993.1925 492.1098 537.595
(.111) (0.032) (0.005) (0.008)
Dollar returns to firm X homogeneity percentile 1.448064 0.4484377 0.1491071 0.1532228
(.232) (0.754) (.507) (.497)
Dollar returns to firm X homogeneity percentile X top -2.223574 -1.242966 -0.1304361 0.0090225
(.108) (.437) (.605) (.972)
Dollar returns to industry index X homogeneity percentile 0.0430189 0.5700511 0.244991 0.3330439
(.953) (0.467) (.337) (.202)
Dollar returns to industry index X homogeneity percentile X top 0.6026113 0.0780626 -0.3429979 -0.6878887
(.466) (0.931) (.386) (.110)
Revenue 139.9572 131.3056 50.70852 49.23604
(.002) (.002) (.001) (.001)
Research and development as a percent of revenue -1.009977 -0.839313 -0.2726691 -0.2541473
(.021) (.036) (.011) (.023)
Market/book value 265.8587 368.7246 105.6227 116.6648
(.001) (.003) (.000) (.001)
Standard deviation 1307.494 -3863.14 191.2815 77.10191
(.591) (0.349) (.743) (.905)
Director indicator 740.5125 645.8824 517.2492 494.7311
(.233) (.355) (.000) (.000)
Number of board meetings 172.8842 171.5065 51.77554 50.41923
(.016) (.020) (.000) (.003)
Property & plant as a percent of book value -35.3471 -30.02487 -13.0598 -10.64867
(0.000) (0.000) (.000) (.000)
Sample Size 8696 8313 9320 8855
Adjusted R2 0.0972 0.035 0.2276 0.2114
Table XVIII:   OLS Regressions of Pay Sensitivity (Total Compensation) for CEOs and Average Non-CEOs per 
CEOs Average non-CEOs per year
1993-2000 Total direct compensation (TDC1) for all proxy executives
Table estimates OLS regressions of the pay-performance sensitivity based on the ExecuComp and U.S. Census of Manufacturing
datasets. The dependent variable is total direct compensation (TDC1) and its changes where noted. Values in parenthesis are p-
values based on robust standard errors from relaxing the assumption of intra-firm independence. Dollar returns to the firm are 1995-
inflation adjusted dollar returns to total common shareholders. Dollar returns to the industry index are 1995-inflation adjusted dollar
returns invested in the index with an initial investment equal to that of the firm's total beginning common stock value. Top is an
indicator variable equal to one if the firm has performed in the top half of its industry in the preceding year. Homogeneity percentile is
the cumulative density function value of the firm's 2-digit SIC code where the initial values are taken from Parrino (1997), P. 189.
CEO indicator equals 1 if the executive was the firm's CEO for the majority of the year and zero otherwise. Revenues for the firm are
denominated in billions of dollars. Research and development as percent of revenue is the total amount spent on research and
development as a percentage of the fiscal year sales. Standard deviation is the standard deviation of the firm's real returns over the
prior 60-months.  Director indicator equals 1 if the executive is a director of the firm and zero otherwise.  Number of board meetings is
the number of board meetings held by the board of directors during the fiscal year. Property & plant as a percent of book value is the
book value of property and plant as a percentage of the book value of the firm. The coefficients for the year indicator variables are not
shown.
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Total Changes in Total Changes in
direct total direct direct total direct
comp comp comp comp
Dependent variable is total direct compensation (TDC1) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept -17.3624 332.8921 -3846.238 -6603.176
(0.993) (0.881) (0.062) (0.085)
Dollar returns to firm 0.1144283 0.0531775 -0.2587139 -0.2900475
(0.052) (.438) (.000) (.000)
Dollar returns to firm X top -0.1422332 0.0897937 0.2333428 0.2873372
(0.640) (0.770) (0.009) (0.001)
Dollar returns to industry index 2-digit SIC code -0.3027818 -0.1383221 0.1348846 0.261214
(.008) (.298) (.480) (.085)
Dollar returns to industry index X top -0.5718404 -0.6729606 -0.0687229 -0.1958079
(.007) (0.003) (0.713) (0.203)
Homogeneity percentile for firm 2-digit SIC code: F(M) 4371.714 6130.738 510.6426 1132.787
(.115) (.053) (.762) (.545)
Homogeneity percentile  X top -2116.982 -3006.62 -951.6783 -2290.651
(.260) (0.157) (0.605) (0.303)
Dollar returns to firm X homogeneity percentile -0.0113812 0.2211944 0.3288718 0.4293859
(.931) (0.155) (.186) (.092)
Dollar returns to firm X homogeneity percentile X top -0.2052329 -0.5589396 -0.3078964 -0.4841007
(.652) (.222) (.369) (.216)
Dollar returns to industry index X homogeneity percentile 0.2957719 -0.1058404 -0.4377441 -0.6811044
(.537) (0.848) (.352) (.080)
Dollar returns to industry index X homogeneity percentile X top 0.7284829 0.9296521 0.0072868 0.1597481
(.216) (0.151) (.989) (.736)
CEO indicator 2482.511 2903.188 6027.123 6739.62
(.001) (.000) (.001) (.004)
Revenue 21.3752 35.77568 101.541 121.1015
(.107) (.033) (.015) (.012)
Research and development as a percent of revenue 54.46126 35.21137 -244.9416 -326.6912
(.211) (.437) (.081) (.063)
Market/book value 388.6185 512.4329 737.6162 592.9531
(.408) (.308) (.053) (.112)
Standard deviation 922.8812 -1120.8000 61420.16 68212.36
(.915) (0.276) (.023) (.037)
Director indicator 3177.539 2635.441 3599.928 1865.899
(.000) (.002) (.018) (.402)
Number of board meetings 101.478 102.1549 277.4961 158.9967
(.407) (.459) (.105) (.282)
Property & plant as a percent of book value -37.55421 -43.22525 -59.14326 -52.17253
(0.044) (0.038) (.004) (.036)
Sample Size 515 420 1323 1029
Adjusted R2 0.322 0.263 0.1804 0.1128
Table XIX:  OLS Regressions of Pay Sensitivity (Total Compensation) for 2001 Based on 2000 Commitment 
Industry RPE commitment firms No RPE commitment firms
2001 Total direct compensation (TDC1) data 
for all proxy named executives from the 2000 S&P 500 sample
Table estimates OLS regressions of the pay-performance sensitivity based on the 2000 pre-commitment dataset for the 2001
performance year. The dependent variable is total direct compensation (TDC1) and its changes where noted. Values in parenthesis
are p-values based on robust standard errors from relaxing the assumption of intra-firm independence. Dollar returns to the firm are
1995-inflation adjusted dollar returns to total common shareholders. Dollar returns to the industry index are 1995-inflation adjusted
dollar returns invested in the index with an initial investment equal to that of the firm's total beginning common stock value. Top is an
indicator variable equal to one if the firm has performed in the top half of its industry in the preceding year. Homogeneity percentile is
the cumulative density function value of the firm's 2-digit SIC code where the initial values are taken from Parrino (1997), P. 189.
CEO indicator equals 1 if the executive was the firm's CEO for the majority of the year and zero otherwise. Revenues for the firm are
denominated in billions of dollars. Research and development as percent of revenue is the total amount spent on research and
development as a percentage of the fiscal year sales. Standard deviation is the standard deviation of the firm's real returns over the
prior 60-months.  Director indicator equals 1 if the executive is a director of the firm and zero otherwise.  Number of board meetings is
the number of board meetings held by the board of directors during the fiscal year. Property & plant as a percent of book value is the


































Frequency 94 65 27 134













Frequency 23 40 5 53














Frequency 79 32 23 99

















Frequency 76 29 23 93
















Frequency 57 21 19 69
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If a compensatory option is written at-the-money or out-of-the-money with a 
fixed strike price and a fixed exercise date then the issuing firm may choose not to 
recognize an expense for that option.  Prior to the corporate governance and accounting 
crisis of late 2001, it was very uncommon to elect to expense compensatory options.  It is 
not this paper’s purpose to investigate the reasons for such an aversion to non-cash 
expenses so I assume the goal of reducing all income statement expenses an exogenous 
characteristic.  Indexed options do not fit the rule of having a fixed strike price so they 
must be expensed if that particular RPE compensation method is elected.  Consequently, 
indexed options have been a choice for a very small minority of firms.  If a firm wants to 
involve RPE into option payouts, the primary methods have been through vesting 
restrictions and/or the initial calculation of options granted.  The vesting restrictions will 
generally be performance accelerated where a predetermined vesting schedule is 
accelerated due to predetermined performance goal achievement.  When RPE is involved 
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in the initial option grant calculation, a target number of options to be granted is modified 
according to a predetermined RPE performance schedule based upon a prior historical 
period.  
Restricted Stock 
According to current accounting rules all grants of restricted stock are expensed.  
Therefore, incorporating an RPE modification into a grant calculation or vesting 
restriction will result in similar expenses compared to a restricted stock grant without 
such an RPE mechanism. 
Cash Based Compensation 
Cash based compensation will result in an expense.  From an income statement 
perspective, RPE based cash compensation contains no additional expense burden over 
non-RPE based cash compensation.  Cash based compensation does have the principal 
drawback that a significant cash payout can have a large impact on a firm’s cash flow and 
that payout is generally unknown at the time of grant.  Therefore, it is both cash and 
income statement expensive to deliver significant value (relative to the target 
compensation package) through cash compensation, and it is rare to see a plan 
constructed without a maximum payout limitation.  That limitation is not generally 
instituted in equity based plans.   
Vesting Provisions 
While vesting provisions do not materially increase or decrease the initial grant 
amounts, they do affect the amount of unvested value that an executive has in control.  
Consequently, for retention purposes, an accelerated vesting event is usually followed by 
additional grants in order to maintain a material amount of unvested value for an 
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executive.  This suggests that higher grant amounts in current periods may be the partial 
result of achieving prior period goals. 
Target Level of Compensation 
 
Compensation convention incorporates a target level of compensation for an 
executive with a given span of responsibility within a given industry.  Competitive 
compensation levels are generally well known within an industry as well as outside of an 
industry. 11  This introduces the possibility of a voluntary departure due to low expected 
compensation levels.  Target compensation is usually composed of cash compensation, 
restricted stock that is easy to value, and options that are by convention denominated in 
Black-Scholes value.  Compensation convention treats dollar values of cash and restricted 
stock compensation on equal footing with Black-Scholes option compensation dollars.  
As such, it is generally inexpensive to the income statement to improve an executive’s 
compensation package through an option grant.  This helps to explain the large portion of 
compensation value awarded through options. 
  
                                                 
11 Target levels of compensation are known either through survey information or through outside recruiters 
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